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THE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE

FOR THE GERMAN AIR FORCE HIGH COMMAND

Karlsruhe Study

by

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- 2 -

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Introduction: Purpose and Objective of Collecting Intelligence</u>	5
<u>Chapter One</u>	
I. <u>The Organization of Intelligence Collection and Evaluation</u>	9
a. <u>The Collecting Agencies (Mission, Organization, and Operations)</u>	9
1. <u>OKW, Amt Abwehr/zu-land</u> (Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command)	9
2. Radio Intercept Service	16
3. Air Force Attaches	25
4. The Press Group of the Reich Air Ministry	32
5. Strategic Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command (Rowehl)	34
b. <u>The Evaluating and Interpreting Agencies</u>	
1. Reich Luftwaffe Ministry, Foreign Affairs Branch -- Target Dossiers	38
2. The 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff	49
3. The 8th (Military Science) Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff	51
4. The Intelligence Officers at Higher Field Headquarters	52
II. <u>The Procurement of Intelligence at the Outbreak of War</u>	
a. <u>Volume of Available Intelligence -- General Status</u>	52
b. <u>The Most Important Adjacent Countries</u>	56
1. Czechoslovakia (Prior to Occupation)	57

- 3 -

	<u>Page</u>
2. Poland	58
3. France	59
4. Great Britain	60
 <u>Chapter Two -- Wartime Intelligence Activities</u>	
<u>I. Changes in the Intelligence Mission and Organization</u>	
a. <u>Changes in the Collecting Agencies</u>	66
1. Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command	66
2. The Intelligence Officers of the Higher Headquarters	74
3. Captured Enemy Material Staff at the Luftwaffe Technical Office	86
4. The Interrogation Camp at Oberursel	87
5. Cooperation with Allied and Friendly Intelligence Services	92
 <u>II. Changes in the Evaluation Organization at the Luftwaffe High Command</u>	
a. <u>The Intelligence Division (3. Abteilung) of the Luftwaffe General Staff</u>	99
b. <u>Professor Steinmann's Agency</u>	104
 <u>Chapter Three -- Analysis of the Wartime Intelligence Collection Effort</u>	
<u>I. The German Intelligence Operations in Western Europe (Sep 39 - May 40)</u>	
	107

- 4 -

	<u>Page</u>
II. The Norwegian Campaign	113
III. The French Campaign	116
IV. The Battle of Britain	120
V. The Campaign in the Balkans	132
VI. The Russian Campaign	137
VII. The Military Operations in the Mediterranean	154
VIII. United States of America	180
IX. The Cross Channel Invasion in 1944	201
<u>Chapter Four -- Lessons and Conclusions</u>	210

- 5 -

Introduction

The Luftwaffe High Command collected information for the purpose of assembling data for air warfare. In so doing, every effort was made to obtain a complete picture of the military capabilities and industrial potential of all countries with whom conflict was within the realm of possibilities. In this manner, the most vulnerable attack objectives could be identified for the German air operations command.

The intelligence process is defined in a study of the 8th (Military Science) Luftwaffe General Staff Division, dated 20 April 1944, as follows: ¹

"One can defeat the enemy only if one knows him. The military commanders must therefore be ~~able to be~~ fully aware of all happenings and circumstances pertaining to ~~enemies~~ ^{their} own combat zone. They must make every effort to uncover the weaknesses, strength factors, and plans of the enemy by anticipating developments ~~from~~ ⁱⁿ the enemy situation that is in constant flux."

"Obtaining intelligence information and evaluating the enemy are therefore important prerequisites for the successful conduct of warfare."

"Luftwaffe intelligence activities extend from the outset over all areas in which the three services conduct operations. The Air Force intelligence covers vast areas

¹
Karlsruhe Collection.

- 6 -

whose width and depth transcend far beyond the boundaries assigned to Army and Navy headquarters employed in the same territory."

" Air intelligence must above all provide the data for combatting the enemy air force and for launching air attacks against the enemy resources in order to destroy them."

"The entire intelligence apparatus subordinates itself to this guide line, and all means serve this end. ~~IX~~ For this purpose,

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~one must take into account that, because of the rapidly shifting situations in air warfare, the enemy situation is subject to constant changes. Quick action is therefore mandatory, if one still wants to score successes."

"In the case of the Air Force, the principle applies particularly that the intelligence process serves its purpose only, if it makes use of every possible source of information and if the intelligence is properly distributed and arrives in time at the point where it can be used for operational planning and can be converted into effective military action."

The recently formed General Staff of the Luftwaffe realized from the outset that the air force would have a decisive effect on the enemy capabilities only if all information for strategic air warfare of this type were

- 7 -

already known in peacetime. On the basis of past experience, it was impossible to obtain such data in wartime; they could only be supplemented.

In the German directive on air warfare, entitled Luftkriegsführung, Air

Force Directive No.

~~Division~~ 16, reprint of March 1940, ~~XX~~ Par 79 - 101 (~~XX~~ Par 2 80) this is stated

as follows:

"Wartime reconnaissance is based on peacetime intelligence."

"The information obtained in peacetime is generally decisive for the initial employment of the air force."

"In the further course of operations it often saves new reconnaissance flights that waste time, necessitating only a supplementation or re-evaluation of available intelligence."

"Peacetime intelligence activities produce the basic information that cannot be obtained during hostilities or only at great difficulties."

Par. 144 of the above directive contains the following statements:

"The battle for ~~XXX~~ resources and for ~~XXX~~ logistical support is essentially a struggle involving fixed installations. Most of these exist already in peacetime and are immobile. The expansion of existing installations and the creation of new facilities confronts the wartime air reconnaissance with important problems. However, the battle for resources is initially conducted primarily on the basis of information obtained in peacetime ..."

2

Karlsruhe Collection.

- 8 -

If there was therefore a need for preparing exact data for offensive strategic air operations already in peacetime, the same would be true of defensive missions. An effective defense against enemy penetrations into one's own zone of interior could be conducted successfully, only if the strength and performance of potential adversaries were exactly known ~~XXXXX~~ before the outbreak of hostilities and if the Air Force High Command had a more or less correct idea of the productive capacity of the same opponents.

The German Armed Forces and Luftwaffe High Commands were fully aware of the significance of these problems. The studies and directives quoted in this study show that they knew the theory; it was their tragedy, however, that the political leadership did not draw the practical conclusions that were essential.

- 9 -

Chapter OneI. The Organization of Intelligence Collection and Evaluation

The Luftwaffe intelligence collection functions were not unified. The collecting agencies were usually not the same as those responsible for evaluation. In peacetime the information collecting functions were primarily assigned to the ~~Foreign Branch~~, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command (~~Amt OKW/Abwehr/Ausland~~). The German Air Force High Command addressed its requirements to this agency. Quite apart from this intelligence agency, the Luftwaffe had its own organizations which will be analyzed in the following pages.

In wartime, the emphasis in the collection of information shifted to the organic Luftwaffe agencies since wartime espionage obviously operates under more difficult circumstances.

The following sections will describe the collecting agencies in detail.

a. The Collecting Agencies (Mission, Organization, and Operations)

1. OKW, Amt Abwehr/Ausland (~~Foreign Branch~~, Counterintelligence Office,
Armed Forces High Command)

The most important peacetime collecting agency was the ~~Foreign Branch~~,
Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command.

The mission of this agency was to collect intelligence abroad, to prepare sabotage operations for the event of hostilities, and

³
For the organizational structure of this agency, see Appendix I.

- 10 -

to conduct counterintelligence operations.

The following quotation fully describes the mission, organization,
⁴
 and development of this agency:

"In 1934 Canaris, then a captain in the German Navy, was appointed commander of the Swinemuende Fortress with every indication that he was headed for peaceful military retirement. At that time, however, the chief of the then small Counterintelligence Branch in the Reich War Ministry, Captain C. Patzig (Navy) suggested unexpectedly that Canaris be made his successor. Raeder (Tr: Chief of the German Navy) approved this choice, and Canaris started his career as chief of the German counterintelligence service on 1 January 1935."

"The modest German counterintelligence service rapidly grew out of all proportions. Since Hitler had taken over, all financial limitations had disappeared. Hitler considered the counterintelligence service as an important instrument of power. And since he had a personal liking for Canaris, the latter was able to draw ^{on} unlimited funds."

"After Blomberg's departure, the Reich War Ministry was dissolved in 1938 and the Armed Forces High Command was organized under Keitel's command. Canaris and his counterintelligence agency operated directly ^{then} under Keitel and ^AHitler in person, being responsible to nobody else. As senior office chief in the Armed Forces High Command, Canaris was Keitel's deputy. This was a considerable concentration of power in the hands of one single man who furthermore had more access to information than anyone excepting very few. Canaris collected everything worth

⁴ Karl Bartz, Die Tragödie der deutschen Abwehr (The Tragedy of German Counterintelligence), Pilgrim Verlag, Zuerich 1955, pp 13-18.

- 11 -

knowing, being curious by nature; as a result, few things escaped his attention."

In ~~XXXXXX~~ 1938 the Counterintelligence Branch was redesignated Foreign Counterintelligence Group. Later, in 1939, the extensive organization was ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ redesignated Foreign Counterintelligence Office. The gigantic agency along the Tirpitz Bank (Tr: Of the Spree River in Berlin) absorbed one private building after another."

"In 1938 the Counterintelligence Group was composed of five major branches that remained in existence until the agency was abolished. These were:

Branch I, an important activity, first directed by Colonel Piepenbrock and later by Colonel Hansen. This branch was the real center of foreign counter-intelligence, consisting of overt and covert collection of information. The

branch was subdivided into such sections as IA - Heer (Intelligence ^{Section} Army), IL - Luft (Intelligence ^{Section} Air), IM (Intelligence ^{Section} Navy), IT - Technik (Technical Intelligence), IWI - Wirtschaft (Economics Intelligence), IG - Geheimwesen ^{Section}

(Secret Intelligence ~~XXXXXXXX~~ obtained through photo and press analysis, detection of secret inks, etc.), and IJ - Funk (Radio Intercept ^{Section})."

"Branch I collected information which was passed on for evaluation -- often however with a preliminary interpretation -- to the appropriate general staff divisions of the service concerned, be it Army, Navy or Air Force. The Armed Forces Operations Staff ~~XXXXXXXX~~ under the direction of Generaloberst (General) Jodl also received intelligence through Branch III or the Foreign Branch."

"Branch II was the central agency for sabotage activities. It was

- 12 -

responsible for training representatives of dissatisfied minorities and also Germans abroad for future sabotage missions. The tasks of the agents working for this branch were difficult and very dangerous. They carried out acts of sabotage in enemy countries, destroyed ships, aircraft, manufacturing plants, bridges, etc."

"This branch was also responsible for insurrections and minority control in enemy countries. Part of it was the subsequently organized Brandenburg Division. It was activated in 1939 under the cover designation of Construction Training Company Brandenburg. It soon achieved regimental strength, and by 1942 it was redesignated as a division."

"At the beginning of 1940 one battalion each of this force was stationed at Brandenburg, in the vicinity of Vienna, and at Dueren in the Rhine Province. The personnel were mainly composed of ethnic Germans or of ~~KOMMUNISTEN~~ aliens speaking a foreign language, most of whom were convinced National Socialists. Their mission was to parachute into a designated area, dressed in the uniform of the respective country, and to create confusion by carrying out acts of sabotage, such as demolitions. They were the forerunners of the British and American commando raiders."

"Chief of Branch II and its operational forces was Major Grosscourth until 1939, Colonel Lahousen until 1943, and Colonel von Freytag-Loringhoven after the summer of 1943."

"Branch III was responsible for counterespionage. It was subdivided into III H (Army Section of Branch III),

- 13 -

III I (Air Force Section of Branch III), III M -(Navy Section of Branch III), and III W (Economics Section of Branch III). In addition, there was a subsection whose integration into Branch III is supposed to have been an organizational mistake. This subsection III F, whose chief was Captain Protze (Navy), was responsible for sending agents abroad, where they were to attempt to infiltrate enemy counterintelligence agencies."

"The counterintelligence personnel collaborated closely with the Reich Security Office (Tr: Nazi Party agency of the SS), for the police, not the counterintelligence agencies, were the law enforcing organs in cases of punishable offenses."

"The German Armed Forces had never been granted jurisdiction over all means of preventing acts of sabotage and espionage against the military forces of the Reich. An agreement with the Prussian Ministers of War and of the Interior, dated 1869, stipulated that the police ^{were} ~~was~~ responsible for combatting enemy espionage. The secret police based its jurisdictional claim on this agreement, and the counterintelligence agencies acquiesced since many Reserve officers on active counterintelligence duty, who had returned to the service after many years of civilian life, were able to adjust because of their practical experience in the secret police service. Covert intelligence, however, was and remained a counterintelligence function."

"The Foreign Branch, which was later elevated to group level, was the central agency to which the

- 14 -

German military attaches assigned to foreign countries reported. There, all reports and information originating from these military diplomats were collected; valuable information was transmitted to the Armed Forces High Command (Keitel), the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Jodl), and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This branch was under the direction of Rear Admiral Buerkner who was Canaris' deputy."

"The Central Branch (Abteilung Z -- Zentralabteilung) was originally responsible for administrative matters exclusively. Because of its chief's aggressiveness, however, this branch developed into the most important agency of the counterintelligence office. This chief, Colonel -- later General -- Oster, was the cause of the eventual downfall of military counterintelligence."

"Before Oster became chief of the Central Branch, he had been in charge of the ~~XXXXXX~~ section or desk responsible for counterintelligence activities in government agencies, which was part of Branch IIIc. In this capacity he had made many personal contacts with chiefs of government agencies."

"Created as a central administrative agency, the Central Branch was at first responsible for administering the tremendous counterintelligence organization. Under its jurisdiction operated the comptroller, the agents' card index files, the legal section, and the passport agency. But Oster enlarged his sphere of influence. He maintained contacts with the National Socialist Party via Count Helldorf and to the Reich Security Office via the chief of the criminal division, Nebe, who was in charge of Office V (amt V -- Reichskriminalpolizei) -- the Reich Criminal Police."

- 15 -

"Oster became the sole point of contact with civilian agencies. All data were incoming reports and information, ~~was~~ ^{were} channeled through his branch, passed through his message center, and then dispatched to the various other branches. We shall later see the significance of this procedure."

"This agency employing some 400 officers and ten thousands of agents was presided over by Admiral Canaris."

The above explanations pertaining to the mission and organization of the central ~~organization~~ ^{agency} responsible for collecting intelligence must be amplified by the statement that the intelligence service was organized in a decentralized manner from the outset. Counterintelligence ^{field} agencies were established at the 7 -- later 12 -- military district headquarters and naval station headquarters; after the reorganization of the Armed Forces, these agencies were assigned to the corps headquarters.

The mission of the various counterintelligence ^{field} agencies depended on their geographical ~~location~~ location and the capability derived therefrom. Thus, for instance, Koenigsberg and Breslau served primarily as outposts toward the East; Kassel, Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, and Muenster toward the West; Hamburg was the center for France and overseas areas, including Great Britain after about 1938; Munich and Vienna served for the Balkans; Nuremberg and Dresden for Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The counterintelligence field agencies were organized on the same principle as the central office

- 16 -

in Berlin. During the war special field agencies were added to collect information from prisoners of war and to carry out counterespionage activities in the prisoner of war enclosures.

The Luftwaffe headquarters and staffs had no intelligence collecting agencies of their own. As mobile and extremely flexible wartime command agencies, they were not suited for assuming rigid assignments of this type. On the other hand, each senior headquarters of the Luftwaffe had one counter-intelligence officer in the intelligence branch or section who was responsible for handling borderline cases and maintaining contact with the intelligence collecting agencies at the corps (military district) level.

The operating procedures of the German intelligence collecting agencies and the central organization -- ~~Foreign Branch~~ Counterintelligence Office, ^{were} Armed Forces High Command -- ~~was~~ no different from those used by the espionage and intelligence services of other major powers. It is therefore unnecessary to go into details within the framework of this study.

2. Radio Intercept Service

One of the most important sources of information on the military organization and strength of adjacent and -- in wartime -- enemy nations was the radio intercept service. Both the Army and Navy had their own radio intercept services, which obtained information for their own top-level command staffs as well as for the Luftwaffe High Command and which rendered outstanding services in peace and war. The information produced by

- 17 -

these intercept services was transmitted from the central agency directly to the Air Force High Command and from the field agencies to interested field headquarters of the Luftwaffe and thus also through channels to the Air Force High Command.

The cooperation with the Navy's intercept services was particularly good. This was of great advantage during joint operations, such as the breakout of the German Navy across the Channel and the German attacks on Allied convoys in the Arctic.

The Luftwaffe intercept service performed as well as its counterpart organizations of the other two services. It could have been an extremely valuable source for obtaining or supplementing elements of information, if the evaluation had been properly organized. But this was never the case, neither before nor during the war.

The radio intercept service -- much like the rest of the Luftwaffe intelligence service -- was almost a private sphere of General Martini, the Luftwaffe Forces Inspector. The radio intelligence service had been organized by Martini primarily according to signal communications principles. The chief of the signal communications system had a Luftwaffe cryptographic agency which acted as central clearing point for assigning missions, evaluation, and deciphering operations. The results of the work done by the field agencies were collected at this center, where they were deciphered and evaluated, if necessary. The center had no receiver or direction-finding

- 18 -

equipment at its disposal.

The field agencies responsible for radio intercept service proper were
⁵
 the following:

North-Western Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Second Air Force at

Telgte near Muenster in Westphalia with

Field Station W 12 at Telgte and

Field Station W 22 at Husum-Milstedt in Schleswig

Holstein.

These stations covered Great-Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Scandinavia.

South-Western Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Third Air Force at

Oberhaching-Deisenhofen near Munich in Bavaria with

Field Station W 13 at Oberhaching,

" " W 23 at Baden-Baden, and

" " W 33 at Mainz-Ginsheim.

These stations covered France and its North African

colonies, the Iberian Peninsula, and Italy.

⁵

Extracted from a study by Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Gottschling.

(Karlsruhe Collection).

- 19 -

South-Eastern Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Fourth Air Force at

Vienna with

Field Station W 14 at Hirschstetten and a

Special Field Station at Budapest-Matyasfoeld.

These stations covered the Balkans, Turkey, and were

given special missions concerning Russia and Poland.

Eastern Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of First Air Force at

Pulsnitz in Saxony with

Field Station W 11 at Breslau (at the beginning of the war,

this station was attached to Station W-4 and redesignated W 24),

Field Station 21 at Deutsch-Krone in Pommerania, and

Field Station 16 (at the beginning of the war, this station was redesignated W 11) at Kobbelbude near Koenigsberg.

On principle, this organization of the radio intercept service appeared to the onlooker as a very effective and proper solution permitting coverage of Europe and adjacent areas. The stations and field stations had the best available technical equipment and elite personnel. However, the deficiencies of the Luftwaffe intercept service were not based on faulty organization or equipment, they were solely caused by the type of missions the service was given and by the local and central evaluation of the information produced by the Chief of the Signal Communications System.

- 20 -

The radio monitoring stations received their missions from the Chief of the Signal Communications System and had to report to him the results of their intercept activities. His Luftwaffe cryptographic agency transmitted the radio intercept information to the general staff division responsible for intelligence in the Air Force High Command -- the 5th Division -- which in turn disseminated this information to the intelligence officers of major field headquarters for whom it was really destined.

It is obvious that this type of organization was faulty insofar as the assignment of missions and the evaluation of information were concerned. The radio intercept service could only supplement or confirm the other sources of information; for this reason, the assignment of missions and the direct evaluation of results should have been the responsibility of the agency in charge of interpreting the over-all intelligence situation. This was not the Chief of the Signal Communications System, but the 5th Division of the Air Force General Staff. The assignment of missions should not have been ~~formulated~~ formulated as requirements; instead, detailed orders should have been issued to the field agencies, and the evaluation should have been carried out in close collaboration with the other branches and sections of the intelligence division. This was the only possible means of producing quick results in evaluating information from radio intercepts.

Furthermore, in order to immediately translate important messages into military operations it would have been necessary to establish close operational contacts between the field agencies and the intelligence officers of the air forces and perhaps also of the air corps. The channels of message transmission

- 21 -

would thus have been doubled or trebled, but without causing any delay. On the contrary, the radio intercept service would have fully accomplished its purpose since the reports would have ~~XXXX~~ resulted in immediate military action. Reports referring to enemy units that were taking off or were in the air, for instance, were without value to field headquarters, if they were made available on the next day or even later because of unnecessary detours.

This author remembers that it was not until 1940, when he was appointed chief of staff of an air force headquarters, that he first heard of radio intercept activities. At that time, a book was submitted to him, giving detailed reports on the activities of the radio intercept service during the preceding months. This book had been published by the Chief of Signal Communications; it gave factual data on the radio traffic that had been intercepted, but most of the information was outdated. ~~It~~ The book also gave an estimate of the situation which naturally was incomplete and partly wrong because of the fact that it was entirely based on radio intercepts that had not been coordinated with information from all other intelligence sources.

Such a situation was untenable, at least for command staffs in the field. During the war it was not changed by any fundamental organizational modifications or by a switch in the chain of command; instead, whatever changes there were, these were made practically in every theater as the result of the personal initiative of senior field commanders

- 22 -

and lower echelon commanders of radio intercept units.

The isolation and secrecy of the radio intercept service were so accentuated at the beginning of the war that even senior commanders did not have access to field stations operating in the area under their jurisdiction. The author remembers that in 1941, when he was chief of staff of an air force headquarters, he was to be denied entry to a field station when he intended to take personal interest in the operations of the radio intercept service. General Martini had interdicted access to everybody. This interdiction was subsequently lifted to such an extent that a certain number of ^{selected} personnel were permitted to visit radio monitoring field stations and to establish official contact with the officers in charge of these stations. ^{In} ~~XX~~ other theaters this had been authorized previously upon request of senior field commanders. But there were no clear-cut channels of communication nor were any such channels established during the course of the war. On the other hand, cooperation in the field worked in a relatively satisfactory manner even without official regulations so that the radio intercept reports were transmitted to field headquarters also directly during the later course of the war. This transmission of reports took place either by telephone or by teletype communication.

The Fifth Air Force went farther in making use of the radio intercept service, carrying out the following interesting experiment. After having observed that reconnaissance and operational missions against Scapa Flow and

- 23 -

northern Scotland were no longer feasible because of the tight fighter screen controlled that was ~~xxxxxxx~~ by radar and radio, a monitor was added to the crews of aircraft flying missions in that area after spring 1942. The monitors selected spoke perfect English and were able to monitor the ground-air traffic originating from Scotch airfields. In this manner the Germans succeeded in changing the route of approaching aircraft or turning in a different direction so that the British fighters could not intercept the German attackers.

In 1942 a secondary radio intercept field station was established in northern Norway to monitor the radio traffic of commercial vessels forming convoys and of the naval ships protecting these vessels. This field station was equipped to intercept also the radio traffic of Russian armed forces, above all air force units. Whereas the results of monitoring Russian traffic were good because the Soviet personnel often sent plain text messages, the operations geared toward intercepting naval radio traffic in the North Sea were unsatisfactory. In summer 1942 occurred a mishap that led to the commitment of sizeable German forces. The radio intercept station reported the presence of a strong British naval unit in the immediate vicinity of the northern Norwegian coast. Upon query the station confirmed its report, indicating that the sound volume of the radio traffic gave every assurance of the presence of strong enemy naval forces in the immediate proximity of the coast. The Luftwaffe thereupon committed reconnaissance and combat aircraft, which however were unable to find

- 24 -

any indications of the presence of hostile forces. A number of sorties were flown by these aircraft so that the radio intercept report tied down considerable forces. No enemy forces were located along the entire extensive area of the northern Arctic Ocean. The Luftwaffe High Command thereupon ordered an inquiry as a result of which it was established that the radio traffic that had been intercepted originated from a British naval unit operating in the Mediterranean. The identical traffic had been intercepted by the monitoring services located in Italy.

As concluding statement regarding the radio intercept service one might quote the former chief of the 8th Division (Military Science) of the Luft-
6
waffe General Staff:

"The radio intercept service was controlled by the Chief of the Signal Communications System who used it according to the technical principles of the signal communications system. This type of employment limited the effectiveness of the radio intercept service so that the intelligence value of this service was restricted. The intelligence agencies were authorized to set up requirements, but they had no operational control. . On the other hand, the radio intercept service (radio monitoring service) attempted to produce and interpret intelligence, which obviously was inconclusive since it omitted other factors that were outside the sphere of the radio intercept service. Radio intercept reports might have

6

Extracted from a study written after the war on the Von Rohden project.
(Karlsruhe Collection).

- 25 -

played an important role in the intelligence activities, for the methodology and facilities had been sufficiently refined for that purpose. That the organizational structure was not adjusted, is typical for the shortsightedness of the German military leadership and its ignorance of the significance of intelligence in the conduct of military operations."

3. Air Force Attaches

The primary mission of air force attaches was to observe the air force, civil aviation, and aircraft industry of the host country and to give current reports. Up to 1938 they received their instructions from the Secretary of Aviation via the Attache Group of the Reich Air ~~Force~~ Ministry, and as of 1 February 1939 from the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff to whom the Attache Group was subordinated at that time.

The air force attaches could have and should have been an important source of intelligence information since they were experts who were capable of obtaining an immediate impression of conditions in their respective countries. Moreover, they could have been used for checking intelligence information obtained from other sources and for verifying its accuracy.

But since neither the various chiefs of staff nor the ^{incumbent} chiefs of the ^Aattache groups considered these spheres of activity as particularly important, the air force attaches did not produce as much intelligence as would have been possible, neither in peacetime nor during the war, when they were anyhow confined to allied or neutral countries

- 26 -

exclusively. The entire organization was not yet properly adjusted, the top-level command was not sufficiently interested, and the personnel were not of such a caliber that this lack of interest could have been compensated for by outstanding performances.

The former chief of the 8th Division (Military Science) of the Luftwaffe General Staff writes on this subject as follows:

7
"The air force attaches serving with German diplomatic missions abroad produced good results for some time. According to Goering's decision, the attaches were not officers with the best military qualifications, as they should have been. In February 1939 the "Attache Group" was shifted to the control of the 5th Division. At that time its chief was Major Von Cramon. He considered that his most important task was to represent the Luftwaffe by social contacts with foreign attaches, much less to obtain intelligence information. Lack of time prevented direct contact between intelligence and attache personnel before the outbreak of war."

It is obvious that those responsible for these deficiencies were the respective Luftwaffe Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the 5th Division. They should have intervened, if they had been interested sufficiently in the attache service. According to the tables of organization for general staff officers, the attache positions should have been filled by general

7

Extracted from a study written after the war on the Von Rohden project. (Karlsruhe Collection).

- 27 -

staff officers in order that officers be assigned to such positions who were properly equipped to take care of their mission with the greatest of ease. In this manner, the attaches were subordinate to the chief of staff in their capacity of general staff officers, even though the attache group was not subordinate to him until 1939. However, the shortage of general staff officers -- particularly older ones who were suitable for assignment to attache positions -- made it necessary to assign other old officers who often lacked the qualifications and ability to judge that were so essential. This happened mostly in cases when Goering or Milch instructed the Personnel Office to appoint one of their favorites or friends to such a desirable position.⁸

The means available to air force attaches to collect intelligence information were as follows:

To obtain information from the political and above all the military leaders of the host country;

To request information from these persons or the agencies they headed;

To make observations during inspections of troops and by participating in maneuvers;

To study the press and military literature published in the host country;

To gather impression during personal contacts with officers and other

8

For assignments to Luftwaffe attache positions, see Appendix II of the yearbook of the German Air Force, 1939, pp. 124 - 6.

- 28 -

representatives; and

To exchange intelligence with the attaches of other countries.

In their instructions the German military attaches were forbidden to use agents and to carry out espionage in person. Moreover, they had no funds for such a purpose.

It is obvious that the attaches' means of obtaining intelligence were relatively closely limited, especially if the host country refused to cooperate for political reasons. In many instances, they had to resign themselves to producing general situation reports.

For this reason, the attache reports varied greatly. Each service attache reported on his sphere of interest, the Army attache on Army matters, the naval attache on ^{the} Navy, and the Air Force attache on the Air Force of the host country. Because of the shortage of suitable personnel, the functions of two and sometimes of all three services were accomplished by one person in certain countries (See, Appendix II). For the same reasons, one attache occasionally took care of several countries. In important countries or nations that were of military-political significance, the attaches were assigned assistants -- the Luftwaffe attache usually had an assistant who was a technician.

Before dispatching their reports, the attaches of the various services submitted them to the chief of the diplomatic mission who had to certify the accuracy of the information or indicate his dissent in political matters, if such was the

- 29 -

case.

The reports were transmitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also received a copy of all written material having political implications, to the attache groups of the three services and to the Foreign Branch, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command. These agencies were responsible for transmitting the reports to interested personnel, above all those engaged in intelligence activities.

Despite the many personnel and organizational deficiencies, the reports of the service ^{attaches} were generally factual. But they often failed to impress the military and political leaders of the Reich and occasionally even appeared unbelievable because too many agencies were engaged in collecting intelligence independently from one another. Particularly harmful in this connection was the so-called ~~Auflandorganisation~~ (Foreign Organization) which was first under Ribbentrop's jurisdiction and then under Bohle. A ^{former} Luftwaffe intelligence officer writes on this subject as follows:

"An evil cancerous growth was the part Ribbentrop's and Bohle's Foreign Organization took upon itself in obtaining intelligence. Reports from their agents, who were ^{it} dilettants lacking completely in know-how and experience, reached civilian governmental agencies -- for instance from Turkey. These agencies used the information for their purposes and mainly for political ends, creating unrest and leading of necessity to

9

Extracted from a study by Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Morell. (Karlsruhe Collection).

- 30 -

wrong political decisions."

How far the political leadership went in its attempts to influence the reports of the attaches can be gathered from the following excerpts from a book written by the former German military attache in Italy who had held this position for many years:

"... The relative weakness of the Italian Armed Forces was known to the Italian leaders, and it played its part in the political decisions made in 1939."

"Only Hitler and Mussolini refused to acknowledge these facts. Based on my reports and on those written by other officers, the Intelligence Branch of the Army General Staff prepared a secret staff study during the winter 1938-39, in which the strong points and weaknesses of the Italian Army and industrial capacity were established on the basis of factual data. It was not until after the war that I found out that Hitler had ordered this study to be withdrawn and destroyed because he considered it to be wrong that German military agencies be furnished such a clear and unsatisfactory picture regarding the armed forces of a future ally."

"The General Staff's attempt to prevent Hitler's disastrous policy seeking this of alliance and of precipitating a war was therefore unsuccessful: the effort to describe Italy's military potential objectively had proved ineffective."

10

Enno von Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse (Mussolini as Ally).
Memoirs of the German Military Attache in Rome, 1936 - 1943. P. 14.

- 31 -

"In spring 1939, during a visit to Berlin, I was told to report to the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. He discussed the German political plans to establish ever closer bonds with Italy, expressing the opinion that under Mussolini's leadership the Italian Armed Forces had become a new factor in power politics. He intimated that I should emphasize this factor more strongly than hitherto, ~~in my future reports~~. I replied to the Minister that in Fascist Italy, ^{his} wishful thinking was far stronger than ~~real~~ capability. ~~Alas,~~ I refused to deviate from factual reporting. I had hitherto held Von Ribbentrop's statesmanship and diplomatic ability in low esteem, but this conversation convinced me that he lacked ^{the} common sense and strength of character that were indispensable for his high position. I reported his request immediately to General Halder, the Army Chief of Staff."

"My efforts to keep reports of the Italian military potential outside the sphere of propaganda and to base them on facts were supported by the naval attache, Captain Lange, and the air force attache, General Freiherr von Bülow. But even so, the service attaches did not completely succeed in rectifying the optimistic estimate on the Italian Navy and Air Force given by Von Blomberg after his visit in spring 1937. The Luftwaffe attache, in particular, was faced by preconceived notions held at the Air Force

- 32 -

Ministry."

This quotation shows that the reports of air force attaches were received with skepticism by the Luftwaffe High Command, even if they originated from a man of the stature of General von Buelow, who before this assignment held the position of Chief, Air Intelligence Branch -- subsequently the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

4. The Press Group of the Reich Air Force Ministry

The Press Group was another intelligence collecting agency in the Reich Air Force Ministry. This group was subordinate to the Central Office until spring 1939, thus functioning under the supervision of the secretary of state. It was mainly responsible for evaluating German news media up to this time. It also had the mission of making air force propaganda in the German press and motion picture industry. A systematic exploitation of foreign news media for the purpose of collecting intelligence was initiated at the beginning of 1939, when the group was integrated into the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff and some basic personnel changes were made. The period until the outbreak of hostilities, however, was too short for building up a fully effective target designation service as a result of pre-war interpretation. Aside from its intelligence functions, the Press Group continued to carry out the censorship mission over the German press, which it had held from the outset. This censorship function extended over matters published pertaining to the Luftwaffe and the release of ^{aerial} photographs and reproductions of ~~military equipment~~ ^{military equipment} belonging to the

- 33 -

Luftwaffe.

In 1933 the Press Group was composed initially of experienced newspapermen who had been recalled to active duty. After its transfer to the General Staff, the change in mission was taken into account and foreign language experts were assigned to the Group, who also had sufficient military background to distinguish between essential and nonessential matters. Because of insufficient time for preparation and a shortage of personnel, this group did not develop into ~~KK~~ ~~not~~ ~~as~~ ~~important~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ an intelligence agency as it might have done otherwise. A systematic exploitation of Western news media, illustrated journals, industrial catalogues, etc., might have provided extremely valuable information for target indication. Because of the above-mentioned circumstances, the Germans were unable to fully benefit of this source of information. 11

The procurement of foreign newspapers, journals, and other militarily important ^{writings} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ was the responsibility of the SD (~~Sicherheitsdienst~~ -- Political Security Service). They were delivered at irregular intervals and selected unsystematically so that precise intelligence exploitation was impossible for this reason, if for no other. The military also tried to obtain desirable materials through diplomatic channels or through the air attaches, but encountered considerable difficulties in obtaining the necessary foreign exchange.

11

Through this medium the Americans obtained very interesting information on industrial targets in Japan.

- 34 -

In summarizing one may state that this group did not achieve satisfactory results as an intelligence collecting agency throughout the war.

Group

5. Strategic Reconnaissance ~~XXXXXX~~ of the Luftwaffe High Command (Rowehl)

One of the most important and valuable organizations for collecting information on conducting the air war operations both before and during hostilities was the Strategic Reconnaissance ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{Group} of the Luftwaffe High Command. Oberst (Col.) Rowehl -- his name was usually used to designate the section -- was its chief. Its official designation was "High-Altitude Flying Test Agency."

Its beginnings date back to 1930, when it was a civilian agency that had one aircraft chartered by the Counterintelligence Branch of the then Reich Defense Ministry from "Luftdienst G.m.b.H." (Air Service Corporation) -- a civilian business firm.

After 1933 the squadron was first subordinate to the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Force High Command; the Luftwaffe High Command had to make requests to this higher headquarters for ~~XX~~ its requirements. It was not until 1936 that the former squadron that had meanwhile been enlarged to group-size became subordinate to the Luftwaffe High Command.

12

This is how Group Rowehl developed its activities:

"The construction of fortifications in countries adjacent to the German Reich was naturally of interest

12

Chronik der Aufklärungsgruppe des U.D.L. in Kurzform (Abbreviated History of the Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command) by Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Rowehl. (Karlsruhe Collection).

- 35 -

to the Counterintelligence Branch of the Reich Defense Ministry. As an aerial photograph expert I was ^sasked in 1930 to fly along the borders of the Reich above German territory and to take oblique photographs of these fortifications, a great number of which could be photographed with a telescopic lense. After these oblique pictures had been taken, the next step was to take vertical ones, if only to conceal the true intentions. In order to satisfy these requirements and at the same time take maximum precautions, it was necessary to fly as high as possible. In this manner, the photographs covered as much territory as possible while the aircraft flew along the borders and at the same time the adjacent countries did not notice anything. A specially constructed Junkers W 34 model for breaking high altitude records was equipped with Hornet engines originating from America. This aircraft reached 20,000 feet without trouble."

"A small group of 3 men, 1 aircraft, some old photographic equipment dating from World War I, a few ^{old} oxygen apparatus, and a little photographic shop ~~WAFK~~ formed the nucleus of the Versuchsstelle fuer Hohenfluege (High Altitude Test Agency), i.e. the Strategic Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command. The agency operated on a very small scale with ~~maximum~~ secrecy. So far as known, no country adjacent to Germany protested against this ~~activity~~ type of reconnaissance activity up to

- 26 -

1933. In order to make each individual flight as successful as possible,

~~XXX~~
a ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ camera for aerial photographs with a 300 by 300 mm picture

using different types of lenses was developed in ^{cooperation} ~~in conjunction~~ with the Carl

^{Optical Works}
~~Zeiss establishment~~ at Jena. This camera was later adopted by the Luftwaffe,

and it still produces optimum performances today. Up to 1933, flights were

made primarily above the territories that had formerly belonged to Germany

and had been ceded to France and Poland after World War I. The Czech ~~XX~~ border

was also the objective of such flights, and all these areas were constantly

surveyed."

"After 1933, when Germany's foreign policy became aggressive, interest

for happenings in neighboring countries grew in proportion with the steady

in
increase ~~XX~~ fortification construction along the German border. In 1934 the

small reconnaissance group moved from Kiel to the Berlin-Staaken airport,

increasing its strength to five photographic aircraft; in 1936 it was trans-

ferred from the Counterintelligence Branch in the Armed Forces High Command

to the Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe Operations Staff in the Reich Ministry

of the Luftwaffe. Because of his personal and close contacts with Luftwaffe

technicians and industrial technologists, the commander of the group was able

to have access to the latest developments in aircraft and apparatus construction.

Assisted by good and enthusiastic crews and outstanding ^{technical} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ personnel,

he formed a well-integrated group that worked hard and was aggressive, thus

achieving a lot with relatively little. There were few

- 37 -

accidents, and the aircraft were usually ready for action."

"In 1934, also, the first photographic missions were flown in the direction of the Bay of Finland, Kronstadt, and Leningrad, in the direction Pleskau-Minsk, and finally also in the direction of the Black Sea coast up to Nikolayev. Like all missions flown since 1933, these were executed by twin-engine aircraft at altitudes varying from 26,400 - 30,000 feet, with various types of photographic equipment installed on the planes. All flights were prepared in great detail and were therefore carried out with success and without loss. No information was gathered by the German intelligence agencies indicating that these aircraft had been observed by security agencies of the neighboring countries concerned, even though the Germans focused their attention on finding any such indication. The small team, composed exclusively of civilians except for their military chief initially operated under the designation Special Air Squadron; by 1937 it had 10 photographic planes and was eventually redesignated High-Altitude Flying Test Agency. Reconnaissance aircraft of the unit participated in the annexation of Austria and the Sudeten provinces. After the annexation of Austria the agency moved to Berlin-Tempelhof airfield. Until the outbreak of war the photographic planes surveyed regularly the frontier fortifications of the countries bordering on the Reich, taking photographs from high altitudes and checking on the construction work that was under way in the Polish Corridor...."

- 38 -

The following chapters will provide information on the wartime activities of the strategic reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command.

b. The Evaluating and Interpreting Agencies

There was no central military agency for evaluating and interpreting the messages and reports emanating from the collecting agencies. These functions were accomplished by intelligence divisions that each formed part of the general staffs of the three services. Within the Army, it was the Foreign Armies Branch, within the Navy the Foreign Navies Branch, and within the Luftwaffe the Foreign Air Forces Branch.

1. Reich Luftwaffe Ministry. Foreign Air Forces Branch -- Target Descriptors

Until 1938 the evaluation of all information pertaining to foreign air forces and to conducting strategic air warfare was the responsibility of two agencies, both working in close cooperation and belonging to the Luftwaffe General Staff (formerly Air Command Agency).

The first of these two agencies originated from an intelligence agency of the ~~Reichswehr~~ (Former 100,000-man Army) Ministry and had been transferred from that ministry to the Luftwaffe; this was the Foreign Air Forces Branch.

The second was a special section of the Operations Branch, the Target Research Section.

The Foreign Air Forces Branch was responsible for collecting all types of

- 39 -

information from a great variety of sources -- ~~XXXXXX~~ above all from written material -- and for evaluating this material. Thus, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Chief of Staff were ^{to be} provided with the essential elements of information to estimate the prevailing situation and the strength of foreign air forces.

The branch also produced information for top-level command agencies and finally published the magazine "Die Luftwacht" (The Air Guard).

In 1935, when the Operations Branch formed the Target Research Section, the Foreign Air Forces Branch was given the mission to select material of interest to the new section and to transmit same.

There was no liaison with the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command. Material originating from agents was first requested in 1935 by the Target Research Section and, after this ~~XX~~ section had been integrated into the Foreign Air Forces Branch, in 1938 such material was asked for by the branch.

The development of the Foreign Air Forces Branch, personnel assignments within the branch, as well as its activities and missions have been described by its first chief as follows:

14

"In 1927 Major Wilberg, who was then chief of T2 V (Luftwaffe) in the Reichswehr Ministry, instructed me to form an

14

Generalieutenant a.D. (Major General, Ret.) Freiherr von Buelow, Extracts from Die Abteilung Fremde Luftmachten im Reichswehr- und Reichsluftfahrtministerium 1927 - 1937 (The Foreign Air Forces Branch in the Reichswehr and Reich Luftwaffe Ministry, 1927 - 37). Karlsruhe Collection.

- 40 -

intelligence agency to determine and research the organizational structure, strength, distribution, and materiel of foreign air forces. To assist me, he assigned two additional officers to the agency, Oberstlttn.a.D. (Lt. Col., Ret.) Prager and Major (Ret.) Morell. Also assigned to my agency was Hauptmann a.D. (Capt., Ret.) Kirschner, publisher of the magazine Die Luftwacht (The Air Guard) that was financed by the Reich ^{Air} ~~Luftwaffe~~ Ministry. This magazine printed information on strength figures and organization as well as on technological progress made in the field of aviation in foreign countries. This information provided the Reichswehr with valuable data, and later also the Armed Forces establishment."

"No preparatory work or precedences for accomplishing this mission were available. The only sources were the foreign press, specialized periodicals, and other publications. No service directive was issued for the activation of this intelligence agency nor was any issued subsequently. Obtaining ^{classified} ~~XXXXXX~~ information through counterintelligence channels was initially interdicted. Under these difficult circumstances, it was impossible to attain the objective of obtaining precise information on all foreign military and civilian aviations in order to establish their potential at that time. Initially, the intelligence agency remained therefore a collecting agency for publicized foreign information instead of being an organization that evaluated and interpreted essential

- 41 -

material on operating procedures, organizational structures, and operational potentials of foreign air forces. The officers assigned to the intelligence agency had all been regular air force officers in World War I, after which they had been retired and later reactivated. Their excellent linguistic ability could not compensate for their lack of recent practical experience in combat and their inability to give a factual interpretation of technological production. progress in foreign aircraft ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Repeated references to these shortcomings were not acknowledged by higher ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ echelons, because the small number of regular air force officers then available did not permit the transfer of individual officers to the intelligence agency."

"The intelligence agency concentrated its efforts on the countries adjacent to Germany, especially France, Great Britain and Russia; also of interest were the U.S.A. and all other countries that were then major air powers, such as Italy and Japan. Gradually, the network of air force collection efforts spread over the entire globe. Thus, by 1930 the intelligence agency employed about 10 officers and several clerical personnel, so that the agency was redesignated an intelligence group."

"Aside from checking on foreign aviation developments, contacts with the German press were intensified upon instruction from the chief of T.A. (L) (Luftwaffe Research and Development). Numerous lectures were held for meetings of officers, military associations, etc., and also on the

- 42 -

radio. The subject was foreign aviation, with particular emphasis being vividly placed on describing the unfavorable air-geographic position of Germany in the center of Europe. In this manner, the audience was made aware of the untenable situation and the need for air power was propagated. Moreover, personnel of the intelligence group wrote articles on foreign aviation, describing the steady progress in the production of fuselages and engines as well as in air force organizational matters, that is to say in spheres that were either interdicted to Germany by the peace treaty or severely restricted."

"In 1933 the intelligence group was again assigned additional personnel in the course of the creation of the Reich Air Force Ministry and was redesignated Foreign Air Forces Branch. More and more emphasis was placed on military matters. A Target Section was attached to the branch, and contact was established with Army counterintelligence,¹⁵ which meant the beginning of a shift in functions until the branch was integrated into the Luftwaffe General Staff at the beginning of 1938 and redesignated 5th Division (Intelligence). "

"The preparatory work done during the 10 years' existence as intelligence agency, intelligence group, and finally as Foreign Air Forces Branch was instrumental in

15

Author's Note: Von Buelow means the Counterintelligence Branch, Armed Forces High Command.

- 43 -

creating the prerequisites for carrying out the intelligence mission given on 1 January 1938. This mission was to produce target data for strategic air warfare and for all other operations connected with air attack or air defense in any future war."

The organization and performance of the Foreign Air Forces Branch that had been organized in 1933 were not in compliance with the requirements of an intelligence branch of a supreme air force command. The prerequisites for accomplishing such a mission were initially nonexistent, neither ~~XXXXXX~~ personnel nor ~~XXXXXX~~ prestige-wise. The development of the branch could therefore not be rapid, all the more so because the primary interest of the top-level command was concentrated on the organizational sphere and progress in training. In 1935, however, it became necessary to expand the intelligence functions. But it was not the Foreign Air Forces Branch that benefited ^{from} ~~of~~ this expansion: the new missions were given to a special section of the Operations Branch, the Intelligence Section (Target Designation).

Whereas the Foreign Air Forces Branch continued to be responsible for collecting material, evaluating the development of foreign air forces, and making this information available to the Luftwaffe command agencies, the Intelligence Section of the Operations Branch compiled the practical data for the conduct of air operations by establishing target dossiers. The basic information for compiling these data was received from or

- 44 -

via the Foreign Air Forces Branch and partly also directly from the Counter-intelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command.

The tasks and operating procedures of the Intelligence Section of the Operations Branch are described by the then chief of the branch as follows:

16

"The target dossiers prepared by the general staff and their interpretation were among the most important media of conducting air operations available to the Luftwaffe for the case of war."

"The preparation of target dossiers was started around 1935 by the Intelligence Section of the then 1st Branch of the General Staff. The section chief was Major von Flotow, later Major Stein. The section was integrated into the 5th General Staff Division "Foreign Air Forces" on 7 January 1938."

The Target Dossiers

"The files were divided into different groups according to types of objectives; there were military objectives, industrial objectives, communications and transportation facilities, etc."

"The groups of objectives were subdivided into objective cards. Each objective was designated by a number. The first two digits of this number indicated the type of objective in which the card was grouped."

16

General d.F.L.S.D. (Lt.Gen., Ret.) Deichmann, Die ZieleBjektivkartei (The Target Dossiers). A study written from memory. Karlsruhe Collection.

- 45 -

"A target dossier was created for each individual objective. The dossier contained the following documents:

One small-scale map on which the position of the objective and the approach route had been marked. Also indicated on this map were such enemy defenses as fighter airfields, gun positions, etc., as well as magnetic declinations, outstanding points of orientation along the approach, distinctive forest areas, and major railroad and highway crossings.

One large-scale map of the objective, showing defensive installations, such as battery positions, etc.; ground plans; aerial photomaps; sketches of the objective; descriptions of the target, indicating its political, military or economic significance, such as for instance information on percentages of production in relation to total production of the respective country, number of workmen, work hours, times at which shifts change; vulnerability of the target to aerial attacks indicating the possibility of producing major explosions or fires; indications on particularly important parts of the objective, the destruction of which would paralyze the target (such as for instance boiler plants, electricity or water supply installations)."

"Relief maps or reliefs were produced for especially important targets."

Evaluation of the Target Dossiers

"The current evaluation and interpretation of the target dossiers were important means of conducting ~~XXXXXX~~ strategic air warfare. In one instance, it was

- 46 -

established that a country adjacent to Germany had some 40,000 large and medium factories. It was therefore impossible to conduct strategic air warfare against the military production capacity of this country by attacking all its factories. On the contrary, it was essential to find out in which spheres that country was vulnerable and which types of objective were the best suited for strategic air warfare."

"For this reason, the following considerations were of decisive importance with regard to military-economic targets:

- A. What ^{are} ~~were~~ the respective country's needs of a particular type of product, such as for instance oil, in case of war?
- B. What ^{are} ~~were~~ that country's capabilities of covering its requirements in case of war?
 - I. How high is the peace- and wartime production? Where is that production concentrated? What percentage of the production originates from each such production center?
 - II. To what extent can the German Air Force eliminate each individual production center? Can it be completely or only partly eradicated? What forces and how much time would be needed for this purpose?
 - III. Has the respective country a possibility of replacing the loss of production in any of the following ways:
 - a. By stored supplies;

- 47 -

b. By switching to other production facilities and plants; and

c. By imports from overseas or by railroad.

IV. Is it possible to interdict this resupply from outside sources by

air force attacks or by other means, such as the preventive buying

of such items in other countries, where they are available; or by

exerting diplomatic pressure; or by air attacks on line of communications

installations such as railroads and ports."

Final Conclusions

"Under what circumstances will attacks on targets of this type achieve decisive results?"

Special Technical Studies

"In addition, studies were prepared on air attack methods against certain types of targets, such as mines, oil refineries, dams, railroad installations, etc., for which purpose technical experts were consulted. These studies indicated, how such targets could be attacked and destroyed most effectively, specifying certain particularly vulnerable parts as ideal target areas, ~~XX~~ listing ~~XXXXXX~~ the types of bombs to be used for different purposes, etc."

Analysis of the Evaluation Results

"Based on the evaluation of these data, the Luftwaffe General Staff arrived at the conclusion -- even before the war -- that

Great Britain was most vulnerable to attacks on

- 48 -

its ~~part~~ installations and naval supply lines, while

Russia's weakness was its communications facilities." ¹⁷

The mission of the two agencies was during the first years extremely complicated because of the lack of clear-cut political and military instructions emanating from the political leadership. In a study on Project Von Rohden, written after the war, this matter is dealt with as follows: ¹⁸

"The "Target Group" Branch, responsible for collecting data on objectives in foreign countries which were to be attacked, was until 1937 part of the 1st Branch of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Since no definite political trend had developed by that time and since it was not clearly known which countries would fight with or against Germany, this branch collected material of interest without applying standards of selectivity..."

Even later -- until spring 1939 -- the Luftwaffe top-level command agencies, like all other military key command authorities of the Armed Forces, remained ignorant of definite political plans. This made the task of the intelligence collecting and evaluating agencies extremely difficult. Information regarding

¹⁷ For further details, see General F.L.H.D. Lt. Gen., Ret.) Deichmann, Das deutsche System der Zielerfassung und Auswertung (The German Target Evaluation and Interpretation System).

¹⁸ The Target Group Branch (Abteilung Zielerfassung), extracted from a study on Project Von Rohden, Karlsruhe Collection. (The designation "branch" is misleading; the Target Research Section was not a separate branch, since it was a section subordinate to the Operations Branch -- Author's Note.)

- 49 -

political "Blitz actions" intended by Hitler was passed on to these agencies at the very last moment, if at all. Insofar as these political actions entailed military measures, such as the occupation of the Rhine land, the entry into Austria and the Sudeten land (province), the local military command agencies received direct orders. Most of the military leaders in the High Command were bypassed on these occasions and were informed shortly before the event. ¹⁹

For all practical purposes, the Foreign Air Forces Branch and the Target Research Section of the Operations Branch had to be prepared for all possible contingencies. Such preparations made disproportionate demands on the responsible staffs, and they also meant a dissipation of effort.

2. The 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff

When the Reich Air Ministry was reorganized in 1937 and the most important military branches were concentrated in the Luftwaffe General Staff on 1 January 1938, the Foreign Air Forces Branch was redesignated 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff. ²⁰

The first ^{branch} ~~division~~ chief -- Oberst (Col.) Freiherr von Buelow -- had been replaced by Oberstlttn. i. Genst. (Lt.Col., Genral Staff) Schmid as early as mid-1937. Up to the time the 5th Division was transferred, the latter had been assigned to the Operations Division.

¹⁹ Personal recollections of the author who at that time was chief of the policy section of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

²⁰ See Appendix III.

- 50 -

He was thus well equipped for appreciating the requirements of the Operations Division insofar as top-level intelligence was concerned.

The division was appropriately reorganized and reoriented toward accomplishing solely intelligence missions. The Target Research Section was integrated into the 5th Division.

From this time onward the adjacent countries were systematically researched for the purpose of conducting effective strategic air warfare and of equipping the field headquarters with better target data for their future sphere of operations. Air topographical descriptions and orientation pamphlets concerning each individual country were prepared and issued to all field headquarters and staffs.

This intensification of intelligence work necessitated a far closer cooperation with the information collecting agencies, and above all with the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command. The Strategic Reconnaissance Group Rowehl, since 1936 subordinate to the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, was employed to collect systematically photographic data on all adjacent countries.

Despite the still existing gaps in the material it had assembled, the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff performed outstandingly well during the short time that had been available up to the outbreak of war. When the war started, there was not a single field headquarters or staff that was not in possession of all the

- 51 -

orientation material and target data for every possible type of operation. 21

3. The 8th (Military Science) Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff

Another evaluating and above all interpreting agency was the 8th (Military Science) Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

All files that were of historical and statistical significance were transmitted to this ~~XXXXX~~ division. Copies of all orders and instructions issued as well as wartime reports concerning the outcome of missions and the day-by-day situation of all service agencies were sent to the division. The same was true of war diaries of all agencies and units. The division thus had complete records to use as source material for its principal task -- writing the History of the German Air Force.

The 8th Division also had the secondary mission of writing special studies and monographs that could be used by the combat forces and which were based on the collected experiences of the great variety of units and staffs in such specialized fields as buildup, organization, training, and military operations in the various theaters.

Upon special request of the Chief of Luftwaffe General Staff, the division also wrote special studies that supplemented or paralleled similar work of the 5th Division. These studies had such subjects as comparative estimates of the military potential of belligerents or ^{tentative} evaluations of future operations plans and others.

21

For the organizational structure of the 5th Division at the beginning of hostilities in 1939, see Appendix IV.

- 52 -

Whereas the 5th Division was primarily interested in immediately interpreting incoming information, the 8th Division was responsible for summarizing after their conclusion the experiences of past combat actions and making them useful for the future conduct of military operations.

Like almost every agency of the infant Luftwaffe, this division suffered from a shortage of suitable personnel. This shortage reflected on its performance: the buildup had been too fast.

4. The Intelligence Officers at Higher Field Headquarters

The intelligence officers at higher fields headquarters, such as the Air Force Military District Headquarters, later the Air Force Headquarters, also evaluated and interpreted intelligence information. In peacetime this function was of little significance, since these staffs received finished intelligence from the Reich Air Ministry.

22
Their wartime activities were extremely valuable and useful.

II. The Procurement of Intelligence at the Outbreak of War

a. Volume of Available Intelligence -- General Status

After Lt.Col. Schmid had become chief of the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff, collection, evaluation, and interpretation procedures were properly systematized. During 1938-39 all efforts were concentrated on collecting as much

22

For further details, see Chapter Two, Section ~~XXXXXX~~ I, par a, subpar 2.

- 53 -

information as possible in order to provide the field headquarters and field forces with the data they might need for operations across the German borders. The technical staff officers of the 5th Division were granted extended leaves in 1938 to travel in those countries for which they were responsible. On this occasion they were to get well acquainted with conditions in the countries that were their specific fields of interest and were to observe as many militarily important objectives as possible. This orientation leave proved to be of great value for subsequent intelligence operations.

Since it was not feasible to distribute to every staff and headquarters all the intelligence that would have been needed to conduct flexible military operations in any direction at any time, record centers were established at all peacetime airfields, where the necessary information was readily available at all times. In the archives of the principal airport of the airfield area command, so many copies were stored that the advance airfields that were not to be occupied until the outbreak of hostilities could also be given adequate distribution. In this manner, it had been ascertained that every unit at every airfield would receive the elements of information essential to its operations. As early as 1938, the necessary steps were taken to reproduce extensively the intelligence, and by 1939 the distribution to airfield archives was accomplished.

- 54 -

Among the distributed data were orientation pamphlets and air topographical descriptions for every country with which Germany might have to fight. Moreover, target data were prepared for every objective that was of interest in the respective countries. Aside from the maps contained in the target dossiers, every airfield had a map depot to service the troops stationed there. At this map depot, all maps were available, which any unit employed in any direction from that airfield might require.

The intelligence furnished to command staffs, headquarters, and airfields corresponded to the information available to the 5th Division, and the target data to the dossiers in the central target files.

The intelligence available at the beginning of the war was very comprehensive owing to the personal initiative taken by the Chief of the 5th Division. Nevertheless, the volume of intelligence and its refinement did not reach and really could not reach ~~XXXX~~ the level desired by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, mainly because of lack of time. For example, orientation pamphlets and air topographical descriptions were not always completely up to date, the target data contained only a selection of the most important objectives,

- 55 -

and the individual target dossiers still showed gaps, the bridging of which would have required a lot more time.

Nevertheless, the intelligence produced by the beginning of the war was truly imposing. During a conference Goering called during the Battle of Britain, he told the assembled air force, air corps, wing, and group

²³
commanders the following:

"The target data that the General Staff had prepared in an exemplary and altogether unique manner are not being exploited by the combat forces. Photomaps and individual target diagrams offer the most plastic information."

Goering thus touched upon a weakness of the system, for the combat forces had not been sufficiently trained in the use of carefully and painstakingly prepared intelligence. The reasons for this deficiency were obvious. Because of constant expansion of the organization, because of the frequent changes in command and personnel that were thus generated, because of changes of station, and because of other important duties the units had no time to practice systematically the use of intelligence data. Target data, however, are of practical value only if the troops are trained to use them; both theoretical and practical training at sample installations are essential for that purpose.

B. The Most Important Adjacent Countries

23

Extracted from Karlsruhe Collection.

- 56 -

1. Czechoslovakia (Prior to Occupation)

As one of the politically crucial countries along the German border, Czechoslovakia had been an important intelligence collection target as early as the time when the Reichswehr was still in existence. After 1933, the intensive exploration of that country was intensified in relation to the increase in available funds for intelligence purposes. The collection of information was facilitated by the existence of data that were still available from the days of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and above all by the fact that major elements of the population of that country were German and felt German. Since these population segments resided in the border areas -- the Sudeten province -- and were precisely ~~XXXXXXXX~~ informed on Czechoslovak military matters because of their military service obligations, the German intelligence agencies had no difficulty in keeping fully informed on all military matters that were worth knowing.

Until 1938, when the Sudeten province was occupied by German troops, the German Armed Forces penetrated every secret of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, its armament, communications system, and everything else. The Strategic Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command under Rowehl had photographed all border areas and other militarily significant points of the country. The corresponding photomaps were included in the target data distributed to the combat

- 57 -

forces.

Before the territory of what subsequently was designated the protectorate was occupied, the unit commanders, who might have been committed in aerial operations, were ~~XXXX~~ initiated accurately on the basis of available intelligence. As LuftHansa (Tr.: commercial air line) passengers they were furthermore given opportunities ~~IX~~ of getting acquainted with the terrain over which they would have to fly.

As a result of the evaluation and interpretation of available information, the Luftwaffe High Command arrived at the conclusion that strategic air warfare against that country was unnecessary for the purpose of ^{overcoming} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ possible military resistance. A surprise air attack would suffice to eliminate the Czech Air Force and to prevent the assembly of Czechoslovak ground forces.

- 58 -

2. Poland

The circumstances pertaining to the collection of intelligence in Poland during the pre-war period were similar to those in Czechoslovakia. This country, also, had become a center of attention for the German military counterintelligence services even before 1930, mainly because of its political attitude toward Germany. Thus, by the outbreak of hostilities the Germans had a complete picture of the strength, distribution, and assembly plans of the Polish Armed Forces as well as exact data on Polish armament production and internal communications. Here, too, the collection of information was greatly facilitated by the presence of a strong German ethnic minority. An additional factor was that precisely the border areas had been almost exclusively former German territory so that the Germans obviously had still all the data to facilitate the operations of the military counterintelligence services.

The Strategic Reconnaissance Group Rowehl had taken photographs of the border areas, of the so-called Polish Corridor, and of all military and armament production targets of importance. These photomaps, together with the target data, had been distributed to the field commanders.

The strength and ground organization of the Polish Air Force were exactly known to the Germans, with the exception of a few airfields in the easternmost part of the country.

- 59 -

3. France

At the outbreak of war ^{the} ~~that~~ data on France were unsatisfactory and far from complete. The counterintelligence sources had provided much information, most of which however was of dubious origin and ^{doubtful} value. The air attache had not furnished any significant information up to that time. Nor had the French press provided the volume of military and military-economic information that was customary among the other Western powers, such as the United States and Great Britain. The only available photographs covered airfields and industrial installations in Alsace-Lorraine. In peacetime, the radio intercept service had not provided any important clues.

In general, the German air force intelligence agencies were not prepared for a war against France on 1 September 1939. The main reason for this unpreparedness was the fact that the political leaders had not included France among the potential adversaries.

- 60 -

4. Great Britain

There were far better data available about Great Britain, when the war started. That these data for the conduct of air warfare had been assembled, was to be attributed to an order issued by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1938. Up to that time the intelligence covering Great Britain had been totally inadequate, just like that pertaining to France. Since the political leadership had not taken a war with the Western powers into account, the collection of information in those countries had not been considered as particularly important. It was therefore not altogether surprising that the information provided by the military counterintelligence agencies ~~WXXX~~ was not only scarce but also totally inadequate in value.

At the end of November 1938 Goering therefore ordered that a study be prepared on the air vulnerability of Great Britain. The then Chief of the 5th Division commented on this ~~XXXX~~ study as follows:

24

"General Jeschonnek, who was then Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, was of the opinion that an exact intelligence estimate and comprehensive preparations based on target data were of decisive importance for the success of an aerial operation. He also thought, that this was particularly the case with a possible air warfare against Great Britain. For this reason, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe ordered that a special study be prepared to establish the air vulnerability factors pertaining to Great

24

Extracted from a report of General S.D. (Ret.) Schmid, who was then Intelligence Officer at the Luftwaffe High Command. This report was written from memory in 1953, with personal notes also being used for this purpose. Karlsruhe Collection.

- 61 -

Britain; this study was given the code designation "BLAU". In 1939 the study, classified secret, was available in ^{five} copies. It was submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe at List on the island of Sylt, and the Chief of Intelligence, who submitted it, was given the approval of the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff.

Study BLAU

The study was prepared during the period January to June 1939 under the direction of the Chief of Intelligence.

Once or twice a week, conferences, verbal reports, discussions, and question-and-answer periods lasting 4 - 5 hours were held. The participants were:

- (a) The foreign specialist of the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe High Command;
- (b) The economics experts of the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command;
- (c) Technical experts from the Air Materiel Command;
- (d) Representatives of private industry;
- (e) Professors of geopolitics; and
- (f) The Air Attaché from London with his assistants.

The study analyzed all ^{aspects} ~~spheres~~ of British statehood: The structure of the British Empire, the armed forces, people, government, constitution, administration, economy, industry, trade, imports, exports, agricultural production in peace and wartime, electricity supplies, air vulnerability,

- 62 -

shadow factories, natural resources, railroad communications, inland waterways, naval and commercial port installations, stock piles, ^{transoceanic} ~~naval~~ lines of communication, etc.

There was an abundance of source material in libraries, in the British press and literature, in foreign writings, ^{minutes of} parliamentary debates, and particularly in papers and documents dating from the First World War.

A number of officials who had lived for some time in Great Britain were of great assistance.

The study resulted in a multitude of suggestions and requirements for obtaining information.

In 1939 the thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the ~~the~~ study was completed. The result was available by mid-July: it was voluminous and included many statistics and maps. It may be summarized somewhat as follows:

"Great Britain is an extremely solid state of considerable national and economic strength. Its military power is based essentially on the Navy, which is far superior to its German counterpart. The mobilization of the British ~~XXXX~~ Navy had been underway since spring 1939. The British Air Force is the second strongest service. It is now being modernized and brought up to date. With the buildup planned for the future, it might become equal to the Luftwaffe by

- 63 -

1940. The defense against air attacks are well prepared and are constantly being perfected in the British Isles. The small British Army is being modernized and makes progress. But the Army can assume significance only in conjunction with French ground forces. Stock piling has begun in all spheres of the British industry and economy. The weakest points in the over-all economic picture are the British dependence on imports and the overseas communications. Because of these factors, its general geographic position, and its numerous naval and commercial harbor facilities -- ~~XXXX~~ the latter are the breathing organs of the economy -- the air vulnerability of the British Isles assumes particular significance. In any air warfare with Britain, the defeat of the British Air Force, including the elimination of the aircraft industry that is a bottleneck at any time, and the neutralization of the British Navy are prerequisites for success. The primary mission of the German Air Force is therefore to neutralize all naval and commercial port facilities on the islands and to destroy shipping capacity. To carry out this mission, the Luftwaffe will need very strong forces. No time limit can be set for achieving this objective. Because of the British government's capability to improvise and because of the spiritual strength of the British people, it might be possible that the surrender of the British Isles cannot be solely obtained through

- 64 -

air attacks."

Field Marshal Kesselring has the following comments to this study as a preparatory step and basic document for conducting air warfare against

25
Great Britain:

"The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe had in this instance (Great Britain) been ahead of the other services. As early as June 1939, after 6 months of preparatory work done with the assistance of scientists and economists, he had produced an integrated plan that constituted a really useful basis for the "air battle against Britain" and might have also been used as basic planning document for an invasion of the British Isles."

According to all these indications, the collection of intelligence concerning Great Britain seems to have been well advanced by the outbreak of war. The above-mentioned study BLAU led to a collection effort to fill existing intelligence gaps; furthermore, the available information was evaluated and interpreted.

The military collection agencies of Canaris contributed relatively little to this effort. On the other hand, the German air attache in London and -- last not least -- the British press provided excellent material.

aerial
The following photographic material was available at the outbreak of hostilities: The ports of London, the southeast coast ports, parts of the south coast, ground organization and aircraft industry in the southeastern part of the country, and the airfields in the Midlands.

25
Albert Kesselring, Gedenken zum zweiten Weltkrieg (Comments to World War II), Bonn, 1955, p. 67.

Thoughts on The Second

- 65 -

Radio intercepts provided valuable information on armament production figures, organization and distribution of the British Air Force, etc., which was ~~used~~ used by the intelligence collection agencies.

The creation and buildup of an extensive shadow industry was known to the Germans. The German High Command was also aware of the existence of a British radar screen. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the airship "Graf Zeppelin" flew several aerial survey missions over the North Sea, which produced additional information in this field. *"(sham-industry)"*

- 66 -

Chapter TwoWartime Intelligence ActivitiesI. Changes in the Intelligence Mission and Organizationa. Changes in the Collecting Agencies

During wartime the organizational structure of the intelligence collecting agencies had to be changed by necessity, even though all responsible personnel made every effort to adjust the peacetime to the wartime organization in order to safeguard a smooth transition. However, sources that were open to collecting agencies in peacetime became blocked ^{under conditions} ~~by~~ wartime ~~events~~ ^{or} were far more difficult to accede to as time went on. Other, new ~~contacts~~ contact and sources had to be established and brought into action and then adjusted to wartime conditions.

The changes in the organization and mission of each individual collecting agency will hereby be discussed as follows:

1. Counterintelligence ~~XXXXXX~~ Office, Armed Forces High Command

There was no immediate change in the mission of this office at the outset of the war. Except for a few additions and changes, the existing organization was to serve both in peace and war. In the course of the war, however, some changes were made in the organization of the office; these

- 67 -

changes resulted from the immediate experiences made in wartime or from the domestic political events after 20 July 1944 (Tr: Attempt on Hitler's life).

Whereas Branches I, II, and III of the Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command remained substantially unchanged until 1944, the Foreign Branch was consolidated with the Central Branch at the outbreak of war, being redesignated "Foreign Office Group." The chief of the new group was General Oster, who had been chief of the Central Branch until then. Oster thus expanded his sphere of influence considerably, since he assumed personal ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ control of the activities by which all reports gathered by Branch I and attache reports ^{of the Armed Forces attaches} from allied and neutral countries were collated and summarized.

This concentration of power probably also resulted in the attempt to develop the office group into a kind of official ^{top-level} intelligence agency of the Armed Forces High Command. This was certainly not an advisable solution, since it ^{seems} ~~is~~ inappropriate to make the collecting agency simultaneously responsible for the evaluation and interpretation of all information. For this purpose, the collecting agency ^{lacked} ~~lacked~~ unbiased objectivity and access to the numerous other sources of information that developed during the course of the war, such as photographic reconnaissance, radio intelligence,

26

The ranking service attache was usually appointed simultaneously Armed Forces Attache with the duty of reporting both to his service and to the Armed Forces High Command.

- 68 -

press analysis, prisoner-of-war interrogation, combat reconnaissance reports, etc. It was not until toward the end of the war that the Armed Forces Operations Staff decided to create its own intelligence division, but this measure did not produce any major effect.

As previously mentioned, the organization of the Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command was not changed. The office consisted of the following three branches until the end of the war:

Branch I -- Collection of Information;

Branch II -- Sabotage; and

Branch III -- Espionage and Antisabotage Activities.

The counterintelligence agencies attached to the corps and military district headquarters were subordinate to the office in technical and operational matters. In addition, the office employed special combat reconnaissance teams in wartime. For its activities abroad, the Counterintelligence Office used the Armed Forces Attaches in allied and neutral countries and the KO -- Kriegsorganisation (Wartime Organization) that was integrated in the diplomatic missions.

The counterintelligence agencies attached to the corps and military district headquarters -- the latter remained in the zone of interior -- continued their peacetime operations also throughout the war. They proved to be effective. When the corps headquarters moved into combat, the

- 69 -

military district headquarters assumed their counterintelligence responsibility in the zone of interior. The counterintelligence agencies of the corps headquarters in the field were assigned missions that corresponded to the military plans pertaining to the operations in which the respective corps was involved.

The counterintelligence agencies of the military district headquarters assumed the responsibilities assigned to the peacetime agencies operating in the respective areas insofar as the collection of information was concerned, emphasizing the ~~MAIN~~ points of main effort as instructed. They subsequently worked on any lead and contact with abroad that seemed worth while to them or the Counterintelligence Branch and later Office. In theory, such operations were to be coordinated with the respective KO operating in that country, which was supposed to establish and maintain the contact.

The KO was an organization that was employed in ~~neutral~~ countries in addition to the military attaches. Operating from neutral bases, the KO's directed their activities at Germany's adversaries, whereas the military attaches reported on matters pertaining to the host countries.

The combat reconnaissance teams, occasionally also organized as squads or similar units, operated near the MLR. Aside from carrying out special tasks that corresponded to the course of combat events, they had ~~XXX~~^{as} principal ^{that} mission_A of interrogating prisoners of war. They coordinated their operations with and received their instructions_A from the local intelligence officers of

- 70 -

the army groups or air forces to which they were attached.

Until 1944, ~~the~~ Branch I of the Counterintelligence Office was subdivided according to the special collection fields ^{the sections} ~~they~~ dealt with, such as Army, Navy, ~~XXXXXX~~ Air Force, etc. Each section was in turn subdivided according to ~~the~~ countries or groups of countries, ^{that} ~~XXXXXX~~ is to say according to the areas in which the information was collected. The country, with which the information was concerned, was considered of secondary importance. Since the above-mentioned sections were not only concerned with collecting information but also adhered to certain premises -- not to say prejudices -- there were difficulties and one major problem that ^{required} ~~XXXXXX~~ an unprecedented solution.

The last chief of the IL (Luftwaffe) -- Air Force Section, Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Kleyenstueber, writes on this subject as follows: 27

"The divergence permeates the entire organizational structure of the secret service. To prevent overlapping, mutual interference, etc., ~~in~~ the collection effort must be ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ organized according to friendly or neutral areas from which or through which the enemy's security screen is penetrated. The evaluation and interpretation must be organized according ^{to} fields of interest or areas with which the information is concerned. Moreover, the retroactive appraisal of the value of a source should not be left to the collecting agencies but rather to the evaluation or interpretation organizations.

27

Extracted from a study written by Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Kleyenstueber in 1955, which dealt with the organization of the military secret service (counterintelligence service). Karlsruhe Collection.

- 71 -

Just like a mother usually closes her eyes to the faults of her own child, whom she considers the best and most beautiful of all, a military or civilian official of a clandestine collecting agency will rarely notice a fault in the contact he has established or ~~maintained~~ maintained. He will be the last one to detect that there is something wrong, even if his source has been operating for the enemy for quite some time. This was one of the organizational deficiencies from which the Counterintelligence Office suffered in 1944. The retrospective evaluation and analysis of reports from a source ^{here} ~~was~~ usually neglected because of the voluminous daily workload. This type of analysis is actually very simple and produces an unequivocal verdict on the value and contents of information. Apart from ^{some} ~~the~~ individual "major" contacts, such an analysis should not be ^{expected of} ~~imputed on~~ the ~~General Staff type~~ evaluation accomplished by the three services. Another factor to be considered is that the evaluation personnel are not acquainted with the collection methods and techniques. For this reason, the above-mentioned sections ~~developed~~ formed subsections or similar organizational units for pre-evaluation purposes, but without finding a truly satisfactory solution to the problem. These were the intellectual premises on which the subsequent reorganization was based."

The subsequent reorganization of Branch I, which took place in 1944 ^{in the light of} ~~simultaneously with~~ the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July and its consequences, led to the following organizational structure:

~~Western~~ Western Section: collection ^{side over} in or ~~above~~ the West, and

Eastern Section: collection ^{side over} in or ~~above~~ the East.

- 72 -

In addition, ^{preliminary} ~~pre-evaluation~~ agencies were created ^{and} ~~that were~~ subdivided ^{into sections dealing with} ~~according to~~ Army, Navy, Air Force, ^{or} ~~and~~ industry. These pre-evaluation ^{oriented} sections were in turn subdivided according to countries, assembly areas, etc., by the various ~~ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND~~ categories of information.

The collection sections were responsible for maintaining existing contacts and -- insofar as possible -- for establishing new ones. They were to guide and control the collection of information through these sources.

The pre-evaluation sections, having equal rank ^{with} ~~as~~ the collection sections, assigned missions and requested information on the basis of requirements transmitted by the intelligence officers of the three services. They evaluated individual contacts and sources by retroactive evaluation of the information produced; in this capacity they cooperated closely with the intelligence officers of the three services. They thus acted as advance filters-- at least in judging the value of information -- in transmitting newly arrived items of information.

This organization was no doubt more effective than the previous. The change in the organizational structure should not be attributed to the fact that the counterintelligence agencies had meanwhile been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Reich Security Main Office (RSMA -- Reichssicherheitshauptamt),

- 73 -

since it had previously been planned on the basis of past experience.

A drastic change in the collecting methods occurred at the beginning of 1944. The numerous other ~~XXXXXX~~ government and ~~XXX~~ Party ~~XXXXX~~ officials who were engaged in the collection of information in some capacity or another -- especially the two dominant personalities Himmler and, until his death, Heydrich -- succeeded in influencing Hitler to dismiss ~~XXX~~ Admiral Canaris who had hitherto been considered indispensable. (that motivated this decision were) The reasons given during and secret conferences will probably never be determined. The Chief of Branch I, Colonel Hansen, succeeded Canaris. At the same time, the Counterintelligence Office was transferred from the Armed Forces High Command to Reich Security ^{the} Main Office and redesignated Amt Mil. (Military Office). It thus became subordinate to the Chief of the State Security Service (~~SD -- Staats-Sicherheitsdienst~~), Kaltenbrunner. This transfer did not change the military status of the personnel assigned to the office, since they continued to serve in a military capacity and were administered by the respective personnel agencies of the three services.

After the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, in the preparation of which the Chief of the Military Office had a certain part, Schellenberg, who was Chief of Office VI (Collection of Political News from Abroad) of the Reich Security Main Office, ~~XXXX~~ assumed the additional duties of directing the Military Office. This organization remained unchanged until the end of the war. As a result, a major part of the information collection effort

- 74 -

of the Luftwaffe and the other services was controlled by the National Socialist Party security service after 1944.

2. The Intelligence Officers of the Higher Headquarters

Whereas before the war the collection of information was primarily the task of the counterintelligence agencies, radio intercept services, and other units of the Luftwaffe High Command under the control of the latter, this function was transferred to a large extent to the higher headquarters subordinate to the High Command. There, the information resulting from air and ground reconnaissance first became available, and to a certain degree also the statements of prisoners of war. The monitoring agency within the higher headquarters was the intelligence officer.

The intelligence officer was responsible for ~~preparing the~~

- (a) Enemy intentions on the basis of ground and air reconnaissance results;
- (b) Prisoner-of-war interrogation statements;
- (c) Interrogation of local inhabitants;
- (d) Exploitation of captured documents;
- (e) Press analysis;
- (f) Target analysis;

and as secondary missions, he ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ took charge of

- (g) Counterintelligence matters (Antisabotage and counterespionage), but only in coordination with the Armed Forces counterintelligence agencies; and
- (h) Soldiers' welfare matters.

- 75 -

The chiefs of the intelligence branches of these headquarters were usually general staff officers.

The higher Luftwaffe headquarters participating in the collection of information with their sphere of jurisdiction were the following:

- (a) The air force headquarters;
- (b) The air corps headquarters;
- (c) The air division headquarters;
- (d) The air force commanders;
- (e) The Luftwaffe liaison missions attached to army group and army headquarters; and
- (f) The air force administrative command headquarters.

The means for collecting information, which were available to the intelligence officers according to the level of the headquarters they served, were the following:

- (a) Strategic and close air reconnaissance units;
- (b) Enemy observations made by bomber, fighter-bomber, fighter, and air transport units;
- (c) Ground and air observations by friendly flak and ^{air} signal units;
- (d) Statements by prisoners of war and deserters;
- (e) Captured enemy property;
- (f) Information concerning the enemy, made available by the Army and Navy;
- (g) Reports from agents (of the counterintelligence services or occasionally of the Luftwaffe proper); and
- (h) Analysis of the enemy press and radio.

- 76 -

In addition, each intelligence officer received information from the Luftwaffe High Command and the higher headquarters. By listing the sources of information available to intelligence officers in wartime, one arrives at the conclusion that the bulk of the information on the ground and air situation was gathered by the headquarters in the field. The intelligence personnel at the Luftwaffe High Command produced the air estimate of the situation from the sum total of information collected by the field headquarters; ^{the information} ~~which~~ passed through the intermediate commands which also made use of it.

The most important and most reliable ^{Fool} ~~intelligence collection medium~~ *to obtain intelligence on the enemy* in the field were the reconnaissance units. The tactical reconnaissance units brought information and photographs from ^{the} ~~combat~~ zone, whereas the strategic reconnaissance units obtained information -- above all photographs -- of enemy territory situated far to the rear. The higher the headquarters, the farther its strategic reconnaissance aircraft generally penetrated over enemy rear areas.

To develop and evaluate incoming photographs, the units responsible for photoreconnaissance as well as every higher headquarters had one photographic shop. The staff photo agency at higher headquarters was under the operational control of the photographic interpretation officer assigned to the intelligence staff. It was his duty to screen the photographs and evaluate them as to their usefulness to the operational command. He was also responsible for transmitting with ~~XXX~~ a minimum of

- 77 -

delay ~~XX~~ interpreted prints to all agencies interested in their contents.

The German ~~XXXXXX~~ Air Force Directive No. 16, ~~Luftkriegsplanung~~
(Air Warfare), reprint of March 1940, par. 79 - 101, defines in great
detail the purpose and methods of collecting information by higher head-
quarters:
28
quarters:

Par. 79: Reconnaissance should produce a reliable and complete picture
of the situation as rapidly as possible. The reconnaissance
results form the basis for the decisions taken by the command and
the operations conducted by the troops.

Par. 80: Wartime reconnaissance is based on peacetime intelligence.

The information obtained in peacetime is generally decisive for
the initial employment of the air force.

In the further course of operations it often saves new reconnaissance
flights that waste time, necessitating only a supplementation or
reevaluation of available intelligence.

Peacetime intelligence activities produce the basic information
that cannot be obtained during hostilities or only at great
difficulties.

Par. 81: Wartime ^{information collection} ~~reconnaissance~~ media are as follows:

Air reconnaissance, aircraft-warning service, intercept service,

28

Karlsruhe Collection.

- 78 -

exchange of information, press and radio scrutiny, reports from agents, prisoner-of-war statements, and evaluation of captured documents.

Par. 82: Every one of these ^{information} ~~reconnaissance~~ media has its own advantages and disadvantages. And each medium has its limitations. The important thing is to use the right one at the right time and to coordinate their use in such a manner that the results complement ^y one another instead of overlapping.

^{A synthesis of} ~~A~~ The reconnaissance information (air reconnaissance, intercept, aircraft-warning service, and reports from adjacent headquarters) collected and evaluated by the air report gathering station at the command post of the air force headquarters in the field produces the estimate of the situation. Every staff must transmit significant information to its own units and other staffs without delay.

Air Reconnaissance

Par. 83: Under favorable circumstances, air reconnaissance ^{produces} ~~rapidly~~ and comprehensively an over-all estimate of the situation as well as numerous details.

But air reconnaissance can only determine whatever is visible to the eye or can be photographed. It fails in

- 79 -

establishing details to which it has no access.

Moreover, air reconnaissance is hampered by the adversary, ~~XXX~~ by unfavorable weather, and by restrictions to certain hours of the day when there is sufficient light. This type of reconnaissance can therefore produce only extracts of the situation. And even these are based on momentary observations.

On the other hand, the range of air reconnaissance is so extensive that the over-all results can compensate for the fact that the information has gaps and covers a limited period.

Par. 84: The air reconnaissance of the Air Force, Army, and Navy serves the purposes of each service and simultaneously also the over-all conduct of warfare. The Armed Forces High Command must therefore ^{delineate} ~~define~~ the territorial and functional ^{information collection} ~~reconnaissance~~ responsibilities of each service and define its own ^{collection} ~~reconnaissance~~ requirements.

Par. 85: The reconnaissance area of the Air Force is usually beyond the reconnaissance areas of the Army and Navy. If possible, the delineation should follow geographical lines.

At the beginning of war, air force reconnaissance on land usually starts beyond the assumed assembly and staging areas of the enemy ground forces. Exceptional situations require different reconnaissance missions.

- 80 -

Par.86: During the course of operations the reconnaissance areas and missions will shift frequently. The activities of the reconnaissance units, however, will be facilitated by maximum consistency.

Par.87: To economize forces, it may be indicated to delegate some of the reconnaissance missions of one service to another. Care must be taken that one's own mission is not impaired.

Par.88: Occasionally, it will be impossible to prevent overlapping in reconnaissance. The use of air combat forces in the reconnaissance or combat area of the ground forces will often make air reconnaissance necessary. In combatting mobile targets in the ^{land} ~~XXXXX~~ battle area, it will be particularly necessary to commit air reconnaissance units.

Par.89: The procedure for flying reconnaissance missions prior to an attack of friendly forces and the selection of units for such a purpose will depend on the type and comprehensiveness of the over-all missions, on the enemy situation, on the weather, on the time of day, and on the terrain.

Directives from higher headquarters will guarantee coherence in the execution of the reconnaissance mission and effective employment of forces.

The air reconnaissance units of bombardment wings will limit the scope of their mission to establishing the enemy and weather situations along their

- 81 -

approach routes and above their targets as well as to collecting detailed information on the objective and ^{checking} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ the effect of bombings.

Even so, these units will observe anything that might be of interest to the conduct of air operations during the execution of their assigned missions.

Par.90: The reconnaissance process consists usually of taking aerial photographs. Since this takes time, the flights must be so prepared that the reconnaissance results can be fully exploited.

In urgent cases, ^{air} ~~photographic~~ reconnaissance will have to be replaced by visual reconnaissance and radio reports to higher headquarters or by direct reports to assembled combat forces.

Entirely new vistas that cannot yet be fully gauged have been opened by the advances made in the field of television.

Par. 91: Economy of reconnaissance forces for individual mission is indicated.

These forces should avoid becoming involved in combat. If proper equipment is available, they should fly singly, taking full advantage of their range.

Employment of units flying in close order might be necessary, if the reconnaissance mission is directed against strongly defended areas or targets and ~~XXXXXXXX~~ powerful protection is needed.

If the mission requires simultaneous ^{and complete} reconnaissance or ^{observation} ~~simultaneous~~ of large areas, the total requirement of forces will be calculated on the basis of the width of territory

- 82 -

covered by each aircraft.

Par.92: The mission given to the reconnaissance forces must clearly indicate what is important to the command agency as well as how and ~~when~~ to whom the results should be transmitted.

It may be expedient to inform the reconnaissance units about the simultaneous commitment of combat forces to whom they can transmit important observations directly by radio.

Par.93: Reconnaissance missions ^{flown} ~~against~~ against fixed targets vary according to the situation, extension, course, and significance of certain parts of the target. The timing and the frequency of the reconnaissance missions depend on their purpose.

Reconnaissance missions flown against mobile targets, such as aircraft, transport movements, motorized troop units, etc., must take into account the probable reaction of the opponent. On the basis of the over-all situation, the intelligence available, the weather reports, and the terrain conditions as they affect the adversary, ^{should} one ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ concentrate on certain points where the reconnaissance effort will be intensified either by covering a wider area or by flying more missions.

Par.94: To supplement the reconnaissance effort over enemy territory on the offensive and to supplement the aircraft-warning service on the defensive, it might be necessary to observe the air space above one's own territory

- 83 -

by air force units.

Par.95: Night reconnaissance may be necessary to determine enemy movements at night, to reconnoiter objectives, and to establish the effectiveness of bombardments.

Night reconnaissance presumes precise knowledge of the terrain and target, as well as the ability of utilizing this knowledge by night even in comparative darkness. However, night reconnaissance cannot possibly achieve the same results^{as} or replace daytime reconnaissance.

Par.96: The results of air reconnaissance operations can be effective only, if they reach in time those agencies which have to take appropriate action.

Aircraft-Warning Service

Par.97: The aircraft-warning service lays the groundwork for the operations of defensive forces. It observes the air space, detects enemy aircraft, traces their routes, and determines their whereabouts.

The aircraft-warning service command screens the individual reports and transmits them according to importance and urgency immediately to the defensive command agencies and to the airraid warning service.

It reports to the defensive command agencies the landing of enemy aircraft, the release of propaganda

- 84 -

by the enemy, and the airlanding of individuals or bodies of troops.

Par. 98: The aircraft-warning service does not lose any of its basic importance,

even if special air reconnaissance units are committed for defensive purposes. The aircraft-warning service operates in any weather, even though it is affected by low clouds, rain, fog, and bad visibility.

It is capable ^{of} ~~to~~ observe the air space without interruption. Herein resides its special forte.

The simultaneous appearance of flying units at different points, the difficulty of identifying them as enemy aircraft, their speed and altitude, rapid change of direction and use of cloud formations complicate the aircraft-warning service.

These difficulties must be overcome by effective organization, thorough training, and constant improvements in transmitting information.

Par. 99: The loss of elements of the aircraft-warning service must not lead to an interruption of service at any time. Rapid relief must be sought by accelerating the replacement of such elements, if necessary by improvising detours.

Other Means of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Information Collection

Par. 100: Air reconnaissance and aircraft-warning service are supplemented

by other means of collecting information to a considerable extent.

These supplementary means often give hints for appropriate action to

- 85 -

the air reconnaissance units.

Radio intercepts provide data on billeting areas, distribution of forces, approach and advance route of enemy forces, and the success of friendly offensive operations, which are obtained by monitoring enemy radio traffic.

The value of reliable reports from agents can be considerable.

They usually inform more accurately on ^{the} ~~internal~~ morale of the enemy home front than the enemy or neutral press. They might be the only means of obtaining target data for bomber attacks, such as for instance, ^{information on} the key installations of industrial plants and power stations.

Statements of prisoners of war usually produce an idea of the enemy's (distribution of forces), the billeting areas, equipment, and morale of ~~enemy air forces~~.

For more details, see the manual on the conduct of operations, par. 184 ff.

Weather Service

Par.101: The weather service is extremely important in wartime. It operates under far more difficult circumstances than in peacetime because no direct information from enemy territory becomes available. The gaps that are thus created on the weathermap should be closed,

- 86 -

IX if at all possible, by using every available expedient to obtain weather reports via allied or neutral countries or by intercepting information from enemy weather stations through monitoring.

In wartime, air reconnaissance can assume considerable importance

the weather service
for ~~air reconnaissance~~. Every ~~XXXX~~ penetration into enemy

territory should be used for weather reconnaissance."

3. Captured Enemy Materiel Staff at the Luftwaffe Technical Office

A so-called Captured Enemy Materiel Staff was formed to research enemy air technology; this staff was attached to the German test center of the Luftwaffe at Rechlin in Mecklenburg at the beginning of the war. It was composed of a great number of technicians and specialists, whose specialized knowledge enabled them to draw conclusions ^{as to enemy armament production} from examining captured enemy air materiel.

Whenever ^e materiel was captured in any theater, including aircraft that had been shot down, the Captured Enemy Materiel Staff was notified by the chief engineer or maintenance engineer of the respective headquarters. If there was any reason for assuming that new or unknown materiel had been captured, an investigation committee traveled to the point where it was located and investigated the item.

Especially important captured materiel was moved to Berlin and was examined according to scientific principles either ^{for} ~~from the point of~~ *aspects* ~~view of~~ counterintelligence or for

- 87 -

the
evaluation of its usefulness to German armament industry.

The analysis reports of the Captured Enemy Materiel Staff were transmitted to the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command, to the Technical Office of the Air Materiel Command, and to the Armed Forces Economics Staff. These reports were a major contribution to ^{the} intelligence coverage of the enemy armament industry, and they closed many gaps in the available information.

When Goering was questioned about the activities of the Captured Enemy Materiel Staff during a session of the International Tribunal at Nuernberg and was asked whether patent rights were ^{safeguarded} ~~considered~~ before the Luftwaffe released items for industrial production, he answered:

"They ^{thrice} ~~should have~~ gone to hell ~~three times~~, ^{done this} ~~if they had~~ ~~acted any~~ different. Patents never bothered me, whether they were German or foreign."

4. The Interrogation Camp at Oberursel

At the end of 1939 a transit ^{ent} camp for enemy airmen was opened at Oberursel in the Taunus Mountains ^{by order} upon request of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command. This ~~transit~~ camp had the single mission of interrogating enemy ~~flying~~ crews before they ^{in transfer} were dispatched to permanent ^{POW} camps. The reason for establishing ^{the Oberursel} such a special camp was that ~~according~~ to ~~past experience~~ ^{had so far been} no useful information was obtained during the first ^{initial} interrogation of such prisoners at field headquarters or at the command posts of combat troop elements. The Intelligence officers assigned to

- 88 -

such headquarters, ^{and were} whose ~~duty it was~~ to conduct such interrogations, ^{had} ~~lacked~~ neither the necessary experience nor ^{and knowledge of} ~~were they sufficiently acquainted with~~ the over-all situation. ~~For these reasons,~~ ^{thus} they were unable to ask these ^{salient} ~~questions that would have produced~~ ^{designed to elicit} information of interest to the top-level command. Occasionally, when prisoners were captured by a forward combat element, such an "interrogation" degenerated into a sociable conversation that was spiced by intoxicating beverages, ^{at the officers' mess} so that the prisoners were often completely spoiled by the time they reached the proper interrogation authorities.

In 1941¹ a general order was therefore issued by the Armed Forces High Command, specifying that all aviators flying enemy planes who had been shot down were to be brought immediately to Oberursel without any prior interrogation. There, the interrogation was then undertaken according to uniform guidelines that were appropriate for the purpose; furthermore, experienced experts conducted the interrogations in conformance with the intelligence requirements of the Luftwaffe High Command.

In general, it is no exaggeration to state that this type of prisoner interrogation produced valuable information. ~~The fact~~ ^{from the outset} that the British prisoners maintained a remarkable interrogation discipline ^{does not change} any of these facts.

During the early period of their intervention in the European theater, the American crews were more communicative. They answered all questions in a harmless, and uninhibited manner. This condition, which was so convenient

- 89 -

with
for the intelligence collection personnel changed ~~in~~ the course of time.

In fact, during the last years of the war, the Americans also maintained an interrogation discipline that was similar to that of the British.

The author has some personal experiences regarding the interrogation discipline of the British. In August 1941 two British aircraft carriers attempted to attack the ports of Petsamo and Kirkenes. About 25 young British fliers were pulled out of the water and rescued from the many aircraft the Germans shot down. Despite excellent care and very sociable treatment, not a single Britisher gave more than his name, rank, and serial number during the first interrogation. The interrogation turned out to be very interesting, nevertheless: while the men were being served at the officers' mess, their clothes had been hung up to dry in the sun. The Germans had taken the opportunity to search the pockets for interesting documents. In so doing, they found among other items the complete operations order of the group, containing all the information on the scope of the operation, the number of aircraft employed and available, the names of the superior officers and the flying crews, and many details on routine matters concerning aircraft carriers, and the service aboard such ships. The interrogation officer was thus able to tell the prisoners all that and even more things that he really wanted to find out from them. Since several of the young men had two movie tickets of a Reykjavik theater in their pockets, it was also not

- 90 -

too difficult to confront them with the information that they had been to a movie ~~with~~ with a girl at Reykjavik only four days ago.

This extensive knowledge of the German officers produced not only enormous surprise but also repeated loud laughter on the part of the young prisoners. The only one who did not smile was the captain, ~~who~~ when he found out that his pockets had been searched meanwhile and that he had forgotten to rid himself of the important documents before starting on his mission.

An amusing incident, but also a serious one, which indicates that the best interrogation discipline is of no use, if all items that might provide the enemy with clues are not put ~~to~~ aside before starting on a sortie. --

The prisoners mentioned above were sent by air to Oberursel on the next day. ²⁹

The interrogation of French fliers was of no intelligence significance because of the short duration of the combat operations against France.

Of all enemy prisoners the Soviet crews were the most willing to answer questions that were put to them in a special camp at Brest Litovsk and later at another inclosure near Loetzen in East Prussia. This willingness to reveal secrets should probably be attributed to the fear spread by Soviet propaganda the concerning bad treatment meted out by the Germans.

The methods of interrogation employed naturally took into account the

29

Gen.Ltn.a.D. (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Nielsen, 1941 Fliegerführer Kirkenes

(Air Force Commander at Kirkenes in 1941).

- 91 -

national characteristics of the prisoners and their individual personalities, since this was the only way of obtaining useful information. In many instances the prisoners made statements to secure optimum treatment. This slanting of information was particularly prevalent among prisoners who had been subjected to some of the atrocity propaganda that had been spread in some countries during the war and who believed that they would be badly treated. With prisoners from west European countries friendly words, generous treatment, and apparent disinterestedness regarding the statements made were more successful than rough tactics, which usually induced the prisoner to become stubborn.

The first commander of the Oberursel transit camp was Major Rumpel, an old wartime buddy of Goering. He was a very capable and versatile officer who was particularly suited for assuming this psychologically difficult task. Despite the primitive amenities, he always treated prisoners in a humane manner, and the interrogation methods were therefore extremely successful. When these facts became known to him, Hitler grew suspicious, feeling that this capable officer and some of his interrogation officers were too anglophile. He therefore ordered that they be released from their assignment. Rumpel was succeeded by Lt.Col. Killinger who did not make any major changes in the methods employed at Oberursel.

The procedure by which a certain category of prisoners were sent to a

- 92 -

specially established interrogation camp has proved fully effective. The interrogation team that had been specially trained in its field had many years of experience and therefore knew exactly how the enemy conducted air force operations and what his items of equipment were. In asking questions, they could limit the field of interrogation to the areas in which there were gaps that needed filling. Because of their background they were able to recognize interrelationships that had hitherto been unknown from minor indications or unintended remarks. Thus, they were able to add piece ^{to} by piece in an effort of uncovering the well-camouflaged edifice of enemy air armament and operations methods and planning.

together with
Oberursel, ~~XXX~~ the transit camp at Loetzen established for the Russian
one
crews, became ~~XXXX~~ of the most important sources of information for the
German Air Force and also for the Armed Force High Command.

5. Cooperation with Allied and Friendly Intelligence Services

Before the outbreak of war, there had been no organized cooperation between the German ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ intelligence service and those of allied and friendly countries. The military staffs of the allied Axis Powers only exchanged official visits, and occasionally leading personalities met ~~XX~~ at conferences. Occasional confidential contacts between

- 93 -

different intelligence services did not result in any exchange of general information, but in reports on details, if anything.

Even during the war the Axis Powers did not cooperate to the degree that would have been essential for achieving one common objective. On the other hand, the allied countries mutually informed the attaches in a very proper and exhaustive manner. Perhaps the sole exception was the representative of the Soviet Union, if that country can be counted as one of the allied powers after the agreement of 1939. One author ~~XXXXXXXX~~ wrote on this subject in 1945 as follows:

"During the Polish Campaign the agreement with the Soviet Union was arrived at, as known (sic). Upon Goering's request, a Russian air attache, Colonel Skornyakov, soon arrived at the headquarters. The unassuming, tacit, and completely uneducated Russian officer was attached to the intelligence section. Although he was assigned his own room at headquarters, Skornyakov made little use of it and could not be seen for weeks. His principal occupation was to travel. Accompanied by a German officer, he visited all major German cities, showing particular interest for churches and cathedrals. The Intelligence Division could not obtain any information on Russian aviation from this source. Skornyakov, in turn,

30

Gen. Lt. a. D. (Maj. Gen., Ret.) Schmid, Die 5. Abt. des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Ic) (The Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff). Karlsruhe Collection.

- 94 -

was not particularly interested in us (Tr: the Germans). He only stated that everything was better in the Russian Air Force than in the German. He furnished a sumptuous apartment in Berlin, brought his wife from Russian in spring 1940, and shortly afterward left Germany without returning. He was not replaced by another officer."

It is probably in the nature of intelligence work that the information obtained is carefully kept secret and that the personnel engaged in this activity do not trust their best friends. Nevertheless, the German intelligence personnel succeeded during the war in carefully establishing contacts with the intelligence services of some friendly countries. Dr. Paul Leverkuehn, presently a member of the Bundes-tag (German parliament, lower house) and formerly associated with the Counterintelligence Office of the Armed Forces High Command, writes on this subject as follows:

"During the military operations in the Balkans the German forces benefited from the information obtained by the German counter-intelligence agencies that had been active in those areas. In addition, they also profited from the carefully established and maintained cooperation with Hungarian, Bulgarian, and partly also Romanian intelligence services."~~XXXXXX~~

"Other sources of information were the reports from the military attaches and the exchange of data with friendly intelligence services.

For this purpose, the Counterintelligence

31

Dr. Paul Leverkuehn, Der militaerische Nachrichtendienst (The Military Intelligence Service), extracted from Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges (The Balance Sheet of World War II) p. 204.

- 95 -

31a

Office of the Armed Forces High Command acted as intermediary."

Another statement made by the same author indicates that friendly relations were also maintained with the Spanish intelligence service. He writes on this subject as follows:

"The counterintelligence staff has submitted information on the imminent Allied landings in North Africa. Moreover, Hitler and the political and military authorities must have known that the Spanish intelligence service had received similar information."

31 b

Another proof of the German cooperation with Spanish intelligence personnel was the so-called Case ~~XXXX~~ Martin. It indicates that at least the British were oriented on the connection between the German and Spanish intelligence services. The Case Martin was an English attempt to play secret documents into German hands. For this purpose, a British submarine ^{ed} abandon^d a corpse near the Spanish coast, which was dressed in a British major's uniform. The "Major Martin" carried documents indicating that landings were intended on Sardinia, not in Sicily. The British plan succeeded completely: the German Armed Forces High Command was immediately informed. However, no decisive changes in the defensive dispositions in the Mediterranean area were made, not because the documents did not seem true but because their contents seemed too unrealistic from a military point of view.

31a
Ibid, p. 206.

31 b
Ibid, p. 207.

- 96 -

With regard to German contacts with the Romanian intelligence service
 32
 dating back to pre-World War II days, Dr. Paul Levenkuehn writes:

"At that time Romania was politically neutral, inclining to the Allies rather than toward Germany. Canaris succeeded in convincing the chief of the Romanian intelligence service that the Romanian economic interests would suffer greatly, if the Danube was blocked as a navigational route. From then on the barge columns on the Danube carried small guard details, composed of counterintelligence personnel."

There are no further details on cooperation with allied and friendly countries in the field of intelligence. It will not be possible to obtain such details because the responsible personalities, who could have provided information, are no longer alive. Both Admiral Canaris and his successor Colonel Hansen were executed in connection with the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944.

Direct cooperation among intelligence officers of allied combat forces naturally existed on a routine basis in all theaters, where combined operations were conducted.

Thus, for instance, in May 1940, an Italian Air Force liaison staff was attached to the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

As a reciprocal measure, the German Air Force general

32

Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p. 209.

- 97 -

von Pohl was attached to the Italian Air Force High Command with a staff of his own. The meanwhile deceased Generalleutnant a.D. (Maj.Gen., Ret.)

Schmid writes as follows on the subject of the value and activities of

the Italian liaison staff:

Relations with staff were good due to its neutrality and despite its failure to provide all.
 "The general relationship to Italy was good ~~because of~~ ^{because of} its neutrality

despite the alliance (sic). The Italian air attache Colonel Teucci made every effort to stay away as much as possible. The mutual exchange of information was minor in volume and rather unilateral. Curiously enough, the Italians showed a particular interest for the British Isles. They, however, had little information on the enemy air bases in the Mediterranean and in the south of France. They had only scanty information even on Malta."

"As early as May 1940 a liaison staff of the Italian Air Force under the command of Colonel Teucci was attached to the Intelligence Division. This liaison staff never provided anything; on the contrary, the Italians always asked for information. The less the Italians took part in the air battle, the more the staff was reduced. Without being able to produce any proof, I am firmly convinced that ~~information was passed~~ ^{information was passed} ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ³³ ~~XXXXXXXX~~ on to enemy countries via this liaison staff and Italy."

Another type of liaison staff were the Luftwaffe commissions established in unoccupied France and in North Africa after the surrender of France.

³³
Gen.Ltn.a.D. (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Schmid, Die 5. Abt. der Luftwaffe (Ic)
 (The Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff). A post-war study written in 1945. Karlsruhe Collection.

- 98 -

Schmid writes in the same book on the intelligence collecting activities of these commissions as follows:

"The Luftwaffe commissions in unoccupied France were effective in collecting intelligence information, whereas those in North Africa did not produce. They had adjusted so well to French colonial life that they were unable to predict the landings of Allied forces in the autumn of 1942. They had trouble in hastily leaving French territory and crossing over to Spain in order to avoid capture by Allied troops."

- 99 -

II. Changes in The Evaluation Organization at the Luftwaffe High Command

a. The Intelligence Division (5. Abteilung) of the Luftwaffe General Staff

Whereas in peacetime the functions of the Intelligence Division were restricted to collecting all incoming information and evaluating it for the use of the top-level command, in wartime the division was assigned a very important additional mission, that of preparing the daily estimate of the situation. This estimate was a synthesis of the daily situation reports of subordinate Air Force headquarters, Army, and Navy agencies, as well as of the reports and messages originating from the other previously mentioned intelligence sources, above all from radio intercepts.

This latter assignment assumed very considerable proportions since the daily situation estimate was composed of an endless number of individual reports and messages, which had to be screened and properly integrated into the over-all situation. The preparation of the estimate of the situation was a ~~very heavy~~ heavy responsibility because it provided the basis for the top-level command decisions. It is therefore not surprising, if the activities of the Intelligence Division, and especially the actions of its chief, are severely criticized in all kinds of publications concerning the German Air Force. These criticisms may be more or less justified, but one thing is certain: the severest critics are mostly writers who never had any insight into higher level interrelationships and who did not always get the right

- 100 -

slant.

At the beginning of the war the Intelligence Division moved with the Luftwaffe High Command to Wildpark-Werder near Potsdam. There the Luftwaffe High Command remained throughout the entire war.

Since it was not possible to move the large high command organization to the command posts established for each campaign, especially since a command train with limited space had been prepared for this purpose, the Luftwaffe High Command -- and thus also the Intelligence Division -- ~~WXXX~~ was subdivided into a first and a second echelon. The second echelon, comprising the major elements of the Intelligence Division, stayed at Wildpark-Werder. The first echelon, forming the intelligence staff of the Luftwaffe High Command, moved to the various command posts as an integral part of the command. The division chief's basic function was to stay with the chief of the general staff, that is to say with the first echelon.

The second echelon of the Intelligence Division thus operated more or less as the preparatory agency supporting the intelligence staff at the Luftwaffe High Command² in all matters that did not require immediate evaluation. At the same time, the principal function of the intelligence staff forming part of the first echelon was to prepare the daily estimate of the situation. The second echelon received its operational instructions as previously from the division chief.

The effectiveness of the Intelligence Division was greatly impaired in mid-1942, when the division chief was replaced because one of his office associates was involved in an espionage case. The new division chief was

- 101 -

a young, inexperienced officer.

The former division chief, ~~Generalitz, A.D.~~ (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Josef Schmid, writes on the subject of his relief from this assignment as follows: 34

"In August 1942, on the same day Goering ordered me to include the SS (~~Schutz-Staffel~~ -- Nazi Party elite troops) in my intelligence agents' network, an officer of the Intelligence Division by the name of Schulze-Boysen was arrested by the ~~Gestapo~~ (Nazi Party Secret Police) with Goering's approval. He and his wife were accused of espionage for Russia's account. He was supposed to have transmitted information from Berlin via Belgium by radio. Throughout the entire month of September I had no more news on this subject. Meanwhile, a number of Intelligence Division personnel were interrogated by a ~~Military~~ court-martial official without my knowledge. It finally developed that First Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen had not received any secret information from the Luftwaffe Intelligence Division, but that his sources of information were the Technical Office of the Luftwaffe, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Forces High Command. The case against Schulze-Boysen was known as the Rote Kapelle Case (Red Chapel); during the course of the investigation at least 100 persons were arrested in Berlin. The Chief of the Intelligence Division was not involved. But, the Commander-in-Chief and ~~XX~~ Chief of General Staff of the Luftwaffe made him the reproach of not having suspected Schulze-Boysen at an earlier stage and of having rejected earlier accusations of Schulze-Boysen by the ~~Gestapo~~ in 1938 and at the beginning of the war. At the beginning of October 1942,

³⁴ Schmid, op. cit., no page number indicated.

- 102 -

I found among the morning mail on my desk a directive, according to which the new division chief was Oberstltm. (Lt.Col.) Koegel. This happened after Goering had made some loud criticisms about me in front of a great number of people. I left my assignment with mixed feelings. Predominant among them was my great worry about the further course of the war and its final issue as well as bitterness about the manner in which I had been dismissed. To leave a division that I had built up and whose work and people I liked, was very difficult for me."

The above-mentioned Rete Kapelle espionage case was a heavy psychological burden for the Luftwaffe because the key personality involved was a Luftwaffe officer.

The author Hans Grimm writes on the subject of Rete Kapelle activities
35
as follows:

"Friedrich Lenz states in his publication "Der ekle Wurm der deutschen Zersucht" (The Disgusting Worm of German Dissension), Heidelberg 1953, that a number of specific betrayals can be traced back to adherents of the Rete Kapelle. The following items of information are listed as having been turned over to the Russians by them: the strength of the German Air Force at the beginning of the German campaign against Russia; the monthly production figures of the German aircraft industry; Germany's POL stockage figures; the German preparations for the attack on the Maikop oilfields; the transfer of German parachute units from Crete to the Russian theater; German bottlenecks in the manufacture of

³⁵ Hans Grimm, Warum-Woher-aber Wohin? (Why-Wherefrom-but Whereto), Klosterhaus Verlag, Lippoldsberg/Weser, pp. 412-3.

- 103 -

locomotives and special valves; the monthly aircraft production figures of the Charleroi plant; details on the layout of the repair docks at Amsterdam; military production and armament industries at Amsterdam and Rotterdam; troop movements along the Belgian and French coast; the blue-prints of an aircraft factory ^{between} ~~along~~ ^{and} the Berlin-Dresden line; the iron and steel production figures of Belgium; details concerning the development of a rifle grenade; the distribution of ~~XXX~~ German ~~XXXXXX~~ naval units; statistics covering the monthly armament production; bomb damages and losses in the Russian theater. Finally, a shrewd radio play informed the Americans that Germany had deciphered the Cairo code. The consequences of the latter betrayal were decisive for the collapse of Rommel's forces in North Africa."

The listing of the betrayals that were revealed indicates clearly what a heavy blow had thus been dealt to the German war effort. Without having had any part in it, the chief of the Intelligence Division was one of the victims of the subsequent house-cleaning operation. However, Goering penalized only himself by the action he had taken, since he replaced an experienced man with a young inexperienced officer.

- 104 -

2. Professor Steinmann's Agency

An interesting organization, responsible for evaluating information, was Professor Steinmann's agency, which was developed during the war.

Professor Dr. Steinmann, who was employed by the Administrative Office where he was in charge of electricity, water, gas, and other ~~XXXX~~ utilities for Luftwaffe installations as a subordinate of the Construction Branch, had already before the war advocated the idea that air warfare against the enemy economic potential and war industries should be conducted by attacks on power stations and long-distance transmission lines. As an expert in this field, he was of the opinion that a lasting disruption of the long-distance transmission lines and the additional destruction of the main power plants would paralyze the entire economy and thus also the armament production of a country.

He had developed a so-called cable bomb to carry out his plans. When this bomb was dropped, a steel cable would unfurl, ^{that} burn ^{ed} through HT wires upon contact, and collapse ^d some of the poles. A prerequisite for the latter, however, was that the wires were not simply ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ^{strung along} the poles, but that they were firmly attached, as had hitherto been the case everywhere.

- 105 -

Professor Dr. Steinmann had participated in the preparation of Study
 36
 BLAU, but had been unable to prevail because the ground defenses, Great
 Britain would put up, made a decisive ~~win~~ victory seem unlikely. Conditions
 in Russia were different. There, the long-distance transmission lines
 traversed extensive unprotected areas. A carefully planned operation
 against the power plants and major long-distance transmission lines would
 certainly paralyze important segments of the Soviet armament production
 potential.

This plan was not prepared during ~~Generaloberst~~ (General) Jeschonnek's
 tenure of office as chief of Luftwaffe General Staff. After the victories
 in Poland, France, and in the other theaters of war, he believed that major
 successes would be obtained also in Soviet Russia by employing the Luftwaffe
 for tactical ~~operations~~ operations exclusively.

After Jeschonnek's suicide, the Luftwaffe General Staff explored new
 possibilities of committing ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ at least some Luftwaffe elements
 for strategic missions. In so doing, Professor Steinmann's ideas were being
 reconsidered. In 1943 he therefore formed a special staff which was given
 the assignment of researching all Russian territory within the range of
 German aircraft for operations that could be conducted against power plants
 and long-distance transmission lines.

The staff was composed of 37 persons; for reasons of concealment, it
 remained within the Administrative Office, but received its instructions

36

The study concerned Great Britain; for more details, see p. 60 ff.

- 106 -

from the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, directly.

During the preparatory steps, all photographs taken in Russia up to that time were screened for long-distance transmission lines. Extensive new surveys completed the over-all picture so that ^{the} complete information on Russian power supply was available at the ~~XXX~~ conclusion of this project. Models were built of the most important power plants to provide more detailed information for the attack units. Based on these data, the IV Air Corps was to fly special missions against the Soviet power plants and supplies after the conclusion of the preparatory work. This corps was being specially trained for flying strategic bombing missions.

However, this plan was never executed. When the preparatory steps came to a conclusion at the beginning of 1944, the situation had changed so drastically because of the German withdrawal in the Russian theater, that the military leaders no longer expected a decisive success from carrying out such an operation.

After the surrender of the German Armed Forces, Professor Steinmann turned over to the Western Powers the data, models, etc., he had prepared. For the ~~XXXX~~ material located in the Soviet-Occupied Zone, he indicated the secret hiding places to the Western Powers.

- 107 -

Chapter ThreeAnalysis of the Wartime Intelligence Collection EffortI. The German Intelligence Operations in Western Europe (Sep 29 - May 40)

As ~~XXXX~~ previously mentioned in Chapter One, the intelligence operations covering western European countries were inadequate until the outbreak of war. The data for conducting strategic air warfare were insufficient, which is not surprising since no political directive for collecting such information had been issued. Great Britain was somewhat of an exception because it had been the subject of an intensive intelligence effort after the beginning of 1939 when Goering had ordered the preparation of the previously mentioned Study BIAU.

After France and Great Britain had declared war, this situation changed radically. The intelligence effort was increased to a maximum upon request of the three services. With the outbreak of hostilities direct operations in enemy countries were greatly reduced so that the main emphasis in the operations against these two countries was placed on the K.O. (Kriegsorganisation -- Wartime Organization), whose agents were active in the neutral countries of Western Europe with Belgium and Holland being given preference. It is obvious that the proper functioning of such a new organization created certain

- 108 -

difficulties and required a lot of time. ~~Any~~ sizable increase in the flow of information from those two countries was therefore not registered during the short time available. It was primarily attempted to direct the agents toward obtaining certain definite ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ types of information needed to fill existing gaps in the over-all intelligence picture. (Among such intelligence targets were high-level military headquarters and staffs, troop transfers, etc.)

Despite the absence of combat actions, the main intelligence collection effort at the outbreak of hostilities was shifted to air reconnaissance. The air reconnaissance operations by the reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command and by the strategic reconnaissance units of the air forces produced good results. Among the information obtained were almost all the missing data on targets on the British Isles and in east France; in addition, shifts of enemy air units were observed as well as the status of enemy ground ^{craft} organization and air production.

The British naval ports, above all Scapa Flow (Home Fleet), were kept under constant surveillance for the German Navy. This observation was as useful for air warfare preparations as for naval planning and operations. Without the photographic data of Scapa Flow the ^{famous} ~~well known~~ attack by Kepitln. (Commander) Prien and his submarine could not have taken place.

- 109 -

For the Army, the strategic air reconnaissance produced photomaps of the border area fortifications and of the enemy assembly areas. After the German operations plans had been determined for the campaign in Western Europe, the crucial areas of operations were covered by photomaps insofar as possible. Photomaps on various scales were thus, for instance, established for advance in the direction of Sedan and to the west of that area as far as the Channel.

The intelligence collection activities of all types were under the same pressure for time as the evaluating agency -- the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command. A particular obstacle was the fact that nobody was exactly informed on the time at which the operation against France was to start so that the proper planning of intelligence preparations was extremely difficult.

Generalleutnant a.D. (Maj.Gen. Ret.) Josef Schmid wrote as the then Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command with regard to the course and status of intelligence collection and of target intelligence up to 10 May 1940, as follows:

"In the six months of the winter 1939-40 the Intelligence Division produced a tremendous amount of work and was always pressed for time. Actually, it was not known when the operations against France were to begin. The Army General Staff was opposed to a start in the late autumn 1939, mainly because it did not yet have sufficient armor. The ^{unusually long} ~~overextended~~ winter, bad weather initially not conditions, and the ~~mis~~cheduled campaign against Norway brought about the delay until 10 May."

³⁷ Schmid, op. cit. (no page number indicated).

- 110 -

"The information on air bases, naval ports, fortifications -- such as Eben-Emael -- and parachute drop zones had been prepared by the end of March 1940. The data were almost exclusively based on attache and aerial photo reconnaissance. At the same time the target intelligence concerning France and Britain had reached a more conclusive stage. The data pertaining to air bases, naval and commercial ports, and the armament industry of both countries had been compiled in comprehensive surveys, consisting of descriptions, aerial photographs, geographic charts, etc. The air objective materials were made accessible to the field forces via the record offices of all the airfields in western Germany."

"The assembly of the Allied air forces were kept under constant observation. Strong fighter defense forces hampered German access to the British air base in northern France. There were therefore still gaps in the information concerning the British air force assembly by 10 May 1940."

"The progress in British ~~armament~~^{production} was observed very closely. The improved Spitfire models were committed in small numbers ~~only~~ at the time the campaign in the West began. Modern bombers were still not available to the Royal Air Force. The combined British and French Air Forces were considered as numerically and qualitatively inferior to the Luftwaffe in Western Europe. The German air forces

- 111 -

were reorganized, reequipped, and given additional training during the early months of 1940. They camouflaged their concentration of forces by frequent mobilization exercises and unit shifts. The lack of enemy air activity was noticeable."

Goering was not satisfied with the intelligence collection and evaluation methods used by the Luftwaffe General Staff. In order to exploit every avenue of military triumph, he explored extraordinary approaches in this field. General Josef Schmid writes in the same study on this subject:

"In the winter 1939-40, the Chief of the Intelligence Division was assigned a special mission. In Kassel lived a doctor of medicine who was more than 70 years old and whose name was Herrmann. This doctor was a fortune teller who used a pendulum for this purpose. He assumed various tasks which he believed to be able to accomplish without fail. These tasks covered ^{such} ~~XX~~ diversified fields as finding gold deposits, bringing down aircraft by electric rays, killing people with electric rays, and many others. Goering trusted this miracle man implicitly. With the expenditure of large sums of money a major operating staff was formed ^{included} ~~XX~~ which [^] a number of deferred personnel. Above all, this group was to produce predictions of matters important to the intelligence field. After several months of activity, Dr. Herrmann and his associates were proved incapable of producing any intelligence.

- 112 -

I was able to effect the dissolution of the miracle staff, thus saving the German Government a lot of money. Apparently, the great savant reentered the scene during the later war years, when the events took an unfavorable turn."

- 113 -

II. The Norwegian Campaign

Since the occupation of Denmark and Norway had not been planned from the outset, the collection of intelligence for this operation presented particular difficulties. Until 1 November 1939 no agents had been employed in Scandinavian countries so that the scarce information concerning that area originated from occasional reports that became available without proper planning. On the other hand, the military power of these countries was no closely guarded secret that had to be especially penetrated.

From the intercept service, whose station at Husum-Mildstedt also covered the northern European area, there was no indication that these countries were making any kind of military preparations. The preparation of an Anglo-French operation, however, was revealed both by agents and by radio intercepts.

After 26 March 1940, when Hitler had decided to anticipate an Allied landing in Norway, the intelligence data essential for such an operation were procured in great haste. The German Navy High Command naturally had a wealth of information since the entire country of Norway was essentially coast line. What the Navy still needed were photomaps of the bays and ports where its ships were to land as well as a reliable system of observation of the British

- 114 -

Fleet. Both tasks were assigned to the Luftwaffe, which was able to combine them with the missions it had to carry out in its own interest. No special intelligence preparations were needed by the ground forces which were integrated into the Air Force and Navy operations; they needed good reliable maps after landing.

The Luftwaffe was most interested in establishing the facts concerning the distribution of the Danish and Norwegian Air Forces and above all the centers of antiaircraft defenses. Accurate photomaps of the Norwegian airfields were required in order to carry out the intended⁺parachute jumps with subsequent airborne landings. The air attaché -- Captain Spiller -- was ordered to obtain exact information on these subjects and to report on same. Captain Spiller, who was a young and very capable general staff officer, performed extremely well within a minimum delay although he had been in Norway only since 1 March 1939.

The principal information for the Norwegian operation was obtained, however, by air reconnaissance; here again most the credit must be given to the strategic air reconnaissance group of the Air Force High Command (Rowehl). Before the start of the operation, no overt infringement of the neutrality of the two countries could be committed. Nevertheless, this group was able to take aerial photographs of all main ports, navigational channels, and of all airfields from Oslo to Kirkenes before the outset of the campaign. In this manner the group produced

- 115 -

the essential data for conducting the operation. The reconnaissance flights covering objectives from Narvik to Kirkenes were made by Focke-Wulf 200 aircraft based on East Prussian airfields.

In addition to the reconnaissance flights over the Danish and Norwegian territories, German strategic reconnaissance flew missions over the British eastern seaboard ports, with emphasis on Scapa Flow. The purpose of these flights was to recognize in time the start of the Anglo-French operation.

The intelligence preparations for the Norwegian Campaign were typical for excellently conducted general staff work using a minimum of improvised means; at the same time, these preparations may be considered as exemplary for maintaining secrecy.

- 116 -

III. The French Campaign

The preparatory steps taken in the field of intelligence collection prior to this campaign have already been ^{partly} dealt with in Section I of this chapter. The collection effort was facilitated by the fact that immediately after the start of the war they were hardly any combat actions. There can be no doubt that the German military leadership would have been in an extremely difficult position, if the Western Powers had started immediate hostilities. The Germans had neither the military strength nor the intelligence data essential for major operations in this area. As it was, however, intelligence agents and air reconnaissance were given sufficient time to fill existing gaps and to produce all the information that subsequently permitted the conduct of a Blitzkrieg (lightning war). As previously mentioned, the air reconnaissance operations played the main part in obtaining this information. But the practical experience gained by German airmen in ^{encounters with} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ enemy aircraft during the Sitzkrieg (sitting war)³⁸ was of great importance to the German intelligence effort, since it permitted a better evaluation of the enemy forces. According to these experiences, the French Air Force was not considered very highly, while encounters with British fighters convinced the Germans that these opponents were not to be ignored.

38

This was the term used by German military for the phony-war period up to 10 May 1940.

- 117 -

Nevertheless, by 10 May 1940 the Germans had a completely accurate picture of the troop and air force dispositions of their opponents. They also had all photographic data ^{needed} to carry out the planned operations.

During the French Campaign the collection of intelligence was limited almost exclusively to air reconnaissance, prisoner-of-war interrogation, and the interrogation of local inhabitants.

Of outstanding importance for the conduct of the swift blitzkrieg movements was only the air reconnaissance, which was all the more important because the weather was good almost throughout the entire campaign. The main part in the air reconnaissance was played by tactical and strategic reconnaissance for conducting ground operations. Reconnaissance missions to uncover the whereabouts of enemy air force units were of secondary importance. This neglect of enemy air force units in flying air reconnaissance missions can be explained by the low esteem in which the hostile forces' combat value was held, quite apart from the fact that the Germans assumed that they had incapacitated the essential elements during the very first days of the campaign.

The photo reconnaissance missions for ground operations and thus also for the primarily tactical employment of the Luftwaffe overlapped frequently. Quite often army reconnaissance aircraft, reconnaissance planes of the air forces and air corps as well as strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the Luftwaffe High Command were

- 118 -

engaged in the same mission. Even though such mistakes in command and staff procedures did not do any actual harm, they must be condemned as ^{a wasteful} ~~inefficient~~ employment of available forces. It can be explained only if one remembers that military events suddenly took an unexpectedly swift and precipitated turn.

The over-all results of the German air reconnaissance during the entire French Campaign were outstanding. There was hardly any serious doubt in the ^{momentary} ~~the~~ situation at any time. The essential elements of information for conducting tactical and strategic operations of all three services were thus always available.

The true value of information obtained before the start of an operation can be exactly assessed after the complete defeat of one's opponent. General-
 39
lt. a.D. (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Josef Schmid writes on this subject:

"The strength, equipment, and striking force of the French Air Force, insofar as it was supposed to support the ground forces, had been correctly evaluated down to individual figures. This fact was confirmed after the campaign by the former assistant to the air attache, Stehlin. The French bomber forces located in central France had been overestimated. They consisted only of cadre units. They had only just begun to receive their equipment."

"The presence of British bombers in central France turned out to be a hoax."

39

Schmid, Intelligence Division, (no page number indicated). Karlsruhe Collection.

- 119 -

"The French aircraft industry was even worse organized and had a lower capacity than the Germans had assumed. The treatment of German airmen who bailed out or made forced landings by the French civilian population was unworthy of the Grande Nation (Information based on statements made by flying personnel who returned from prisoner-of-war camps, such as for instance General Kammhuber.). The assassination of German airmen by the French was established and registered in reports."

"The over-all evaluation of the Royal Air Force during the French Campaign was unfavorable. The strength of the flying units committed in northern France had been greatly overestimated. The Germans had anticipated that British bomber units would raid during daytime the vulnerable and overextended German lines of communication, but no such raids took place."

- 120 -

IV. The Battle of Britain

The intelligence data for the Battle of Britain that started in the summer 1940 consisted of the previously mentioned Study BLAU. This study was no doubt an appropriate basis for ^g a strategic air warfare against Britain since it was the result of extensive pre-war intelligence work. It would have satisfied requirements, had sufficient forces been available for the operation. The preparation of this study and the work that it represented indicate the high standards maintained by the Luftwaffe General Staff in preparing operations at the top-level command echelon. Such recognition is all the more necessary because precisely the activities of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff ^{WERE} ~~WERE~~ subjected to severe criticism by many authors. The failure of the Battle of Britain is often attributed to the activities of this division and its chief.

For this reason, the opinion of Generalltn. a.D. (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Josef Schmid, then Chief of the Intelligence Division, is hereby quoted as follows:

"The Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command was intensively engaged in the preparation of target intelligence. Photo reconnaissance results from mission flown over the British Isles provided ample source material. Photo mosaics taken from economic publications and atlases complemented the information for the flying forces. In addition, data were computed on the British ports and the various ~~industries~~ ^{industries}

40

Schmid, Intelligence Division (no page number indicated). Karlsruhe Collection.

- 121 -

industrial installations, with emphasis on giving the air vulnerability of each target in detail"

"... Intelligence Estimate: After the campaign in the West, the British concentrated their efforts on ascertaining the air defense capability of their islands. The reorganization of the fighter arm was essential for that purpose. The British fighter squadrons and distribution became well known during July 1940 and the following months. Insofar as it can be remembered, the number of fighter combat units, equipped with Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft, was about 1,000. The number of antiaircraft guns was not known to the Germans. They did know, however, that there was a shortage of small-caliber antiaircraft guns because so many guns of this type were needed by the Air Force, Army, Navy, and commercial shipping. The British bomber forces were by no means up-to-date by summer 1940. They were weak, consisting of approximately 600 - 700 Wellington, Hampden, and Whitley aircraft which were available to the Bomber Command for ready commitment. The performance of the Spitfire was being improved by the introduction of the new Merlin engine; the change-over was in full swing. Similar efforts were being made to improve the performance of the bombers and to ^{increase} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ their armament. But, the United States could not rapidly furnish something better, and British aircraft models were not yet ready for mass production. During the Battle for Britain the fighter arm suffered extremely heavy losses, particularly in materiel. The lowest point was probably reached at the end of August - beginning of September. At that time there were days when the

-122-

number of aircraft available for commitment had dropped to 100 as the result of the fighting that had preceded for several days. Even the transfer of squadrons from the Midlands and northern England to the south coast did not materially increase that number. On the other hand, during intervals in the fighting caused by bad weather, the fighter units recovered their strength considerably and ^{and} increased ~~XX~~ rapidly to 300 - 400 aircraft. Because of the then defective communications security of the British fighters, the Germans were able to establish all their strength figures and information on employment of forces. The Royal Air Force's weakness and plight were such, that even Gladiator models were being committed and that replacements for the fighter squadrons were pulled out of the officer training units of the Bomber Command.

During the course of the Battle of Britain and the German night bomber attacks, the British Fighter Command very soon (October 1940?) decided to commit night fighters. As in Germany, single-engine aircraft seem to have been used for the first trial flights. The success of the first night fighter sorties was apparently minor. The German night bomber units did not report the surprise intervention of numerous British night fighters until April 1941. The extensive and costly ^guse of barrage balloons at various heights to protect pinpoint^g and area targets surprised the Germans. The actual effectiveness of these balloons -- measured in terms of destroyed planes -- was small, whereas the deterrent effect on day and night bombers was major. Equally

- 123 -

unexpected was the tremendous use of all other means of antiaircraft defense except for flak, such as searchlights, rocket barrages, and flak rockets. Commercial vessels of all types were quickly and successfully armed with small-caliber antiaircraft weapons and other defensive measures, such as smoke screens, standing still, reducing steam, fake maneuvers, were introduced for naval craft. The British ability to improvise, noticeable even in peacetime, was manifest. The Battle of Britain forcibly advanced the developments in the entire field of high frequency techniques to an unexpected degree and at an unprecedented rate. New methods of fighter command procedures were introduced, aircraft and ground equipment was modernized and adjusted to defensive purposes, and interference and deception were practiced at an early stage. The emergency period during the Battle of Britain led to an advance in the development of high frequency equipment of all kinds for offensive and defensive operations of the Royal Air Force, so that the latter had at least one year's head start over its German counterpart. Since I later became closely acquainted with the so-called high-frequency-war, when I was assigned to the defense of the Reich, I have the greatest admiration for the British performance in this field."

"The Battle of Britain was lost by Germany. There are today some people among former Luftwaffe personnel who have a tendency of blaming also the wrong intelligence estimate of the Intelligence Division for the outcome of the lost battle. On the other hand, the assumption continues to prevail

- 124 -

according to which the British fighter arm was subjected to extraordinary pressure during the first phase of the battle. For all other points of consideration, it is best to refer to Study BLAU. An "intelligent air force high command", after analysing that study and relating it to its own striking power, might have conducted the Battle of Britain quite differently or might have decided to abstain from such a battle altogether. Finally, one should point out that all intelligence information of various kinds had been distributed so widely and extensively to the combat airfields that there was over abundance."

"All German ~~preparation- for an invasion~~ were a complete bluff. The Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command had to contribute to this bluff by dropping faked invasion plans above the British Isles by parachute during summer and autumn 1940."

The above statements of the former Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff indicate that Study BLAU was the basic document for the operation against Great Britain. A coordinated intelligence collection effort going beyond that study was conducted shortly before the start of the Battle for Britain, and then ^{with} ~~in~~ extreme haste. During the French Campaign the interest of ~~all~~ military agencies was focused on the course of the

- 125 -

operations in France proper. The problems concerning Great Britain ~~proper~~ were obviously not being considered more ^{seriously} ~~intensively~~ for the simple reason that all agencies -- both the political and military ones -- were convinced that the war was over once France was defeated. This concept was justified by the passive attitude of the British ground, ~~naval~~, and air forces during the French Campaign. The successful withdrawal of the bulk of British troops near Dunkerque was not considered to be a factor that would strengthen the British in their will to resist. On the contrary, the German intelligence collecting and evaluating services hoped that the disarmed and defeated army would depress the morale of the British population. The change in the British leadership that had meanwhile occurred -- when Churchill became Prime Minister -- and the appointment of a new production minister -- Beaverbrook -- ^{in their triumphant mood} were not properly recognized by the Germans who ^{overlooked} these warning signals of growing British will to resist. The Germans generally believed that the British, having an army without weapons, had no possible chance of continuing the war by themselves.

The principal factor, however, in hampering any planned activity against Great Britain was Hitler's well-known aversion to conducting warfare against Britain and to weakening that country's stature as a major power. All leading politicians and military men on the German side were

- 126 -

convinced that, after his victory over France, Hitler would succeed in making Britain conclude a peace treaty with Germany. Only after Hitler had failed in his attempt to do so, did the various German governmental agencies realize that the war against Britain would have to be continued.

In evaluating the available data for a war against the British Isles, which had meanwhile become a necessity, one must take into account that the essential part of these data -- the operational study BIAU -- was prepared in 1939 from information that was mostly even more antiquated than that. The rapid development of the British aerial armament, though anticipated in this study, was not fully known at the time the study was written. During the French Campaign and the first part of the Battle of Britain there was no sign of a renovation of the Royal Air Force. The Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command was therefore fully justified in assuming that the British fighters^{strength} had reached a new low at the end of August-beginning of September, 1940. German intelligence failed to take into account that the British aircraft production had meanwhile been developed to a point that permitted to replenish decimated units shortly they came out of combat after ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and even to increase their strength. The Germans simply did not know how readily the British were able to replace lost aircraft. The personnel losses were never truly disastrous because a major portion of the crews could parachute over British territory or rescue themselves somehow so that they could be committed again. This unawareness on the part of the Germans shows that there was either

- 127 -

a gap in the intelligence collection effort or a real mistake in evaluation.

On the other hand, the Germans could not possibly have any doubts on the number of planes the British were able of committing. The German radio intercept service was ~~XXXX~~ ^{by} that time so well coordinated and operated so excellently that these facts could not escape its attention. This is shown

⁴¹
by the following quotation:

"Whereas the German radio intercept service had been very successful in peacetime and must be considered as having rendered excellent services in all theaters during the war, its outstanding achievements were obtained here along the Channel coast opposite the British Isles. For this reason, more details must be given concerning radio intercept activities in this area."

"The radio intercept unit of the 3d Battalion, 2d Air Force ^{Signal} Regiment, had cooperated very successfully with German fighter units during the position warfare along the West Wall. It contributed greatly to the German air victory in the German ^{Bight Heligoland Bay} ~~Bay~~ ^(?). In summer 1940 this cooperation became even more successful, when the unit started to operate at ~~Wissant~~ ^{Wissant} along the Channel coast. Here, a special radio monitoring station had been established by the Radio Intercept Post No. 2. From Wissant there was direction-finding traffic with direct long-distance communications to the DF stations at Le Touquet -- 6 miles south of Boulogne -- Boulogne, Wissant, and Ostende. At

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Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Gottschling, XXX H.-Erfolge (Erfolgsmeldungen der III./In. Regt. 2) im Kampf gegen England nach der Besetzung Hollands, Belgiens und Frankreichs (Intercepts -- Successful Reports from the III Battalion, 2d Air Force ^{Signal} Regiment -- in the Battle of Britain after the Occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France). Extracted from Karlsruhe Collection.

- 128 -

Boulogne there were also Navy personnel. The radio intercept and DF station at Wissant, which had first-rate personnel and equipment, was situated close to ~~XXX~~ the British coast. It had direct contact with the advance airfields along the Channel coast and sent out warnings each time British bomber, reconnaissance and fighter units took off from England. Even General~~feld-~~marschall (Field Marshal) Goering was very impressed; so much so that he and other high dignitaries often visited the station. At this station were Lt. Thoma and Inspector Barth who performed outstandingly. Above all, Wissant succeeded in fully monitoring the British fighter radio traffic along the English southeast coast. As a result, the station identified the complete British fighter effort in this area, including ground radio stations, airfields, units, numerical strength figures, etc. The corresponding reports were currently transmitted to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff via the Commander of the Second Air Force, General~~feld~~marschall (Field Marshal) Kesselring. Among other details these reports listed the exact figures for fighters operating every day on patrol and defensive missions around London as well as along the English southeast, east, and south coast. The number of British fighters decreased steadily, until eventually only 140 fighters were counted."

"Even though German fighters also reported the decreasing strength of the British defenses, The Germans did not take any steps to implement the landings in England which they had

- 129 -

planned originally."

"The two principal tasks of the radio intercept service along the Channel coast -- as anywhere[#] where strong enemy fighter forces were employed -- were to ~~XXXXX~~ warn~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ against enemy fighters and to inform friendly fighter forces. The first task consisted of ^{alerting} ~~XXXXXX~~ the German fighters to engage enemy units, while the second task was to constantly notify and inform the German fighters ^f of the whereabouts and strength of the enemy units and the enemy's direction of flight so that the German fighters would be employed to best advantage."

"The radio intercept service of the 3d Bn., 2d Air Force Signal Regt., was capable of performing such outstanding services only because it had so much experience~~XX~~ in intercepting English radio traffic. By continually following the evolution of the British air defenses during their buildup and by watching every minute detail, the intercept personnel constantly broadened its field of knowledge. They found out many things because the British radio ~~XXX~~ operators conversed with one another, often leaving^{on} their microphones ~~on~~ by mistake. In this manner the Germans were able to listen in on their extra-curricular conversations which were certainly not destined for enemy ears. The Germans thus also discovered that the British were simulating ground-air traffic in order to deceive the Germans into believing that more fighters were committed than were actually available. For this purpose, the radio station on the ground conducted the entire radio traffic at certain times without contacting any aircraft. Another fact discovered

- 130 -

by radio intercepts was that the British did not intend to launch an offensive along the West Wall at that time."

"Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) Kesselring visited the intercept station almost every second day. The command post of the Second Air Force was also at Wissant. He summarized the impression he received of the station's operation by exclaiming: "What a remarkable job!"

The statements of Oberst (Col.) Gottschling show very clearly that the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command was exactly informed on the number of British aircraft committed, if from no other source than from the intercept reports. These reports also testify to the fact that the British fighter defenses were facing a serious crisis in summer 1940 -- all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. If nevertheless or perhaps for that very reason the Germans broke off their struggle against the Royal Air Force and initiated the attack on London, one cannot blame the intelligence personnel. This was a strategical error made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and his Chief of Staff. If the aircraft production capacity of the British industry had been properly known, the struggle against the enemy air forces and above all against the fighter production resources should have been continued until the British defenses had actually succumbed. This capacity was no doubt not sufficiently known, and that must be considered as a serious failure in the intelligence collection effort, and in second place only as an evaluation error by the intelligence personnel.

Because of the wrong decision made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Luft-

- 131 -

waffe, the German air force units failed also during the next phase of the air battle for Britain to take advantage of the crisis in the English defensive system, although ~~this~~^{its} critical situation was accentuated. On the contrary, when the Germans had to switch to night attacks, they were unable to prevent a recovery of the British fighter defenses and their constant strengthening as time went on.

In summarizing one may state that wrong decisions based on faulty intelligence together with overoptimism in evaluating the existing situation finally led to failure in the Battle of Britain.

- 132 -

V. The Campaign in the Balkans

The Campaign in the Balkans, also, was not a preplanned operation. The collection of intelligence in this area was therefore not directed toward conducting operations against the Balkan nations. The events in Yugoslavia and the plan to clarify the situation in the Balkans before the campaign against the Soviet Union came as complete surprises to the Luftwaffe High Command and thus also to the Intelligence Division. The intelligence data concerning Yugoslavia and Greece thus had to be obtained very hastily by photo air reconnaissance and by agents, whereupon they had to be evaluated. As a result, the information for this campaign was not as complete as for the principal theaters of war. This deficiency, however, had little effect on the course of operations since strategic air warfare did not seem necessary in this area and the Luftwaffe could thus restrict its activities mainly to tactical support of the ground operations.

The decision to seize Crete was not made until the Greek campaign had been brought to its conclusion. The data on Crete were therefore very scarce and also had to be obtained with a minimum of delay, primarily by air reconnaissance. The strength of the British garrison was unknown to the German top-level command and staff agencies, even though the counter-intelligence organization made every effort to obtain some information by dispatching and interrogating

- 133 -

agents. The air reconnaissance missions were flown by 2 reconnaissance squadrons of VIII Air Corps and 1 reconnaissance squadron of XI Air Corps (Parachute Corps). The principal mission of these squadrons was to observe shipping in the sea around Crete, to establish the number of vessels in the ports, and to reconnoiter the defensive and air force installations on the island. The squadron belonging to the parachute corps reconnoitered landing fields, field fortifications, artillery positions, troop billeting areas, etc.

The following official information is available on the results of this important reconnaissance activity:

42

"The intelligence estimate resulting from that information was as follows:

- a. Suda Bay was the most important port on Crete. Few war ships were present, whereas there were a certain number of commercial ships that changed frequently. The landing facilities at Rethimon, Heraclion, at the Gulf of Mirabella, at Ierapetra, and in the Bay of Messara were very limited.
- b. There were usable airfields with runways near Malemes and Heraclion. An airfield with limited facilities was near Rethimon. The total number of aircraft at these fields varied from 25 to 40 planes, most of them fighters and a few bomber aircraft.
- c. The flak defenses in the Canea area were strong; the same was true of

 42

Extracts from a report of the Fourth Air Force, dated 28 November 1941, Crete. Karlsruhe Collection.

- 134 -

Suda Bay, the Malemes airfield, and the Rethimon and Heraclion areas.

- d. According to the statements of agents and prisoners of war, the island garrison was estimated at about one division plus elements of troops which had escaped from Greece.

The constant observation of the shipping to and from Crete did not give exact information since these ships brought in and removed personnel and supplies. A direct observation of the convoy traffic in Cretian waters was not possible because both the arrival and departure of ships in Suda Bay, like all other ocean shipping around Crete, took place under cover of darkness.

- e. The attitude of the population of Crete was difficult to assess. The Germans believed that, in order to obtain equally favorable treatment as the Greek population on the mainland, the islanders would assist the Axis Powers or at least maintain a neutral attitude.

- f. No major fortifications were observed despite detailed photo reconnaissance.

Reports from agents indicated that some natural caves were being used as storage dumps.

- g. The terrain conditions of the island limited the execution of a parachute or airlanding operation to the

- 135 -

three areas along the northern coast, where airfields were available.

Here, the Germans would have to face strong defenses, since these were the key positions of the island.

That these intelligence estimates did not correspond to the conditions the Germans actually encountered had its cause in the early preparations of the British who had started to build defensive fortifications on the island long before the Germans had initiated military operations in the Balkans. Also, the British had masterfully disguised all fortifications. Some of the antiaircraft gun positions identified on the aerial photographs were dummy positions, and the real emplacements were not recognized.

The mostly contradictory statements of agents could not be properly corroborated because of lack of time.

Great Britain was firmly decided to defend Crete. For this purpose, the British were ready to offer tough resistance, as the course of operations was to show, and to commit their naval vessels.

The British were aware of the fact that an attack on Crete would have to be staged as an airborne operation. Their defenses had been prepared accordingly. Strong points organized for all-around defense had been established around the airfields and at all points where they could serve a useful purpose.

- 136 -

In so doing, the British placed special emphasis on keeping the ^{heavy} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ weapons ~~XXXXXX~~ within range of the airfields.

The island garrison was far stronger than the Germans had presumed.

Subsequent *disclosed*
After-action reports indicated that the garrison was composed of about

22,000 men; there were 24 combat battalions, 1 artillery regiment, and

approximately 40 tanks. Moreover, the civilian population sided with the

British, participating actively in the defensive actions against the

Germans, particularly in the western section of the island.

- 137 -

VI. The Russian Campaign

The German intelligence effort preceding the start of the Russian Campaign is subjected to various criticism by expert and laymen writers who almost without exception are absolutely unfavorable in their judgment.

One must state in advance that the German Armed Forces High Command and thus also the Luftwaffe Operations Staff were actually not very well oriented concerning the Soviet Union, when they received the order to prepare a campaign against Russia at the end of 1940. Their knowledge remained rather sketchy until the start of the campaign.

The outsider will consider this ~~NA~~ curious, particularly if he is told that for many years -- until 1932 -- the German and Red Army leaders maintained close relations, that the Germans had troop training installations in Russia for weapons they were not allowed to have according to the Versailles Treaty, and that the Germans and Russians exchanged visits at maneuvers and inspected each others' troops.

These facts are true, but nevertheless the Russian sphinx succeeded in camouflaging its real face despite all these contacts and ties. Before criticizing any particular agency or person, one must realize the very special circumstances that contributed to this situation. It is in the nature of the Russian and even more of the Communist, to distrust everything foreign. Despite the prevailing good relations with the Soviet Union,

- 138 -

the German experts and training units located in Russia were unable to obtain any insight into the organization and strength of the Soviet armed forces. Certain special observations that were inevitable were useless for obtaining an over-all picture. During troop visits and maneuvers it was possible to get a superficial and mostly deficient idea of ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{the} training and equipment of certain Russian troop elements, but no more than that. There never had been an exchange of information regarding the two countries and their armed forces. If despite the Soviet Union's effort to keep its military strength absolutely secret from its political friend, German intelligence had a fairly accurate picture of the Soviet armed forces, until 1932, this fact is irrelevant for the estimate of the Soviet Union in 1941. Of real importance was, however, that the Soviet armed forces and armament production never stopped advancing throughout the years of collaboration with Germany and particularly from 1933 until 1941. The Soviet military forces and armament of 1941 had no similarity with what existed in this field in 1930.

After 1933 the Germans were subject to the same limitations in obtaining intelligence information regarding the Soviet Union as any other nation. Perhaps, they encountered even more distrust than some other foreigners. The Iron Curtain separating the

- 139 -

Russian territory from the rest of the world prevented any insight into Soviet-dominated areas. The German diplomats and military attaches had no more means and ways of obtaining information than those of other countries. To establish a network of agents within this area was almost hopeless in view of the strict border control and the close supervision of the entire national life. To recruit agents from among the Russian people was almost impossible. Mutual ^{suspicion} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and fear of spying deterred the Russian from acquiring any knowledge beyond the narrowest scope of his work and his ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ field of activity, preventing any investigation of wider spheres of activity.

Even when it was possible to introduce here or there an agent, such as ^a ~~a~~ Russian-speaking national of ^{related ethnic origin} ~~racially-similar adjacent peoples (???)~~, the difficulties that were encountered in the field of transmitting information were insurmountable. To establish a courier service was impossible, the ordinary Soviet citizen was not permitted to travel outside his country, and the tourists were subjected to strict controls. People who had illegally entered the country had no chance of leaving it through normal channels.

Other possibilities of transmitting information were:

Illegal bordercrossing by the courier -- a very dangerous undertaking since

- 140 -

the frontiers were well guarded;

Dropping carrier pigeons by night with parachutes in desolate regions; and

Radio communication.

All these⁴ possibilities involved considerable risks for the agent, and for this reason it was far from easy to find someone to take such risks.

Up to 1939 the achievements of the intelligence service directed against Russia were therefore very poor. The analysis of the Soviet press also produced far less material than that of Western nations, where the press enjoyed full freedom. In many matters the German military leaders therefore had to rely on guesswork and assumptions. For this reason, the opinions on the Russian military forces and armament potential were either outdated or differed greatly.

Relatively sound information was produced by Oberst (Col.) Aschenbrenner, the air attache who spoke Russian perfectly and overcame many a handicap in his efforts. He reported on his activities as follows, writing⁴³ after the war:

"With regard to obtaining information: Jeachonnek had given me the following mission as air attache: "Establish the best possible relations with the Soviet Union, and never mind

⁴³

Extracted from his report. Karlsruhe Collection.

- 141 -

the intelligence angle!" -- That I kept my eyes open, nevertheless, was because I thought I owed that to my country."

"My concentrated effort was directed toward obtaining first of all an insight into the air force production. The key figure in the Russian economy was Mikoyan. For $1\frac{1}{2}$ years I begged him at every possible opportunity to give me that chance, stressing more and more emphatically what we had done in this field. It was not until April 1941 that I succeeded in obtaining Mikoyan's approval for a visit of 10 German experts who would be permitted to see about 20 Russian armament and research facilities. Within 36 hours of getting this approval my boys had landed at Moscow. They had to wait 11 days because apparently Josef (Tr.: Stalin) had not given his approval. Finally, they were permitted to go ahead. The result was a clear cross section of the air production effort which permitted also to draw conclusions regarding the rest of the armament production. My very knowledgeable experts -- aside from Tschersich and Schwenke from the Reich Air Ministry there were representatives from such German armament firms as Daimler-Benz, Heinkel, Arkania, Henschel, Mauser (Weapons), ~~etc.~~ etc. -- who had very comprehensive knowledge of all foreign armament plants, including the United States and Great Britain, and who were able to make comparisons, were very much impressed by the things the Russians had been able to produce. My reports went to Germany day after day by way of short cables. According to Below, Hitler is supposed to have stated on this subject: "There you are, we must get started

- 142 -

immediately!"

"To my knowledge, there were no other sources of information; it was very difficult to obtain information because the Russians secluded themselves completely from any foreigner. I succeeded in taking the "Atlas of the Red Commander" from the library of the Polish military attache whose apartment I took over in 1940. The German military attache General Kossling had tried to get that atlas for years. It contained very comprehensive data regarding railroads, industrial facilities, etc., including plans for future installations with power plants and their future kilowatt capacity, etc. This atlas was dispatched to Germany, where it produced much information. Moreover, during a tour I made in April 1941 I was able to take along a telephone directory from the Ural Mountain district, which contained much valuable information on the Russian industries in the Urals ..."

From the statements of the former air attache one can gather that he had some possible openings after the joint Polish campaign. Incidentally, after the Polish campaign the Eastern Section of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff was reduced in personnel strength. Intelligence efforts directed at the Soviet Union were almost completely stopped "because the collection of intelligence and the activities of agents

44

ceased entirely."

The Russian-Finnish War of 1939-40 was folloed very closely by the Germans. They could not understand why the Russians were not able to crush

⁴⁴ Schmid, Intelligence Division, (no page number given), Karlsruhe Collection.

- 143 -

the small Finnish Armed Forces within a short time. The German intelligence agencies received a lot of information regarding tactics, flight performances, technique, and strength figures of the Russian Air Force via Finland. In general, the apparent ^{knowledge} ~~estimate~~ derived from the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40 contributed to German underestimates of the Russian combat and armament potential; this applied also to the Russian Air Force potential, more specifically. Then already individuals voiced the opinion that the Soviets had purposely bluffed in a negative sense by performing so badly in that war; none of these accusations could be reasonably motivated by those who originated them.

Truly positive information and data were produced during the winter 1940-41 by committing the air reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command (Rowehl) whose activities have been discussed previously. The commander of this group reports on this subject as follows:

"In October 1940 the Fuehrer in person ordered the commander of Group Rowehl to reconnoiter Russian territory with suitable aircraft, emphasizing photo reconnaissance of airfields. This order was to be executed by 15 June; after that date all airfields were to be reexamined once more within one week. This order was complied with precisely. Simultaneously, around November 1940 an order was issued to the German commander at Plovdiv, ~~in~~ Bulgaria, according to which he and the air attache were to use a commercial aircraft for flying to the

45

Chronology of the Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command, (no page number given). Karlsruhe Collection.

- 144 -

Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Air Force. After contacting the latter, the German representatives were to ask him to make available an airfield in Bulgaria, which would serve for German reconnaissance flights over Greece and Russia."

"In the Winter of 1940-41 the group began to fly systematic reconnaissance missions from airfields at Seerappen-Koenigsberg in Prussia as well as from Cracow (Poland) and Budapest (Hungary). Because of the many different types of missions, the group had meanwhile reorganized its forces. In the winter 1940-41 the reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command was composed of 3 squadrons. The supplementary squadron commanded by Captain Schach, which belonged to the group, was redesignated the 1st Squadron. It replaced the old cadre and core, which were shifted to Oranienburg, where they formed the experimental station for high-altitude flights. The personnel assigned to this station were to fly preparatory reconnaissance missions without warning, were to drop agents by parachute, etc. ^y Eventually, they were to emphasize the development of high altitude flights. The 2d Squadron remained at Orly for the time being, and the 3d transferred to ^{ch} ~~Bukarest~~ ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Baneasa."

"The 1st Squadron, operating from Seerappen airfield, reconnoitered the territory of White Russia with Heinkel 111 aircraft."

^{started}
"The 2d Squadron ~~XXXXXXXX~~ later from Insterburg airfield, covering the territory of the Baltic States and advancing in the direction of Insterburg."

^{ch}
"The 3d Squadron flew from ~~Bukarest~~ in the direction of the Black Sea coast and to the north thereof, as far as possible."

- 145 -

"The experimental station for high-altitude flights flew sorties from Cracow and Budapest into the area extending from Kiev to about Minsk."

"The aircraft used for these flights were Heinkel 111's with high-altitude engines, Dornier 215's, Junkers 88 B, and Junkers 86 P, which were specially equipped with pressurized cabins and with engines tuned for high altitudes."

"One high-altitude aircraft was lost a few days before the start of the Russian Campaign, the crew was captured, but it was liberated the day after the offensive got underway."

"Meanwhile, some agents had been parachuted at various sectors, having been assigned intelligence missions. All these missions were accomplished in accordance with instructions without major losses."

"The reconnaissance mission in the Balkans was flown in addition by three crews using Dornier 215 aircraft from Plovdiv, Bulgaria, starting in March 1941. By executing this mission the group's forces were dispersed in different direction. The need for attaching the individual squadrons in accordance with their assignments became more and more urgent. However, the existing organization remained intact until the start of the Russian Campaign, after which the squadrons were tactically subordinated to the appropriate air forces ..."

During the Russian Campaign the intelligence collection effort was unequivocally concentrated on air reconnaissance. The squadrons of the air reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command, which had been assigned

- 146 -

to the air forces, were primarily responsible for strategic air reconnaissance. These squadrons have photographed major parts of European Russia several times during the course of the campaign, have checked the effectiveness of bombing raids by obtaining photographic evidence, have observed railroads and canals ~~XXX~~ in distant rear areas, etc.

Statements by prisoners of war were another important source of information. The captured Russian soldiers, like the civilian population, were far more willing to provide information than the soldiers of Western Powers. This was particularly true during the early part of the campaign, when in many instances fear of bad treatment on the one hand and perhaps a certain hope that the internal policies might change induced the Russians to talk rather freely. The one exception were the commissars, that is to say the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ communist officials. The collection of intelligence from such sources was complicated by the fact that the simple Russian soldier and the lower non-coms knew very little. Nevertheless, their statements made it possible to obtain an over-all impression, to know the units committed in combat, their equipment, supplies, tactics, and -- since the higher ranks were not much more discreet -- very often also the enemy plans and intentions.

The arrival of large numbers of prisoners of war, among whom there were also many bitter adversaries of the political regime, facilitated counter-intelligence operations that penetrated deep into enemy territory. The

- 147 -

agents could once again resume their activities. Dr. Paul Leverkuehn

46

writes on this subject:

"After the Germans had occupied sizeable parts of Russian territory, they established special centers for collecting and evaluating intelligence and for employing agents behind the Russian front. These centers cooperated well with the intelligence officers in the field and at higher headquarters.

Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) von Manstein writes in his memoirs

with reference to so late a time as the Stalingrad encirclement at the

beginning of 1943: The figures and data regarding the enemy units were

based on the sum total of all reconnaissance information. This information

proved nearly always to be accurate (as in this instance) and ^{was} not -- as

Hitler always asserted -- exaggerated."

As the last important source of intelligence information permitting an evaluation of the existing situation one must mention the radio intercept service. It operated successfully already in its peacetime coverage of Russia and performed excellently during the war. Since radio was often the only means of communication available to the Russian Air Force units that changed so frequently from one locality to another, the Germans were able to draw extremely important conclusions regarding Russian unit strength, sites of employment, supplies, and plans from intercepted radio traffic.

46

Dr. Paul Leverkuehn, Member of the Bundestag, Der militaerische Nachrichtenendienst (The Military Intelligence Service), Extracted from Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges (The Balance Sheet of World War II), p. 199. Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg.

- 148 -

The former Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command writes as follows on the subject of the preparations for collecting intelligence, on the evaluation, and on the continuation of intelligence operations during the Russian Campaign:

47

"Around 10 January 1941 the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff was notified of the plans for defeating the Soviet Union. This news came unexpectedly because the Battle of Britain had not yet been terminated and above all because the two-front war, that Hitler had always proclaimed as having to be prevented, would now become an accomplished fact. The many disadvantages for a successful continuation of the conduct of military operations on the part of Germany led to doubts. In the Intelligence Division as well as in other staff divisions there were many officers who opposed the attack plan on Russia. The Chief of the Intelligence Division, in particular, repeatedly submitted his serious objections to the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. The new plan changed completely the methods of operation of the Intelligence Division. Most of the personnel were now used for topographic and target intelligence directed at the Soviet Union. Since no ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ information from agents or other sources pertaining to Russia had been received, the new orientation meant ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ building up an entirely new organization from scratch. All sources were instructed to devote their energy fully to

47

Schmid, Intelligence Division, (no page number indicated).

- 149 -

the collection effort. The information obtained from agents through the counterintelligence channels had little effect up to the start of the operation, which was announced for the beginning or the middle of May. The winter weather imposed severe limitations on the photo reconnaissance. By 1 May 1941 target intelligence work concerning the Soviet Union had been concluded up to the general line Archangelak -- Leningrad -- Lake Ilmen -- course of the Dnepr. The distribution of Soviet air force units was closely watched until the start of the campaign. Most of the airfields and the plans for their improvement, especially on former Polish territory, were known to the Germans. The German evaluation of the Russian Army aviation was generally correct. The total strength of the Soviet air force support units in Europe was estimated at 2,500 - 3,000 outdated aircraft and about 200 - 300 modern fighter planes. By 21 June 1941 this latter figure proved to be too low. Little was known regarding the Russian antiaircraft defenses. The Germans believed that apart from the flak attached to the combat forces all industrial areas and railroad junctions would be strongly protected by antiaircraft guns. The very advanced training of Russian Army units in combatting aircraft with all suitable weapons as well as the excellent camouflage training given to ground forces were not known to the Germans. The Russian aviation strength figures for Asiatic Russia were merely assumptions, the total strength being estimated at 2,000 outdated aircraft. Russian bomber aviation was considered of insignificant value, which

- 150 -

turned out to be a correct estimate. Although the Germans were aware of the existence of major industrial centers at Moscow, Leningrad, in the Ukrainian Dones Basin, and along the middle sector of the Volga, the Russian aircraft industry's capacity was greatly underestimated. Above all, the production capacity in the field of modern aircraft engines, primarily for fighters, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ was far more advanced and extensive than the Germans expected. The estimate was absolutely wrong insofar as the total capacity of the Russian military economic capacity and the performance of the Soviet railroads were concerned. Both were immeasurably better than the Germans had assumed. The over-all underestimation of the Soviet Union by the Germans was caused by the total seclusion of the Soviet state for two decades, by intentional German propaganda, and perhaps also by the antagonistic attitude of Russian emigrants.

The positive information, obtained from a German industrial commission that had visited aircraft industrial plants at Moscow as late as spring 1941 and which had also been in the Urals and along the Volga, had not been given sufficient credence by the Intelligence Division. On the contrary, the intelligence experts believed that the Russians had bluffed the industrial commission. The German air attache had little opportunity to see anything in Russia and was ill informed, generally. Shortly before the start of the campaign he agreed with the wrong estimate of the Intelligence Division. The combat effectiveness of the Russian aviation had been correctly evaluated by the

- 151 -

Germans. At the outbreak of hostilities the entire European-Russian Air Force was destroyed. It lost almost its entire materiel but only few men. It was surprising that the Russians were able to reorganize and replenish their air force units by about 1 November 1941, when they had some 400 - 500 aircraft, even though they had to transfer forces from Asia to do so. Despite constant attrition, their strength rose to about 700 aircraft by 1 May 1942. The outdated fighters had disappeared. In their place they had modern types of aircraft in addition to the Boston and Hurricane planes delivered by the Western Powers. The Russian Air Force with its badly trained personnel continued to suffer severe losses in the summer 1941 and during the entire course of 1942. The total number of aircraft lost may be estimated at a minimum of 4,000 aircraft. Nevertheless, the Russian industry succeeded in replacing ~~XXX~~ these losses, in delivering up-to-date fighter, ground-attack and light bomber aircraft, and in slowly increasing the overall strength of the Soviet aviation in combat-efficient aircraft. By the autumn of 1942 the Russians had some 1,000 aircraft. Russian^g was approaching total collapse after having suffered tremendous losses of territory during 1942. The production capacity of the industries in the Urals had been of no use, and the turn in the military events that occurred at Stalingrad would not have been possible,

- 152 -

if the military assistance of the Western Powers had not been so effective. Without the delivery of food, aviation gasoline, aircraft, and scarce material from Great Britain and the United States the Russian weakness in 1942 could not have been ~~XXXXXX~~ overcome and the war in Russia would have taken a different course. Whether the Russians would have surrendered is another question."

"The strength figures of the Russian Air Force after summer 1941 were indicate aircraft that ~~XXX~~ ready for service. The percentage of serviceable aircraft in the Russian Air Force never exceeded 60 percent and was usually only 50 percent of the actual strength or actual number of aircraft."

"Radio intercepts covering Russian traffic showed good results in peacetime. During the war, radio intelligence provided the only comprehensive and outstanding reports, particularly with regard to the strength and equipment of the Russian aviation. In many instances it was possible to draw conclusions on the operations plans of the Red Army by observing ~~X~~transfers and shifts of Air Force units from one airfield to another."

There were no major changes in the German intelligence collection methods and sources during the further course of the war. The radio intercept service became more and more efficient in the performance of its tasks and developed into the most important and reliable collection instrument.

The primitive and careless radio transmission methods of the Russians with

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To illustrate the steadily growing significance of intelligence work during the course of the war, a pamphlet on field intelligence is attached as Appendix V.

- 153 -

their lack of radio discipline facilitated the German task. It may be assumed that this was not intentional. The causes were probably to be found in the bad communications facilities in general, which enforced extensive use of radio communications. Also, Russian radio operators were not sufficiently intelligent and therefore badly trained. Finally, there was a constant shortage of suitable personnel. Since bad radio discipline had been observed already during World War I, one may assume that ^{my} a change in this field ~~in the~~ future would take place slowly.

The German intelligence collection effort improved further as of 1942, when the interrogation of prisoners of war was centralized. Up to that time such interrogations took place at air force headquarters, where they were carried out in a haphazard manner. Since these methods did not produce satisfactory results, a central interrogation agency was established at Loetzen, near the Luftwaffe High Command headquarters, where especially important prisoners were interrogated.

- 154 -

VII. The Military Operations in the Mediterranean

The collection of intelligence in the Mediterranean area was considered a secondary matter in peacetime so that there was little information available at the beginning of hostilities regarding this future theater of war. This probably indicates that neither the political nor the military leaders of the Reich anticipated during pre-war days and even after the start of hostilities that Germany would have to conduct military operations in this area. The Mediterranean was considered as an exclusively Italian sphere of interests and operations.

Although Admiral Canaris maintained contact with the Italian Intelligence Service (SIM -- Servizio Informazioni Militari, whose chief was General Roatta), the Germans were unable to obtain any important information either from this agency or from the Italian Air Attache. The German Armed Services Attaches in Rome were equally unable to produce worthwhile data for the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean. This is not surprising, since their mission was only to report on their host country.

This generally unsatisfactory situation continued to exist during the subsequent joint operations with Italy -- the Italians did not know much, and what they knew they were obviously not willing to communicate ^{freely} ~~generously~~.

For all the operations in which German troops eventually became involved in the Mediterranean area during the course of the war, the

- 155 -

data had to be ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ collected immediately before or even during the operation, essentially from German resources alone.

The methods of collecting information in this theater were the same as elsewhere, taking into consideration the political, geographic, and ethnological particularities of the areas involved. Since no basic organization was peacetime ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ available, it was necessary to use wartime media; this meant that collection through agents -- although conditions were favorable for this type of activity -- was of secondary importance compared to aerial reconnaissance, radio intercepts, analysis of captured items, and interrogation of prisoners.

The X Air Corps, which was the first senior Luftwaffe headquarters employed in the Mediterranean area, was at first responsible for the collection of intelligence. The central control of this effort was later assumed by the Second Air Force headquarters which had command over the Italian-North African Area. The former intelligence officer of X Air Corps summarizes the collection activities of his headquarters as follows:

"At the end of 1940 the X Air Corps was transferred to Sicily at the same time as the German Africa Corps was organized and committed in North Africa. The missions of X Air Corps were directly related to the over-all mission -- direct and indirect support of the

48
Report of Oberstlttn.a.D. (Lt.Col., Ret.) Kleyenstueber. Karlsruhe Collection.

- 156 -

ground operations in North Africa. The Italian army in North Africa
disintegration
was at that time in a state of ~~disintegration~~ and flight from the British
forces thrusting out of Egypt."

"The X Air Corps had the following missions:

- a. Direct support of the ground operations;
- b. Providing immediate security for the supply routes from Italy
to North Africa; and
- c. Securing the lines of communications indirectly by neutralizing
Malta."

"These tasks were to be undertaken in conjunction with the Italian
air force units, with the Germans attempting simultaneously to improve
the combat efficiency of the Italians."

"The following additional missions developed during the course of
the operations:

- a. The British naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean had to
be combatted, their bases, especially Alexandria, and the
supply lines through the Suez Canal had to be attacked;
- b. The blockade had to be maintained, that is to say British
air and naval forces and supply vessels had to be prevented
through
from passing ~~XXXX~~ the western Mediterranean and penetrating
as far as Malta or the ~~XXX~~ eastern part of the ocean."

"No time could be lost, since the situation of the Italians was

- 157 -

^{desperate}
 so ~~hopeless~~ in North Africa. On the other hand, the German air force intelligence had very little information on the enemy air and naval forces. This theater of war was only very scantily observed from Germany for very obvious reasons, and there were therefore many gaps in the intelligence. The Italian intelligence data were poor. With regard to Malta, for instance, the question as to how many aircraft there were on the island was answered by: "Molti" (~~Tr~~^{the Italians}: many), leaving it ~~XXXXXX~~ open whether this meant 100, 500 or 1,000. The question as to the various models of aircraft was answered by ^{the Italians} presenting the German aircraft-type- chart for the air reconnaissance service, which had been reproduced in Italian. -- The German air force intelligence personnel therefore had to obtain as quickly as possible the information needed for the employment of air forces and the estimate of the enemy strength, and this had to be done by using German media. The extended and unsatisfactory signal ~~communications~~ between Sicily and Germany required furthermore that the X Air Corps operate independently and that it be equipped with reconnaissance means that would produce results."

Author's Note: The command and staff organization and the training of the young Luftwaffe was still absolutely inadequate at the start of hostilities, which is altogether understandable. The constantly recurring tendency to control units or even individual planes, if possible even during their commitment, directly from the Luftwaffe High Command or at least from the respective air force headquarters

- 158 -

led to the overloading and malfunctioning of the signal communications and intelligence ^{channels} ~~agencies~~ because of ^{overloading} ~~exaggerated reporting~~. The ~~normal~~ staff of intelligence personnel assigned to an air corps or division headquarters was fully occupied with these reporting functions. If one adds such other functions as military administration, military news reports, etc., there was no time ~~XXX~~ or personnel left for the intelligence functions proper, namely to prepare the intelligence estimate. The X Air Corps therefore formed an intelligence ^{message} ~~reporting~~ section that really acted as ^{a go-} ~~in-between agency~~ for the operations and intelligence officers. It collected automatically the yard-^{length} ~~long~~ tele-type messages concerning take-offs, operations, landings, and ~~XXXXX~~ successes achieved that arrived from subordinate units ^{well as} ~~as~~ advance, main, supplementary or corrective reports, transmitting same to a nervous ^{ly impatient} ~~senior~~ command that really failed to realize its proper mission. ^{The} ~~Qualified~~ intelligence personnel were exempted from such ^{burdensome tasks} ~~duties~~ or else they would ^{never} ~~not~~ have been able to produce ^{their} ~~such~~ a satisfactory intelligence estimate."

"The X Air Corps used the experiences made during the Norwegian Campaign to establish intelligence coverage for the Mediterranean Campaign. For this reason, maximum emphasis was placed on obtaining ^{intelligence collection of various} ~~XXX reconnaissance~~ of all types to be used in this distant subsidiary theater of war; it turned out that this was fully justified."

"Aside from air reconnaissance units, the air corps included the

- 159 -

following intelligence collection agencies that were either transferred together with corps headquarters or moved in subsequently: an enlarged photographic laboratory; an overstrength air force radio intercept company with organic decoding section; a naval radio monitoring station; an advance field station of OKW, ABw.I (Armed Forces Counterintelligence Office, Branch I -- collection of intelligence); geographic, economic, and political experts of the areas occupied by the enemy; and a field station for the interrogation of prisoners."

"These units, insofar as they were not Luftwaffe organizations, remained under the technical and administrative control of their parent organization. For operations, ~~KW~~ however, they were subordinate to the intelligence officer of X Air Corps. He assigned them their missions, and to him they had to report primarily. The chiefs of these units usually participated in the daily situation conferences at the air corps headquarters, and they attached a liaison officer to the intelligence section."

The various fields of intelligence collection will be dealt with in detail with special emphasis on their methods of operation, activities, and successes achieved.

Reports of Sighting Aircraft in Flight

These reports were uncertain and their veracity depended on the training and experience of the respective crew in the fields of ground combat and naval tactics.

- 160 -

Moreover, many mistakes were made because of bad light and enemy camouflage. In summary, such reports are important items of information, but for preparing intelligence estimates they can be used only after having been checked by another more reliable medium of intelligence collection.

Air Photo Reconnaissance

This is an amazingly effective means of collecting information, if the photographs are really thoroughly examined. Photographs of airfields were examined with special enlargers. These permitted even with not particularly good or sharply focused pictures to identify up to 50 - 70 percent of the models represented by the aircraft parked on the airfields.

checking of the same
Frequently ~~XXXXXXXX~~ airfields permitted photo identification of dummy aircraft as well as those which were not being committed at the time; the latter showed no changes in position whatsoever and no taxi tracks.

On photographs taken of the fortified area of Tobruk the ^{visibility} favorable ^{light} conditions made it possible to recognize on enlargements the freshly dug-in mines, including the related wire obstacles and gaps in the mine fields.

On photographs of naval forces one could not only identify without fail

- 161 -

the different types of vessels -- it was also possible to establish the damages inflicted to the superstructure and to examine the holes caused by bombs hits.

At first, automatic aerial cameras were used only over reconnaissance objectives. Later such wrong economy was dropped -- the amount involved was so small compared to the commitment of an aircraft with its crew. Two special items of information derived from aerial mosaics of enemy-held coastal areas and return flights over the same territory along the coast: ^{were} A French-built branch line of strategic importance was accidentally discovered in this manner in southern Tunisia; this rail line had not been noticed by the armistice commission that was naturally also engaged in intelligence collection. In another instance, the airhead of the British airlift across central Africa, which was situated far south of the Nile Delta was accidentally recognized on the margin of a mosaic photograph, whereupon it was given full coverage by a specially dispatched aerial reconnaissance plane.

Author's Note: As so often in the history of Luftwaffe operations, chances were missed because of half-measures taken by the top-level command. That also happened in this case. As mentioned above, careful ^{photo} interpretation had succeeded in accidentally identifying an important enemy installation in the midst of the desert. The airfield and dispersal area contained some

- 162 -

300 - 400 fighter aircraft which the British had laboriously brought to West Equatorial Africa by ocean transportation during the last half year or so. The planes had been assembled at the coast and then flown over a long detour via the Sudan to Egypt. This support airfield was insufficiently secured, its defenses consisting of only a few light and medium antiaircraft guns that had been identified on the photographs to the exclusion of any other defenses. Apparently there was no radar screen and therefore no proper fighter safeguards.

The unit commander and some general staff officer at advance posts requested a concentrated daytime low-level attack by all bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft available to the air corps -- at that time, in the autumn 1941, the air corps was stationed in Greece -- and the Air Force Commander Africa who was subordinate to corps headquarters. Naturally, such an attack might have involved the loss of some 10 aircraft, perhaps a few less. But, on the other hand, the British re-supply of fighter aircraft would have been at least halved through destruction. This, in turn, would have delayed the British offensive in the Cyrenaica by 3 - 6 months; this offensive was under preparation at that time.

One must mention in that connection that the constant evening or night operations ordered by the top-level command and directed at airfields involved on an average the loss of at least one aircraft.

- 163 -

Finally, it was decided to launch an evening-dusk operation by one bomber group of the Air Force Commander Africa. This group was equipped with Junkers 88 model aircraft; because of the constant strain and overload imposed upon the flying units -- instead of concentrating all forces for essential and promising operations which is the only feasible method of employing a technical arm -- only about nine aircraft were capable of taking off on this mission. About 2 or 3 of these reached the target which was difficult to locate since the desert was without markers. This was all

the more difficult at dusk which is of short duration in the south. The

achieved little success.
~~success of the operation was of no consequence.~~ The airfield, which the
~~became~~ *became* bristled with
 enemy had hitherto believed to be unidentified, ~~was strongly defended by~~
 air warning service, fighter patrols, and antiaircraft guns within hours
 and days after the raid, as ascertained by subsequently committed air
 reconnaissance planes.

This is not the place for post mortems of mistakes made; rather, an example was given to illustrate the basic problem. The best and most revealing information concerning the enemy is of no possible use, if the command is incapable of availing itself of such opportunities and basing
 of
 its operational plans on the intelligence produced.

Radio Intelligence

The immediate interpretation of the information concerning the airfield identified through aerial photography as described in the above example

- 164 -

was possible only through the medium of radio intelligence. For long-distance ferrying flights, such as between Gibraltar and the Cyrenaica with intermediate landing at Malta or between the Cameroons and Egypt via Central Africa and the Sudan, flight security radio traffic -- however restricted -- was indispensable. It is questionable whether the radio operators in Central Africa and the crews in the aircrafts were aware of the fact that almost every signal they originated was intercepted somewhere -- that is to say wherever reception was best -- by German radio monitors. In any case, almost every aircraft that transferred supplies or served as replacement was identified by its tactical symbols (monitored from Gibraltar) or its manufacturer's serial number (intercepted from the Takoradi station). At the same time -- if not even before -- the chief of supplies at Middle East headquarters entered the newly arrived aircraft in his reserve stocks, including manufacturer's serial number and tactical identification symbols, the German intelligence personnel performed the same transaction.

Author's Note: No doubt, limited flight security traffic cannot be dispensed with during such long-distance flights over enemy territory or over areas lacking ground organization support. On the other hand, it would be possible to deceive the enemy while conducting flight security traffic. By an added expenditure of a few kilowatt-hours, the British air supply organization might have deceived the German intelligence personnel, insinuating that 10 or even 20 times as many aircraft were being moved than in reality. This type of

- 165 -

deception would have reduced the value of intercepts -- the monitoring of enemy flight security radio traffic -- to a minimum. In view of the present developments in technical intelligence devices, active deception reigns supreme.

While the supply line across Central Africa was of only general significance with regard to information referring to enemy materiel and supply reserves, the transfers via Gibraltar could be stopped or intercepted by active countermeasures. Moreover, the take-off of aircraft at Gibraltar could easily be observed by an expert or trained person who simply went for a walk along the neutral Spanish side of the border. This could be done with bare eyes by daytime or by watching the essential illumination of the runways, the searchlights, etc., by night. The problem was therefore purely technical, namely how to transmit such observations to Sicily with the necessary rapidity.

Because of their ^{short}~~low~~ range at that time, fighter aircraft did not take off from Gibraltar but were transported on aircraft carriers that penetrated into the western Mediterranean as far as Algiers. To intercept them effectively, the German air reconnaissance had to identify the British fighters as soon as possible after they took off from the carrier. After sufficient intelligence data had been collected, the Germans were able to counterdirect their tactical operations even without this specific air reconnaissance information.

- 166 -

At the specified time, the Germans flew fighter patrols above and particularly west of Malta above the sea surrounding Sicily. A not insignificant percentage of the aircraft flying toward Malta for an intermediate landing were here intercepted. The British supply aircraft found no better protection by a detour above the then "neutral" territory of Tunisia because they were recognized by German radar sets at Sicily and by intercepted flight security radio messages (for instance by direction-finding of the ground station Malta). The corresponding information was immediately transmitted to the German fighters in the air.

One might add in this connection that the almost 100 percent surveillance of the enemy flight security traffic resulted in the rescue of many crews that were in distress at sea because they had run out of fuel. The German sea rescue service saved these crews in addition to those whose aircraft had been shot down.

The possibilities of immediately exploiting for one's own operations the information derived from monitoring tactical ground-air traffic of enemy aviation have been discussed separately. Naturally, all this traffic was constantly being monitored for other purposes, for instance to find out the number of aircraft the respective squadron had ready for commitment, to obtain clues as to their home base, to know^{of} which model aircraft their equipment consisted, etc.

- 167 -

Radio traffic that had been monitored for some time was naturally well known by squadron, home base, area of commitment, etc. Whenever new code designations, wave lengths or unusual radio traffic appeared in the area under surveillance, ^{by the intercept service} radio direction finding network was extended over the entire operational area with the assistance of a special direction-finding command signal communications service. In this manner the station that had not previously been identified was integrated into radio traffic intercept service.

The decoding service concentrated its efforts on the ground-to-ground radio traffic of the various airfields and logistical installations. (The messages of the enemy reconnaissance and bomber units, which used simple code charts that were changed almost every day for encoding their ground-to-air traffic, were usually decoded the same day.) The radio traffic between ground stations provided extremely interesting information because there were so many supply messages that had to be transmitted by radio since there were no wire communications. These messages were necessary in the North African desert, especially in conducting mechanized ^{operations} ~~warfare~~. The supply messages, in particular, transmitted by transposition cypher, was hard to crack. (It could mean, for instance that 1 was three, 2 was negative report, 3 was four, etc.) In general, interpretation was possible because of constant observation with the assistance of German logistical and technical specialists. After that, the messages became all the more valuable.

After discussing the two outstanding intelligence collection media, one should interpolate a few observations on the

- 168 -

methods of evaluation. To make it short: high praise must be bestowed on intelligence the maintenance of card-index files. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Every enemy squadron had its own file, in which records were maintained of every operation by registering the reports from different sources.

This registration differentiated between reports from German crews, from the German aircraft warning service, the intercept service, etc. For this purpose, the same methods were used as for geographic situation maps, i.e. different colors were used for the various sources, such as red for intercepts, green for photo interpretation, etc.

After a few weeks or months the evaluating personnel were able to produce without delay such data on enemy squadrons as average number of aircraft ready for commitment, kills scored, etc.

In general, the intelligence officer thus had after 3 - 4 months an estimate that was based on an almost personal relationship to the enemy units he kept under surveillance. In this connection the author always maintained the point of view that a truly effective intelligence officer who knows his job inside out must be able to replace the enemy operations officer from one day to another. Obviously, constantly renewed retroactive evaluation and examination of cover designation hypotheses, etc., are essential in order to ascertain complete correlation of the information produced by the various intelligence collection sources with absolute

- 169 -

certainty. On the other hand, such checks must be made, if one wants to avoid falling into the trap of a "cheap" enemy deception in one field of collection. During the last war neither side consistently tried to use coordinated deception in several fields simultaneously. At that time it was therefore almost foolproof to check one item of information against information obtained from another field of collection, before integrating the first item into the intelligence estimate.... Aside from the previously mentioned evaluation based on card-index files, other ^{up-to-date} statistical methods were employed, such as curve diagrams. Because of the more effective enciphering methods used in the radio traffic of British naval forces, the Luftwaffe intelligence adopted the "radio frequency curve" from its naval counterpart. This curve, all by itself, gave a ~~XXXX~~ clue to the opponent's operations. By observation, as previously mentioned, the intelligence officer would for instance notice immediately, whenever British bomber forces in the Mediterranean would deviate from their usual routine -- 4 squadrons in operation, 1 squadron idle. If all 5 squadrons were committed simultaneously, this was obviously an alert signal and was recognized as such. As it later turned out, it was the preparation for a major attack in North Africa.

Aside from transmitting intelligence information to

- 170 -

the German top-level command and to the Luftwaffe High Command, it was obviously also important to keep the German units informed on the enemy distribution of forces and dispositions. For this purpose, the "enemy news sheet" was distributed. In a war of movement such as that in the North African desert, one had to take into account that information disseminated to combat units would fall into enemy hands. According to the motto: "Effect has priority over security," all intelligence information was disseminated down to squadron level. The only thing that was not revealed -- a SECRET classification was put on it -- was the source from which the information had been obtained. In retrospective it seems as if this cover had been sufficient. No doubt, the enemy was surprised at the volume of information available to the German command, ~~XXXXXX~~ when he captured ^{such} ~~XXXXXX~~ data. But no timely change in the methods of radio transmission occurred. It was not until after the Yalta conference, during which this subject was apparently discussed secretly, did the Soviet Union and the Western Powers obscure their radio messages a little more than they had previously started to do. But at that time it was too late, the German evaluation personnel were so well oriented that such changes could be overcome through analysis and interpretation. It is not without interest -- especially in view of the very modest achievements of the German communication security -- that the

- 171 -

warnings regarding the remarkable effectiveness of the German intercepts of radio communications probably reached the Allies mainly through communication security. A specially established contact of the enemy communication security, operating at the top-level command and dealing with problems concerning the military conduct of warfare, repeatedly issued warnings of breaches of security during the latter years of the war. These reports were monitored in Germany, where they could not be pinpointed as to the country of destination because they were transmitted very skilfully from a radio engineering point of view.

It remains an Allied secret -- no doubt the Allies were fully aware of all details concerning these messages -- which country received and above all who sent these messages that produced a truly deadly effect on the German intelligence system. In summarizing one must state that the sources of information should be kept secret at any price, while the intelligence itself must be disseminated and used for current operations.

The mechanics of intelligence dissemination in the Mediterranean theater were as follows: Down to squadron level, ^{every} ~~every~~ unit was issued a loose-leaf binder. In the introductory part, the binder contained general data on the combat area. There followed details concerning the forces of the enemy that had been identified in the combat area. This information was constantly brought up to date, the new information carrying the page number or appendix references of the enemy news sheet that were to be

amended
~~corrected~~.

- 172 -

All that had to be done, was to insert ^{the addenda} ~~them~~ automatically where they
~~addenda~~ belonged. (One has to count with the "indolence" of the flying
 crews who are fully occupied with operational matters.) -- The enemy
 news sheet contained furthermore a special attraction. This was the
 daily Headquarters Middle East report and other foreign press reports
 concerning the combat area. The reproduction of these news and propaganda
 releases was carried out with all the more enthusiasm during the early
 part of the Mediterranean campaign because the enemy press reports
 showed as much imagination -- the word "lie" has been purposely avoided --
 as Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. The German units, isolated
 in some tents in the North African desert, enjoyed ^{reading} ~~listening~~ of the
 exploits of the enemy who had contracted a dose of Arab fantasy. The ^{troops} ~~They~~
 were the best qualified to submit these assertions to a critical analysis
 since they were directly involved in the actions described. With this ~~juicy~~
 juicy morsel it became possible to make the "enemy news sheet" of the air
 corps a readily read and ^{eagerly awaited} ~~anxiously~~ expected item of information.

When the German political leadership ~~eventually~~ decided to interdict
 the transmission of enemy press reports altogether during the subsequent
 operations in the Mediterranean theater, the

- 173 -

troops became all the more eager to receive the daily enemy news sheet. Some time later such publications on happenings in the German combat area were forbidden also within the framework of military surveys. With the stoppage of the flow of such information, rumors of all kinds spread like fire among the troops, much to the detriment of their morale."

These statements have been quoted so extensively because they hail from an officer with wide experience in the general field of intelligence who was particularly well versed in the collection of information. They describe graphically the methods of collection and evaluation as applied in the Mediterranean theater.

In the course of the German participation in the operations in the Mediterranean, the espionage service in this area was activated. The degree to which the Germans collaborated with the Italians in this field is difficult to establish since the responsible persons are no longer alive and because there can hardly be any ~~XXXX~~^{records} on this subject. How effective the information from intelligence agents was in contributing to the Second Air Force's estimate of the situation can be gathered from statements by ~~XXX~~ General der Fl.a.D. (Lt.Gen., Ret.) Deichmann, who was then Chief of Staff of that headquarters and who writes as follows:

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"During the months from the end of August through September and October 1942

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Der deutsche Nachrichtenbeschaffungsdienst beim Oberkommando der Wehrmacht im Herbst 1942 in Erwartung einer Alliierten Landung im Mittelmeer (The German Intelligence Collection Effort at the Armed Forces High Command in the Autumn of 1942 in Expectation of an Allied Landing in the Mediterr.)

Karlshof Collection

- 174 -

the Commander-in-Chief South and Second Air Force -- both committed in the Mediterranean area -- received a great number of reports from the Armed Forces High Command, Counterintelligence Office, regarding an imminent landing in the Mediterranean. Every one of these reports started with the words: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ^{Un-tworthy} According to a ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ^A agent ... "

"Within a short sequence landings were predicted in the south of France, in Sicily, in Sardinia, in the Tripoli area, in Greece, etc. Each one of these reports ^{might} ~~would~~ have had great impact on the operational preparations of the Air Force, affecting such important matters as the improvement and new construction of airfields, their filling with ground and technical personnel, gasoline supplies, bombs, spare parts, technical equipment, and the establishment of signal communications. In view of the great distances involved, each one of the above landings would have required a different disposition of the air force units. The Second Air Force, however, had neither the necessary personnel, nor the equipment, let alone the supplies."

"While this was happening, Admiral Canaris, the Chief of the Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command, announced his visit at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief South in Italy. "

"In the presence of the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff made the following oral suggestions:

1. There is probably not a single possibility for landings in the Mediterranean area which has been omitted from the predictions by

- 175 -

apparently trustworthy agents during the last few weeks.

2. By his present procedures, the Chief of the Counterintelligence Office at the Armed Forces High Command ^{practically} conducts a war of nerves against the Commander-in-Chief South and the Second Air Force, thus aiding and abetting the enemy.

3. Already now there can be no doubt that most these agents are not trustworthy; on the contrary, they are extremely untrustworthy and are obviously serving the enemy."

"If the Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command, is not in a position to scrutinize the trustworthiness of the reports of individual agents, the Commander-in-Chief South should at least be given an opportunity to do so himself. If therefore an agent sends in two reports that seem unbelievable, his future reports will be equally unreliable. To enable the Commander-in-Chief South to check the veracity of these reports, the agents originating them must be made identifiable by some distinguishing mark.

Naturally, this would not mean that the names of the agents or the symbols used by the counterintelligence personnel be revealed. An identifying mark expressed in figures or letters would suffice to show

- 176 -

which reports had originated from each individual agent."

"Admiral Canaris replied that he had ordered all reports to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief South, ^{who} ~~since the latter~~ was best qualified to discern ~~XXXXX~~ what might possibly happen. The request for an identifying mark that would permit recognition from which agent originated several reports was ^{rejected} ~~refused~~ without credible reason."

"At the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief South one got the impression at that time that Admiral Canaris might perhaps deceive the Commander-in-Chief South intentionally."

The supposition that has been here expressed and which arose at that time, namely that the counterintelligence people were deceiving intentionally, can obviously not be proved because counterintelligence services ~~XX~~ in general will not show their hands. After the war, when it was publicized that important information was played into enemy hands from the Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command, through General Oster, who had been executed as ^{an} ~~one of the~~ accomplices ^{of} ~~implicated~~ in the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, the possibility that intentional deception could was used ~~XXX~~ after all not be refuted altogether. On the other hand, it was only natural that the enemy tried to confuse the situation by all means, including deceptive maneuvers; a properly integrated counterintelligence service, however, should be capable of discerning such maneuvers in the long run.

In order to deceive the German intelligence service with regard to the

- 177 -

Allied plans for landing in Sicily during the summer 1943, the British intelligence used some extraordinary measures. The corpse of a man who had pneumonia -- to died from ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ simulate death from drowning -- was dressed in a British Major's uniform that contained the identification papers of a Major Martin. The corpse was brought close to the Spanish coast by a submarine and then released so that it would surely be drifted ashore and found on the beach. In the pockets were two letters from prominent personalities, the contents of which led to the conclusion that the Allies intended to land in Greece and in Sardinia.

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This affair greatly preoccupied the German intelligence and the German command. General Deichmann, then Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief South has the following comments on this subject:

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"The contents of the two letters that the German intelligence people had seized were also communicated to the Commander-in-Chief South. In the case of the letter, which was supposed to have originated from Admiral Mountbatten, C-in-C South, after thorough analysis, arrived at the conclusion that landings in Sardinia, to which a remark contained in that letter referring to "Sardinia" was obviously ~~XXX~~ supposed to point, were unlikely. The Allies would have once again been on an island that was at a considerable distance from the Italian mainland. If they landed in Sicily, they would be separated from the mainland only by the Straits of Messina. According to

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For more details, see The Man Who Never Was, by Ewen Montagu, London, Evans Brothers.

51

Deichmann, Karlsruhe Collection.

- 178 -

German theories, they would have been even strong enough to land directly in central Italy. -- This deception, insofar as Italy was concerned, therefore had no effect. As to Greece, which at that time was no longer within the sphere of responsibilities of C-in-C South, I do not believe that the letter from General Archie Nye resulted in any changes in the defensive dispositions that had been previously planned."

This attempt at deception with "Major Martin's " corpse was based on an assumed relationship between the Spanish and German intelligence services; this assumption was justified. ^{The deception} ~~it~~ was perfectly executed on the basis of meticulous plans, and everything went according to schedule. But -- as General Deichmann's comments indicate -- it produced no results. The reasons are easy to find. An attempt at deception that is too perfectly staged must fail if there exists a strong distrust of such reports on the part of the opponent³; the existence of such distrust must be assumed all the more ~~XX~~, if the report that is being floated seems somewhat unbelievable. Landings in Sardinia lacked all military sense, and an operation in Greece had to appear unlikely to any militarily trained commander in the existing situation, so long as German troops in Italy and Sicily had control over the lines of communication across the Mediterranean. To

- 179 -

carry out landings in Greece, the seizure of Sicily would have been an absolute prerequisite.

As a matter of fact, the carefully prepared and well executed "Operation Martin" ^{had} ~~had~~ not achieved its purpose -- that the Germans shift~~ed~~ their Mediterranean forces to facilitate Allied operations.

- 180 -

VIII. United States of America

The persistently continental outlook of Germany's political and military leaders prevented that country from maintaining an effective espionage service in the United States before, during, and after World War I as well as before and during World War II. For this reason, the German counterintelligence had almost no information concerning the United States for World War II.

The most significant and correct information regarding the American Armed Forces and armament potential was provided by the German military attache -- General von Boetticher. This general was an Army officer, acting simultaneously as air attache, which indicates how little importance the German Air Force High Command attached to information from the United States. Also, it shows that a military conflict with the nation across the Atlantic was not taken into consideration. Although he was an Army officer, this capable general provided excellent data concerning the American air armament before and during the first years of the war. The collection of information was greatly facilitated by the lack of restraint with which American politicians and military personnel discussed their problems in conversations and in public. Additional sources of information were the official publications, press reports, magazines, and the radio.

- 181 -

Very productive sources of information regarding the American military establishment and armament were the hearings on military matters before Congressional committees and the army register.

On the basis of all these sources the Intelligence Division at the Luftwaffe High Command was after all capable of piecing together a somewhat adequate picture of the United States military establishment and of the armament potential in which it was primarily interested. The intelligence agencies involved in this effort were aware of the enormous -- compared to European standards -- industrial potentialities of the United States and they did not fail to draw the attention of their superior authorities and of the political leadership to this information. That no credence was given to their reports or that these reports were considered exaggerated cannot be ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ blamed on intelligence. Despite the experiences of World War I, neither Hitler nor the great majority of the top-level military leaders considered the United States as a potential threat that might influence military decisions on the European continent. They hoped that the United States would not participate in a war in Europe. This was the decisive miscalculation in Hitler's political scheme -- as the result of the war has shown. For, one may assume with some certitude that he would have achieved his military aims in Europe -- also against Great Britain and the Soviet Union -- if the United States with its

- 182 -

tremendous resources had not intervened in the conflict. Such an intervention was considered unlikely, all the more since the German Legation in Washington and especially the military attache uttered even in 1941 the opinion that the United States might stay out of the war, if every effort was made to avoid friction. That the inflammatory propaganda against Germany, which was then already going at full blast, was part of a psychological preparation for the United States' entry into the war and that the very extensive unilateral support given to Great Britain, which went beyond the framework of neutrality, actually meant practical participation in the war against Germany, was -- perhaps because of wishful thinking -- not properly considered in evaluating the United States' attitude. Even if Hitler had counted on the eventual participation of the United States in active warfare, he would not have been capable of realizing the danger that would thus have arisen to his military intentions, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ for the simple reason that he did not went to spoil his preconceived notions by such considerations. Moreover, he did not believe the information regarding the United States' resources. Finally, he might also have believed that he would be able to terminate the war victoriously before the United States' intervention or its potentialities could make themselves felt.

This type of reasoning, even if it ^{had} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ taken place,

- 183 -

was not communicated to the military command agencies. These, having access to exact information on the military potentialities and being disinterested in minimizing them, had only some dark forebodings that the question of peace or war with the United States ^{would} mean the decision regarding the issue of the war. The Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command realized in the course of the year 1940 on the basis of the unequivocal position taken ^{by the United States} and the assistance ^{it had} given to Great Britain that one had to take into account a United States intervention in favor of Great Britain before too long. A first full evaluation of the United States armament was therefore prepared in the autumn 1940. General Schmid, who was then Chief of the Intelligence Division, writes on this subject as follows:

"The Intelligence Division was well oriented with regard to air armament progress, conversion of peacetime industries, industrial and manpower mobilization, and the future output of modern fighter and four-engine bomber aircraft. The information had been provided by the air attache in Washington. The emergency assistance given to the Air Force in delivering scarce materiel was closely watched. The United States' influence on and interest in South America, Africa, and the Middle East became obvious at an early moment. The establishment of the two flight routes across the Atlantic was followed with great interest. The Luftwaffe High Command was informed by the Chief of the Intelligence Division that by about summer 1943 the first ~~XXXXX~~ combat-ready Air Force

⁵² Schmid, Intelligence Division, (no page number indicated).

- 184 -

units would be available in the United States. American intervention in the European war was taken into consideration, but was not considered to be likely. It was not until spring 1941, when ~~Overleutnant~~ (First Lt.) von Werra, who had escaped from a British prisoner-of-war enclosure, returned via Canada, the United States, ~~and~~ Mexico, and South America, that the American inflammatory propaganda against Germany became obvious. But even at that time General von Boetticher ~~was~~ radioed from Washington that he considered United States' continued non-intervention a possibility, yes even a likelihood. But everything possible ^{would have} ~~had~~ to be done to avoid incidents that might annoy the United States."

The political leadership and the agencies responsible for armament did not take any notice of the above-mentioned industrial mobilization of the United States, particularly in the fields of developing and constructing heavy bombers. On the contrary, they ordered the well-known stoppage in research and development, according to which all developments in the sphere of armament were to be set aside, unless the item could be designed and made available for combat commitment within one year. It was precisely this radical measure, which affected particularly the air armament sphere, that induced ~~an~~ ^{with vision} ~~industrialist~~ -- the aircraft designer and ^{manufacturer} ~~builder~~ Fritz Siebel -- to take a courageous step by informing Hitler of the dimensions of the threat presented by the United States

- 185 -

and by making suggestions with reference to the dispositions Germany should take as a result of that situation. Since Siebel's concepts of 1940 proved to be absolutely correct by the further course of World War II, his letter to the Chief of Air Forces Special Supply and Procurement, with whom he was on friendly terms, and his memorandum will be quoted verbatim

53
as follows:

Fritz W. Siebel

Rotterdam/Antwerp, 7 October 1940

Chief of War Economy

Siebel Aircraft Factory Halle Co., Ltd.

To the

Chief of Air Forces Special Supply and Procurement

Generaloberst (General) UDET

Berlin

Dear Ernest:

During our last conversation I promised you to put in writing my ideas and concepts of the air force in the present and in the future, especially in the light of the American air armament developments. These thoughts occurred to me in July, but because of being ~~so~~ occupied with ^{construction} building barges (Tr.: The so-called "Siebel Ferries" for the invasion of England.), I did not have time until today to keep my promise. The

53

Both documents are part of the Karlsruhe Collection.

- 186 -

attached memorandum contains the essential parts of these ideas that I have worked out together with my friend Koch.

Although this might seem like big talk, I don't believe that I am exaggerating when I say that the key to the future of our people during the next few years is in the timely expansion of our air armament. This will be true whether the ~~XXX~~ present war will end soon or only after some time and whether the United States will intervene or not.

Because of the office you hold, your actions will have great influence on our future. You have the elan and imagination to fully realize the scope of the tasks with which destiny has confronted you. In the "Iron Man" ⁵⁴ you have somebody who will back you up with the full impact of his personality and who will enable you to ^{put} ~~transpose~~ into reality whatever he considers ~~as~~ right.

The problem seems ~~seems~~ very serious to me. In my opinion you should therefore immediately establish a committee of highly capable men -- preferably in collaboration with the president of our industrial association. This committee should prepare in conjunction with your leading experts some very precise plans ^{for} ~~XX~~ our future armament production. This will permit the expansion

54

Goering's nickname among his personal friends.

- 187 -

of the armament production ~~XXXXXXXX~~ with a minimum of delay, which might mean as little as a few weeks, the way I see it.

The problem of the skilled technicians is of decisive importance in this connection. The Army must not only put an immediate stop to drafting technically skilled men, but beyond that it must also discharge technicians on a large scale. This is true for both blue-collar and white-collar ~~men~~ ^{#workers,}

The attached memorandum follows up the study of 11 January 1939 on that ~~study~~ ^{study} contained subject. This ~~XXXXXXXX~~ a detailed plan for a constant resupply of technicians, and I still believe that today in wartime this plan should be implemented.

But everything will fail, unless planning and implementation are assigned to one person, to whom the Reichsmarshal (Tr.: Goering) give dictatorial powers. Above all, this man must be in a position to eliminate without delay the obstructions presently caused by the central control of all construction activities. But this is just one of the functions for the accomplishment of which such far-reaching powers are necessary. The execution of every other segment of the expanded armament program -- for instance the increase in productivity of the subcontractors -- will depend similarly on the pivot question whether one man can impose his will without resistance.

Even though I know that you see the future in a similar manner, you

- 188 -

will understand that I feel compelled to submit my ideas to you; I just have to express my thoughts in the way things appear to me.

I remain gladly as comrade by your side and greet you

Heil Hitler!

Yours Fritz Siebel

Fritz W. Siebel
Chief of War Economy

Berlin, 7 October 1940

I.

The United States rearm at an extraordinary rate of speed. So far as air armament is concerned, this American armament buildup will certainly result in a shift in the size of air units. The air forces of the future will no longer be composed of thousands but of ten thousands of aircraft. These air forces, which will be composed of armored aircraft equipped with powerful guns -- some of them remote-controlled -- will gradually develop to such perfection that the air arm will become the exclusively decisive factor in any type of warfare.

The world enters a new epoch of warfare. What had been predicted after World War I and ~~has~~ ^{seems} already ^{indicated} clearly ~~has~~ during the present war, will be transformed ^{numerical} ~~have~~ into reality simply by the ^{increase} in aircraft without taking improvements in aircraft performance into account: wars of the future

- 189 -

will be fought almost solely by the air forces and will be decided by them. For, with enemy air forces having the numerical strength they will possess in the future, it will be impossible to maintain industrial production and to transport essential supplies for modern combat forces and the zone of interior once air supremacy has been lost. We are confronted with a similar turning point in the development of warfare as that which occurred during the transition from the knights' armies to the formation of infantry. Germany should not be retarded in making this transition. If any other country overtakes us, we shall enter a period of extreme vulnerability during which all the gains achieved by the victorious conclusion of this war would be jeopardized. That the air arm would become absolutely predominant over the other arms of the service was anyhow inevitable. This evolution, however, has been accelerated by the start of the tremendous air armament effort of the United States. All this is valid no matter how the present war will continue. If one is of the opinion that the United States will enter the war, be it by direct intervention or by indirectly giving Great Britain full support, the immediate strengthening of the German air armament is anyhow inevitable. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the United States want to rearm; there is

- 190 -

no reason why that country should not be able to carry out its rearmament at all or not according to planning schedules. The United States has demonstrated during World War I and on other occasions that the organizational capability of its industries and the youthful energy of its people enable that country to perform seemingly impossible tasks.

II.

The productivity of the German air armament must at least be as large as that of the United States. President Roosevelt wants to build up an army air force of 50,000 aircraft and plans for an initial production of 3,000 planes per month. These figures are not utopian, in fact they will probably be exceeded. Since we have to count on more than one opponent, we shall have to produce rather more than fewer aircraft than the United States.

The proportions of this air armament effort in conjunction with technical developments, such as the absolute necessity of armor-plating initially at least the vital parts of aircraft with all the consequences this implies, the construction of stratospheric aircraft, of fighters and of twin-engine planes flying at sonic speed and beyond as well as of long-range aircraft, etc., will require very drastic measures. A shift in production will be necessary on a large scale, for outdated equipment will be replaced by new items all along the line, and the industrial capabilities must be adjusted

- 191 -

accordingly.

A detailed description of the measures that would have to be adopted would exceed the scope of this study, but some of the salient features will be mentioned.

To begin with, one must enlarge the raw material capacity. The production of the necessary quantities of steel will probably involve relatively minor difficulties. This is not so with regard to alloys.

Equally difficult would be to make the necessary quantities of duraluminum and electron available. Their procurement is complicated by the high consumption of electric current required for their production. The experiments of making steel lighter by the addition of light alloys without impairing its tensile strength will be continued.

The main bottlenecks in the production field are in the machine tool industry and in the drop forges. There are not sufficient drop forges, their machines are inadequate, and their performance^{is} unsatisfactory. To achieve a satisfactory performance standard, the drop forges must be issued additional machine tools. In this manner two bottlenecks really form only a single one expressed in terms of time factors: the new or improved drop forges cannot begin to operate

- 192 -

until the necessary machine tools are delivered to them. The same is true of the subcontractors in their relationship to the industries producing machines for them, such as the producers of wire-cutting presses, extrusion presses, rolling mills, etc.

The question of skilled technicians is naturally of special importance, both for planning peacetime production and for setting aside the technicians needed for the production effort in a future war. In this connection, reference is made to the study of 11 January 1939 addressed to Reich ^{not only} Marshal Goering. It is inevitable, but at the same time quite feasible, that the Army will soon release a corresponding number of skilled technicians. Probably one will have to make plans for housing these workers -- at least the highly qualified ones -- near their site of employment together with their families, instead of making ^{them} serve as draftees, ~~XXX~~ separating them from their families for many years, and billeting them in camps.

Moreover, the production plants of the aircraft industry will have to be enlarged considerably, in some instances up to three times. This will have the corresponding repercussions on the entire construction industry (Iron, cement, lumber, and various other assimilated industries.)

Finally, one must solve the fuel problem,

- 193 -

essentially with regard to securing the lines of communication to the oil deposits. At the same time the exploration of German territories must be continued ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ intensively.

As a result, Germany has to overcome extremely long preparatory stages, also in the sphere of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ production facilities, before it can expand its air armament. The production increase in engines and fuselages can begin only after the preparatory hurdles have been jumped. The expansion of the armament production must therefore start on the widest possible scale and range all the way to the raw materials.

III.

The United States has to undergo far shorter preparations. ~~THE~~ Its natural resources are far greater, it has access to the raw materials of the rest of the world, and the capacity of the American industry that is suitable for transformation to military production probably exceeds that of its German counterpart. Furthermore, the United States has started its rearmament program already three months ago so that this head start will increase its natural advantages. One must also take into account that the construction of new German production facilities will be complicated by the need for securing and camouflaging these plants extensively to safeguard them against air attacks, a

- 194 -

factor the United States does not have to consider for the time being.

In Germany production facilities, where particularly important scarce items are being manufactured, are especially safeguarded by constructing, for instance, underground plants. In many instances production has to be decentralized, although centralization would be more rational. Special consideration must be given to securing the routes of transportation between the individual production centers.

For this reason the start of ^a further buildup of the air armament effort is particularly urgent. Even if we start immediately, there can be little doubt that for quite a long time the United States air armament will remain superior to ours.

IV.

The necessary production capacity will be reached only if the manufacturing processes, especially those of producing fuselages, are ^{converted} ~~XXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ to mass production and if the craft-manlike procedures are dropped. This would also result in a reduction of skilled technicians needed per unit produced, quite apart from the simultaneous drop in cost. Such mass production methods are opposed by people who argue that the ^{initial} ^{and} conversion ~~XXXXXX~~ subsequent changes ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ cause too much delay so that one cannot produce the most recent aircraft in this manner; they prefer to have fewer aircraft of the most recent model rather than

- 195 -

several times as many of the preceding type. This objection is not valid.

If a model is designed for mass production from the outset and planned accordingly -- this does not exclude that the test models continue to be built according to craftsmanlike processes -- and if ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ a manufacturing plant is available, which is properly equipped for this type of production (Installation of sheet molding and stamping machines, conveyor belts, etc.), the time lag between the end of test runs and the start of deliveries need be no longer than hitherto. The deliveries, however, would be incomparably larger.

The construction of appropriate plant facilities is part of the industrial preparatory stage.

V.

The entire task ~~XX~~ is of extraordinary dimensions that permeate all spheres of the war economy. Its execution is possible only if air armament is given absolute priority in the field of industrial production. For this purpose ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ must be granted and plenipotentiary powers ~~XXXXXXXX~~ placed above the authority of any individual responsible for a single sphere of activities. A far-reaching plan with careful exploratory preparations will be a prerequisite for this new expansion. The size of the task and the competition with the United States will make it compulsory to start immediately along the full length of the

- 196 -

^{The}
 production front. Timeliness, completeness, and speed with which this task is undertaken may decide our future.

The author of this ~~MEMO~~ memorandum -- F.W. Siebel -- who was a former World War I pilot and aircraft manufacturer, had clearly recognized the significance of the air force and ^{of} the industrial capacity required to back it up. In contrast to the political and military leaders, he knew how important the air force was for the eventual issue of the war. This memorandum also indicates that German industrialists were well informed on what was happening in the United States as well as on the armament potential of that country. There is no reason to assume that the agencies responsible for the political and military decisions were not equally well informed. If Hitler as the solely responsible dictator did not draw the respective conclusions from such information, this may be explained by his aversion to having his preconceived plans thwarted by disagreeable statements concerning possible outside interference. The fate of this memorandum shows his way of thinking and how he skipped over realities that were unpleasant to him. In the autumn of 1940 the memorandum was submitted to Hitler, Goering, the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff Jeschonnek, and the Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, General von Waldau. The Minister of Armament Production, Dr. Todt, who was then considered very highly by Hitler, flew with the memorandum from Siebel to Hitler. His intention was to strongly endorse the theory that the war would be decided by

- 197 -

the air force. During this conference Hitler tapped the also present Chief of Air Forces Supply and Procurement, General Udet, on the shoulder and is very nice stated: "All ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ that has been written here -- it may be that the gentlemen are right -- but I have just about won the war already." Hitler issued strict orders that the memorandum not be discussed with other persons or given any publicity.

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No wonder things took their uninterrupted course in view of such a disastrous tendency toward self-deception. It is only one of the many examples of attempts made to inform Hitler on the enemy capabilities and thus also on his own situation. He disbelieved unfavorable information on principle, if such information did not fit into his pattern of thinking and if he had already made up his mind on the basis of other sources of information. An unequivocal armament policy that was geared to the enemy effort was under such circumstances not possible, since it was Hitler alone who determined the policy.

As late as 1943, at a time when the United States had already entered the war after Hitler had declared ~~XXXXXX~~ war on that country and ^{when} the air superiority of the Allies made itself felt in an oppressive manner, Hitler rejected all advice concerning measures that would have to be taken in view of the recognized American

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Verbal statement of Director Siebel made after the end of the war.

- 198 -

armament capacity. General d.F.L.G.D. (Lt.Gen., Ret.) Kammhuber made the following verbal statement on this subject on 15 March 1956: ⁵⁶

"In June 1943 I requested Hitler to triple the strength of the fighter aircraft that were to defend the Reich territory. In so doing, I mentioned Allied production figures taken from a handbook issued by the Armed Forces High Command. Hitler called Field Marshal Keitel and asked him from what source these crazy figures had been extracted. Keitel replied that the Counterintelligence had provided them. Hitler ~~XXXXXXXX~~ then said that he knew what quantities of steel, machines, etc., such an armament effort would involve. The red book issued by the Armed Forces High Command, which contained this information, was to be suppressed immediately."

"Turning to General Kammhuber Hitler continued: "If the figures were correct, I would have to stop the offensive in Russia right now (This was the German Operation ZITADELLE) and switch everything to air defense. But the figures are wrong. Now, I must defeat Russia. Once I have defeated the Soviet Union, you can get all you want for defending the Reich. But then you will not need anything any more."

A psychiatrist might draw some interesting inferences from Hitler's categorical assertion that the officially compiled information regarding American and other Allied production capacities was wrong. The fact remains that for Germany's fate

56

General Kammhuber, who now serves as Inspector of the Air Forces of the Bundeswehr with the rank of lieutenant general, was Commander of the Home Defense Flight Units in 1943.

- 199 -

these concepts of the country's head of the government were disastrous.

After the United States became an active belligerent, the American Press grew constantly more reserved. Despite this obvious reluctance to reveal military information, the German collection agencies, which continued to have access to these news media through neutral countries, were able to trace both the strength and the expansion of the United States Army Air Force. Espionage did not produce any results. Attempts to infiltrate agents into the United States via submarines or through neutral countries were limited to isolated instances and proved ineffective because almost all agents were seized by the American authorities.

The radio intercept stations, established to keep track of the aircraft transferred to Europe ever since the war started, provided complete data on all flights across the Atlantic along both aircraft transfer routes.

With regard to prisoner interrogation it has already been mentioned that the prisoners made during the first months after the arrival of American units on the European continent were very willing to make free statements, but that subsequently prisoners became increasingly reluctant to do so. Nevertheless, even during the last years of the war the interrogation of prisoners remained one of the most important sources of information concerning the United States Air Force and its air armament.

Additional sources of information were the evaluation of captured equipment, such as aircraft that had been shot down or had performed emergency landings, and photo air reconnaissance of the air bases used

- 200 -

by the American fliers. The sum total of information produced was such that the Germans were never in doubt about the existing and steadily increasing strength of the United States Air Force units that were committed against their country.

- 201 -

IX. The Cross Channel Invasion in 1944

No special intelligence effort was needed to establish that an invasion of the European continent was planned by the Allies -- by 1943 at the latest this was an open secret. The task with which all fields of intelligence collection were confronted was -- when, where, and in what strength the invaders intended to land.

For obvious reasons, the covert intelligence collection was particularly interested in obtaining the answers to these questions. The contacts established for this purpose ^{communicated} ~~XXXXX~~ mainly via neutral countries; but attempts were also made to airland agents on the British Isles in order to obtain insight into the events across the Channel. Because of the difficulties that had to be overcome and because of natural enemy efforts at secrecy and concealment, the information consisted only of bits and pieces which -- even after they had been put together -- gave only a blurred picture of the situation. This is all the more comprehensible, since many false reports -- mainly from agents who worked for both sides -- had to be taken into account. One must state in this connection that covert intelligence did not succeed in obtaining important information concerning the time and place of the Allied landings on the European continent.

Other intelligence media therefore had to be employed to supplement

- 202 -

the scanty reports from agents. First, there was the interrogation of prisoners. There again, the results were poor. The discipline observed by the Anglo-American crews in making statements has already been mentioned. Moreover, they were naturally completely ignorant of such TOP SECRET matters, to which they had no access. They, too, could provide only minute bits and pieces.

Aerial reconnaissance was more productive. Photo interpretation produced information on reinforcements at air bases, the construction of new airfields, and the shipping as well as landing craft found at ports. In the course of time, particularly in spring 1944, a certain amount of progress in the preparations for an invasion was observed in that manner. But aerial reconnaissance was equally unsuitable for obtaining information the on time and place of such an invasion. Intensified preparations in south and southeast England gave certain cues that the landings of the bulk of the forces would take place somewhere along the coast of northern France. The almost impenetrable fighter screen above England complicated air reconnaissance missions to such a degree that results were obtained only accidentally. Thus, no information could be gathered as to possible secondary landings, for instance in Norway, Denmark or perhaps along the German North Sea coast.

-203 -

Radio intercepts provided important information, particularly concerning the organizational structure, strength, and disposition of forces. The well-integrated intercept service that by then had been functioning opposite the British Isles from stations in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, northwestern Germany, Denmark, and Norway monitored every message and every ^{that} signal [^] radios operating in the British Isles transmitted. Radio operators and cryptographers were well acquainted with their tasks and were able to ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ detect the slightest change in the radio communications operations. Changes of frequency or codes introduced by the enemy presented no obstacle since they were uncovered and solved without delay. It was therefore primarily to the credit of the intercept service that already in spring 1944 -- long before the start of the invasion -- exact information on the organizational structure, strength, and disposition of the invasion forces was available. However, the most crucial information concerning the ~~Kilack~~ ^{points where} ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ [^] the landings would take place, that is to say the data that were of the greatest interest for preparing the defense, were not made available in time by the radio intercept service. Only shortly before the start of the invasion did the radio intercept service obtain the first indications in this field; they were rejected as improbable. The former Chief of the Western Section of the Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe High Command, Oberst a.D. (Col. Ret.) Kienitz, made the following statement on this subject:

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 "As Chief of the Western Section I witnessed in 1944 that

57 According to a verbal statement made to Professor Suchenwirth on 3 April 1956 (Karlsruhe Collection).

- 204 -

an important intercept made by my monitoring personnel was ignored. I had established that north of the Isle of Wight there were two enemy groups connected by radio communications, each having its own radio network. Since I knew that the Americans linked their ground forces to the tactical air force, I identified these groups as the forces assembled for the invasion. I transmitted the interpretation of this information, namely that one should not count on an invasion of the Channel coast, but rather of the coastal area which was eventually selected by the enemy for their landings. I addressed the corresponding teletype message to the Western Intelligence Branch of the Army. They replied that my interpretation was wrong. The area I had assumed as potential invasion sector did not have sufficient harbor installations for landing strong forces. The records concerning this matter were transmitted to Section Rhoden; they must still be among the papers of that agency."

This statement shows that the German Supreme Command had formed its own opinion on the probable location of the impending invasion. For lack of other information, the military leaders had based their preconceived notions on naval warfare and general staff theories. They failed to take into consideration -- partly because of their ignorance -- that the enemy might be so flexible and might have sufficient means to overcome

- 205 -

difficulties that appeared insuperable to the German General Staff and that they might land precisely at the point where they were not expected to do so. Oberst a.D. (Col., Ret.) Gottschling makes the following interesting statement on this subject:

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"Invasion 1944. On this subject Luftwaffe intercept sources report that the time and place of the invasion were recognized in such good time that the Intercept Regiment West and individual officers were given special commendations."

"In a study published in the Wahrwissenschaftliche Rundschau in 1953 entitled Die deutsche Luftwaffe während der Invasion 1944 (The German Air Force during the Invasion 1944) the following information was provided concerning the imminence of the invasion:

the evening of 59

"On 2 June certain indications pointed toward the imminent start of a major operation. Around 2100 the enemy radio broadcast sabotage instructions to the partisan units in France, the execution of which was to take place within 24 or 48 hours. Toward 2200 weather reconnaissance aircraft of the American heavy bombardment units transmitted weather reports. From 2300 onward weather reports were transmitted for the United States tactical air force units. Toward 2300 the intercept service monitored radio messages indicating the transfer of British close-support flying units into the southern area. Shortly before midnight the London radio broadcast that the invasion would begin within the

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Der deutsche Funkhorchdienst bei der Invasion (Juni 1944) - (The German Radio Intercept Service during the Invasion in June 1944), Extracts from study in the Karlsruhe Collection.

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Apparently a typographical mistake. Should probably read 5 June.

- 206 -

next 48 hours after 0000, 6 June. With all these indications coinciding, the advance message center Paris of the Radio Intercept Regiment West recommended that the subordinate intercept units maintain increased alert. After 0235 intercepted messages indicated the assembly of United States heavy bomber units north of London. Meanwhile, after 0030, airborne landings accompanied by simultaneous air bombardments took place in the area between the Seine and Orne estuaries. The area of the German Fifteenth Army headquarters -- north and northeast of the Seine -- had been put on a preliminary alert status after midnight. The same was true of the Dieppe Antiaircraft Group at 0127 and the LXXXI Army Corps at 2200. The invasion forces were on the move. Despite the abovementioned preliminary alerts, the enemy achieved surprise, and the landings succeeded from the outset."

The author of the above statement supplemented this information by answering as follows to a questionnaire:

"The fact is that the radio intercept services of all three segments of the Armed Forces had kept track of the continuous buildup of the enemy invasion forces down to almost battalion-size units. Moreover, during the night of the invasion the assembly of the heavy bombardment aviation above the British territory had been recognized in time (In those days, however, such a concentration of forces took place every night for raids on Germany). Furthermore, the British radio broadcast -- by mistake --

- 207 -

a report on the execution of the invasion in one instance (I, myself, have read the reference in a teletype message of the Armed Forces High Command, when I was in London). Despite ~~some~~ attempts at deception by parachuting (Tr.: elsewhere (?)) dummies, the airborne landings and parachute jumps on the Cotentin Peninsula were very quickly noticed; but at first no major landings were expected because:

- a. The weather conditions were distinctly unfavorable for air and naval operations:
- b. Naval experts considered the tide as unfavorable for seaborne landings; and
- c. The Armed Forces High Command had -- in contrast to the Navy -- always assumed that the invasion would take place in the Dunkerque-Calais-Dieppe area."

"For these reasons, precious time was lost. Even after the invasion forces had made full-scale landings in the Seine Bay and the operation was in full swing, the Supreme Command could not see its way to moving the major ground forces stationed in the above-mentioned Dunkerque-Calais area toward the Seine. Even at that time, the major landings proper were still expected in the Channel-coast area mentioned above. The time thus lost could never again be compensated ^{for} because the enemy air superiority that now became fully effective made movements of major ground forces extremely difficult."

- 208 -

If the intercept achievements are given special emphasis in this study, and that with full justification, one must mention after all that this collection medium was not capable of establishing the time and place of the invasion in such an irrefutable and timely manner that would have permitted to concentrate major ground forces for the defense of the actual invasion front. This would have required strict coordination of all intelligence collection media and a ^{total} concentration of effort toward the achievement of this one single purpose.

If the important messages and observations of the radio intercept agencies during the night of 5 - 6 June 1944 were not immediately utilized by the German field commanders, this would probably have to be attributed to the organizational separateness peculiar to the radio intercept service, particularly within the Luftwaffe. The main reason for this deficiency, however, was that the ~~XXXXXX~~ key military personnel and general staff officers of the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) knew too little about the capabilities of this technical agency and did not have sufficient confidence in the reliability of this source of information. They were not sufficiently indoctrinated in the utilization of this important medium of intelligence collection and they did not understand the messages it conveyed. Significant for this state of affairs is the fact that Gen. Lt. (Maj.Gen., now Lt.Gen.) Speidel does not mention one word about the important function of the radio intercept service in providing preliminary intelligence and tracing the

- 209 -

events of the night of 5 - 6 June 1944 in his book "Invasion 1944."

After the invasion got underway, the intercept service continued to be one of the most important media of intelligence collection. The other media available were primarily front-line reconnaissance and the interrogation of prisoners of war until the war ended. The Germans had failed to establish an effective espionage service in the rear of the advancing Allied armies, probably because they had not counted on such a ^{rapid development} ~~course~~ of events.

- 210 -

Chapter FourLessons and Conclusions

purpose
 The ~~XXXXXXXX~~ of the intelligence collection effort is to provide the political and military leaders with information that will enable them to make ~~XXXXXX~~ a correct estimate of the situation of their own country and of the enemy situation. In addition, in wartime the intelligence collection agencies should submit ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ an up-to-date record of the existing military situation which serves as basis for military and political decisions. -- Since a correct estimate can be made only if maximum coverage is obtained, this implies automatically the requirement that all possible sources of information be used for preparing the estimate of the situation. Although the German military leaders realized properly the value of collecting and evaluating information, they did not draw the logical conclusions from the above principles. One of the cardinal mistakes made was the dissipation of effort, which will be discussed in more detail in the following pages. Such a dissipation will occur only if a precise political concept is lacking, which in turn will result in the absence of a precise directive covering the entire intelligence service.

After Germany had been defeated in World War I, it had only few organizational and financial resources for collecting information pertaining to foreign countries. The

- 211 -

diplomatic foreign service of Germany -- in contrast to ~~XXXX~~ its counterparts in many other countries -- had no covert intelligence functions. By tradition, it was not related to any espionage service or foreign agents. The German foreign service was restricted to the traditionally proper methods of collecting information through diplomatic channels. Naturally, the governments to which the diplomats were accredited could easily control the flow of such information. The foreign service ~~XXX~~ collected no military information, let alone target information for a potential commitment of air force units. The diplomats would have refused categorically to have any dealings in such touchy matters. After 1933 this orientation remained basically unchanged. It has already been mentioned in this study that the military attaches appointed after 19³³ (Tr.: ???) had no intelligence collecting functions which could be carried out solely under cover. Wherever there were supposed to have been any deviations, these occurred upon the individual's own initiative or upon request of subordinate agencies.

The only agency ~~that was~~ concerned with collecting secret military intelligence during the years after World War I until the organization of the Armed Forces was the ^{small} Counterintelligence Branch of the Reichswehr (100,000-men Army) Ministry. It was designated Counterintelligence Branch because its primary function actually was to protect the small Reichswehr during its buildup against foreign agents and against

- 212 -

penetrations by communist and other subversive elements. The ^{pitifully} ~~miserably~~ small sums of money available to this branch were obviously insufficient for obtaining ~~XXXX~~ anything like an adequate idea of the military situation and of the new developments all over the world. The branch was therefore forcibly restricted to direct its attention to the most vulnerable points along the Reich border opposite Poland and Czechoslovakia. Shortage of funds for establishing an extensive espionage service even for covering only this field of activities limited ~~XXXXXX~~ led to the idea of obtaining an accurate picture of the intentions of these disquieting neighbors by secret air reconnaissance along and beyond their borders. This type of collecting information has proved to be the most reliable and effective method and has -- as previously mentioned -- been expanded subsequently also to other countries. This activity can be carried out only by infraction of the air sovereignty of the countries concerned, but even so it does not transcend the limitations of other secret intelligence activities. The photo ~~air~~ reconnaissance activities of the Special Squadron Rowehl produced clear and unequivocal information which proved valuable during later days not only against Poland and Czechoslovakia but also against other countries. On the basis of practical experience one may state that no power can renounce peacetime air reconnaissance to supplement the

- 213 -

other intelligence collection media. Comprehensive information on fixed military preparation for war, on the construction of routes of transportation, on the extent of the industrial mobilization, on the installation of supply facilities, etc., can be provided only by continuous air observation that leaves no gaps. All the other intelligence collection media will be capable of producing only bits and pieces, but they will constitute precious supplements to the data obtained from a photograph. The difficulties, which improvements in direction finding -- an auxiliary means of air defense -- create in carrying out peacetime air reconnaissance missions, must be compensated for by ~~making~~ systematic technical improvements in developing the models of aircraft needed for this purpose, be they crew-served or of the missile type.

restrictions

The National-Socialist state ignored the ~~limitations~~ of the Versailles Treaty also in the field of intelligence. As a result, concurrently with the activation of the new Armed Forces the secret military intelligence service was drawn up on a large scale. This task was assigned to Captain, later Admiral, Canaris, as has been pointed out previously. Canaris was certainly specially ^{suited} ~~suited~~ for this assignment. He had "a sixth sense" for obtaining information; his resourcefulness in carrying out new tasks ^{devising methods for} ~~in~~ carrying out new tasks was as remarkable as his resoluteness in transposing his ideas into action."

60

Leverkuhn, ~~Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges~~ (The Balance Sheet of World War II). (Tr.: No page number indicated.)

- 214 -

Since apparently the right person was here in the right place, the part failure of the German intelligence collection poses the question whether the organization had been adjusted to its mission. Even though one must agree that the unification of the secret military intelligence effort on an armed forces basis was right, it must seem wrong that the head of the state tolerated the creation of a number of other intelligence services in addition to this central agency. Aside from their proper tasks, these intelligence services showed a predilection for collecting military intelligence without having been assigned a special mission in this field or possessing the necessary qualifications or other prerequisites for this purpose. Thus, the ~~Staatssicherheitsdienst~~ (SD -- State Security Service) built up an intelligence service in foreign countries, which took up sizeable proportions in some instances. The foreign organization of the National-Socialist Party also considered it one of its tasks to dabble in collecting intelligence --

Goering formed the so-called Research Office of the Luftwaffe, an organization that mainly served to monitor the communications with foreign countries and the domestic telephone conversations of foreigners and foreign diplomats. This agency had -- apart from its cover designation -- no relation whatsoever with the Luftwaffe. Finally, the Foreign Ministry under Ribbentrop could not deny itself ~~of~~ the privilege of establishing its own secret intelligence organization outside diplomatic channels. Because of its shortage of funds, however,

- 215 -

the latter organization remained insignificant, but this made it no less liable to further increase the confusion created by such diversification. All these agencies carried out their activities in one and the same field, and each agency had ~~SHYXEM~~ ambitions to collect also military information and to impress Hitler with the profundity of its knowledge. As an autocrat, Hitler was inclined toward making decisions that were not based on realistic examination of available precise information originating from competent agencies. On the contrary, he wanted to see the situation as it suited his purpose. For this reason, the non-military agencies in particular were inclined to encourage this natural tendency and submit situation reports that Hitler preferred to listen to ^{rather than to} ~~over~~ the realistic facts presented by the competent military agencies.

The lesson that might be learned from this is that it is detrimental for forming an opinion on political and military problems, if several organizations collect intelligence information independently of one another within the same area without clear delineation of responsibility. To obtain a clear picture of the situation, that is neither blurred nor distorted, be it in peace or wartime, it is necessary to make one single agency responsible for the collection effort or at least to control the entire collection by one agency.

But even if there might be differences of opinion on the proper methods

- 216 -

of intelligence collection, the need for unified and centralized evaluation cannot be questioned nor can it be subject to discussion after the experiences of World War II. Quite apart from the other organizations engaged in intelligence collection, which had their own evaluation units, the evaluation of military intelligence was not assigned to producing agency -- the Counterintelligence Office of the Armed Forces High Command -- but was the function of branches that the three services had specially established for this purpose. The transmission of incoming information without evaluation and generally also without comments to those "agencies, which were unrelated to the collection of information, could produce satisfactory results only so long as the responsible personnel in the general staffs and in the counterintelligence agencies were operating as one team. This was the case in peacetime and during the first years of the war. However, as soon as frequent personnel changes occurred, this carefully tuned instrument got out of tune." ⁶¹

The general staff officers assigned to evaluation duties in the respective branches of the three services had not been trained in counterintelligence or collection methods. This was particularly true of the young officer replacements. As a result, incoming reports from agents were often wrongly evaluated. This led to wrong evaluations of the situation by individual

⁶¹ Leverkuhn, Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges (The Balance Sheet of World War II), p. 208.

- 217 -

services and -- even worse -- to different interpretations of the over-all situation among the services. Actually, each service prepared its own estimate of the situation, and the Armed Forces High Command based its decisions on a makeshift evaluation by the Counterintelligence Office.

Since furthermore the "Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces" -- Hitler -- had a preference for using other organizations, this led to a terrible confusion in forming an opinion on one's own and the enemy's situation.

The lesson that should be learned from this experience is unequivocal.

The evaluation of all intelligence ~~XXXXXXXX~~ information should be concentrated in one agency. It must be ascertained that the incoming information of all types is submitted to uniform evaluation procedures so that no detail, however unimportant it may seem, ~~XX~~ will be ignored because of insufficient awareness of background information. Such a central evaluation, analysis, and interpretation agency must be ^{solely} responsible to the chief of state, the government, and the military leaders that all sources of collecting and obtaining information have been exhausted. The agency must also be responsible for composing a factually correct picture of the situation from carefully examined and scrutinized information and for providing factually correct information for all those political and military top-level agencies, which need such information and knowledge or even an over-all estimate of the situation for the exercise of their

- 218 -

functions. The special requirements of certain political or military top-level agencies would have to be submitted to the central intelligence agency as requests, and that agency would make every effort to provide the required information. This is particularly true in the cases of target selection and analysis for the air force, during peacetime. For its usage, the air force will need other data than the army or the navy to fulfill the tasks assigned by the joint high command or the chief of state. The requirements of the other services, however, will also be different from those of the air force. On the other hand, since most information will be used by the three services, there will not be any difficulty in satisfying such special requirements.

The prerequisite for joint evaluation, interpretation, and analysis is, however, a clear ^{ly defined} and unequivocal armed forces high command ^{agency} with a joint general staff. It is necessary that all military leaders and general staff officers be ^{well} acquainted with the significance of the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and analysis of intelligence as well as with the methods of operation of this ^{intelligence} organization. Only thus will they be in a position to ^{properly} judge the value ^{or} ~~and~~ worthlessness of individual items of information and reconnaissance. The various branches of the intelligence service and the methodology of evaluation, interpretation, and analysis must be ^{explained} ~~made available~~ already to the officer candidate in a very general

- 219 -

terms
~~any~~

At the military academy for general staff officer candidates this branch of the service must be dealt with in detail. This is particularly true of the intelligence service of higher headquarters, which in wartime have to take care ^{of} not only their own limited tasks but also have to contribute to the over-all intelligence effort. In this connection one might mention the exemplary work done by the intelligence officer of X Air Corps in the Mediterranean area. And especially in this context it seems significant to point out the importance of the radio monitoring and direction-finding service. Many troop and general staff officers in World War II had no idea of the potentialities of the latter two services. The officers of all three services should be fully acquainted with these two media -- they must know how to use them, as they use bread for their daily meals. The more a future war will be a war of the air waves, the more the knowledge of this branch will become part of the daily routine of higher, intermediate, and also lower headquarters. Obviously, radio monitoring agencies will be integrated into the organizational structure of every command. It cannot be admitted that these important sources of information become separate organizational entities -- such as the radio monitoring service of the Luftwaffe in World War II -- and that it be left to the personal initiative of individual commanders and headquarters to produce interesting results.

- 220 -

A very important problem is the choice of key personnel; this concerns not only the selection of the head of the organization but also the composition of the top-level and subordinate intelligence agencies. Since modern warfare is not only a war of soldiers and weapons ^{but} also a war involving ~~the~~ economic potential and ideologies, it seems ineffective to put the military solely in charge of the over-all conduct of the war and above all of the intelligence collection, evaluation, interpretation, and analysis effort. In wartime all top-level command staffs should be led and staffed by the best available ^{and} also from the political, scientific, technical, and economic spheres. Within the framework of the draft laws these personalities must be put under a peacetime obligation -- instead of participating in military exercises -- to make their knowledge fully available at any time in the position they would have to occupy during wartime. It is obviously wrong to make outstanding economists and technicians, excellent experts on foreign countries of interest to the war effort, ~~XXXX~~ who know these countries' political structure, economy, etc., ~~peel potatoes~~, to use plain language. The German intelligence could have produced better results if it had taken such ideas into consideration. The mechanics, the organizational structure, its integration into the over-all framework of the command -- these are all important matters, but far more important is that the

- 221 -

~~right men at the right places.~~

There have been some suggestions and initial steps toward centralization of the intelligence effort in Germany. The previously mentioned Study BLAU, which was concerned with operations against Great Britain and contained information for such an eventuality, produced shortly before the war, was for instance a composite effort of all military, technical, economic, and other civilian agencies. Since these agencies were the best qualified to provide contributions for such a study, this was the best ever produced in the field of intelligence evaluation, interpretation, and analysis.

During the course of the war, the Chief of the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff suggested that evaluation be concentrated within one single armed forces agency; the Counterintelligence Office of the Armed Forces High Command also made plenty of suggestions for more appropriate solutions. But all these remained without result because the supreme command agency lacked ~~any~~ proper understanding or -- what seems more probable -- because there was a lack of confidence in such an armed forces agency, the chief objection being that it would not function as desired.

The corresponding orders were therefore never issued. Hitler preferred to obtain his information from a variety of sources, and in so doing he selected the version he liked best. The unification of the intelligence collection of the Armed Forces High Command and the Staat-Sicherheitsdienst (SD -- State Security Service), which was carried out as of 1 May 1944, under the Chief of the

- 222 -

SD was not the type of solution suggested in this context. Rather it was a reversal of a meaningful organization, since the collection of information, that is to say the secret military intelligence service, was put under the tutelage of the police.

One of the basic principles learned from the course of World War II was that the intelligence service -- collection as well as evaluation, interpretation, and analysis -- must be given steadily increasing importance in the conduct of operations in the age of global warfare. For the employment of air force and for a war with intercontinental missiles the entire structure of all potential enemy countries has to be studied in greatest detail. Any neglect in this sphere will have the consequence that the first decisive blows fail to hit their targets -- a mistake which cannot subsequently be corrected.

Finally, a properly conceived intelligence service is not only a preparation for the employment of weapons in wartime but also a peacetime means of checking one's own position and on occasion a means of reminding oneself not to take a threat of war too seriously. If Hitler had properly used and taken into serious consideration the information produced by the military intelligence service -- this is what a correct analysis of a careful evaluation of the enemy situation and his potentialities deserves -- he could not possibly have ^{made} ~~taken~~ the political and in wartime military

- 223 -

decisions that he actually made. His inclination toward ignoring the information from military intelligence sources or even toward declaring them absolutely wrong and interpreting them in such a manner that they suited his intentions, finally led to many wrong decisions that in turn brought about the defeat and loss of the war. His totally wrong decisions in the field of air armament and the employment of the air force as a tactical support force of the ground troops may be attributed to this factor. If he had properly considered the information from the various intelligence sources, he would not have felt tempted toward a military adventure at a time when the German Armed Forces were still in the midst of their buildup. As the most powerful and most effective element of a modern military force, the Luftwaffe should never have been organized only as tactical auxiliary arm with limited industrial and ~~MANPOWER~~ manpower resources for its future development. Hitler should have taken into account the information on developments in foreign countries and should have provided the production and operational facilities from the outset so that the Luftwaffe would have had the means to maintain its superiority over all potential adversaries. Naturally, Hitler alone was not at fault -- his accomplices are all those who knew the situation abroad and were aware of these developments and who did not have the courage to express their opinions with the necessary

- 224 -

emphasis; nobody can relieve them of this responsibility.

In concluding one must state that it proved to be a fatal mistake to stop or neglect the intelligence effort vis-a-vis certain countries -- allies not to be ~~XXX~~ excluded -- because of political considerations.

The neglect and temporary stoppage of the intelligence collection effort in Great Britain and the United States and the interdiction to carry out collection activities in Italy led to disastrous misconclusions that could not possibly be corrected during the war.

Modern warfare is not entirely fought by armies -- it is a struggle between nations and ideologies and perhaps a struggle between entire continents. All resources enter into the struggle and are used to defeat the enemy and to survive. The basic prerequisites for this struggle are created in peacetime by appropriate developments in armaments and by protective measures suited to safeguard one's own peoples and resources.

The necessary proportions ^{will} correspond to the effort made by the potential adversaries ~~availabilities~~. Only a universal intelligence service without gaps can ~~XXXXXXXX~~ provide satisfactory coverage. The intelligence service therefore assumes even in peacetime a decisive role in winning any future war or -- if one wants to say so -- in preventing such a war.